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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis consists of three papers that investigate firms’ management of innovation and 
precautionary cash holdings.  
The first paper examines innovation efforts and abilities of firms at different stages in the 
lifecycle. The study exploits unique firm data on investments and sales related to innovation from six 
waves of the Swiss Innovation Survey between 1996 and 2011. Using firm age to identify established 
firms, I find that established firms, compared to young firms, invest less in innovation and are less 
efficient in producing innovation output within the firm. By contrast, established firms are more efficient 
in using knowledge from outside the firm (e.g., from suppliers, competitors, universities) to produce 
innovation output. These results largely do not depend on whether the innovation output is incremental or 
radical in nature. These findings suggest that young and established firms differ in the allocation and 
productivity of innovation resources. 
The second paper examines the importance of the precautionary motive relative to other motives 
as a determinant of corporate cash holdings. According to the precautionary motive, firms facing future 
financing constraints hold cash to ensure that they can make investments or meet obligations. I develop an 
index that includes the precautionary information of six popular firm-level measures: cash flows, cash 
flow volatility, R&D intensity, market-to-book, net working capital and product market competition. The 
index explains 32% of the variation in corporate cash holdings and increases to 41% when using the debt 
and equity constraint indices of Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) as additional precautionary measures. As 
the predominant cash determinant, the precautionary motive is particularly strong for firms that face 
greater opportunity costs of disclosing proprietary information. This finding is consistent with the notion 
that these firms are more reliant on precautionary cash to protect proprietary information that they 
otherwise have to disclose to investors to reduce equity constraints. 
The third paper investigates whether the debt or equity capital supply shock of the recent financial 
crisis (2007-2009) caused firms to use precautionary cash holdings to mitigate underinvestment. I find that 
precautionary cash was used to substitute for the decline in net equity issuance but not net debt issuance. I 
also find that precautionary cash was used by equity- but not debt-constrained firms to mitigate 
underinvestment during the crisis. Consistently, precautionary cash was not used in the absence of the 
equity supply shock, i.e., during placebo crises or during the economy-wide demand shock following the 
financial crisis. This paper provides new evidence on the importance of corporate liquidity management 
for equity-constrained firms and identifies the crisis’ equity capital supply shock as a dominant first-order 
effect on corporate financial policies. 
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I. Firm innovation: a lifecycle perspective 
 
 
 
Stefan Aebischer* 
June 2016 
 
 
This paper examines innovation efforts and abilities of firms 
at different stages in the lifecycle. The study exploits unique 
firm data on investments and sales related to innovation from 
six waves of the Swiss Innovation Survey between 1996 and 
2011. Using firm age to identify established firms, I find that 
established firms, compared to young firms, invest less in 
innovation and are less efficient in producing innovation 
output within the firm. By contrast, established firms are more 
efficient in using knowledge from outside the firm (e.g., from 
suppliers, competitors, universities) to produce innovation 
output. These results largely do not depend on whether the 
innovation output is incremental or radical in nature. These 
findings suggest that young and established firms differ in the 
allocation and productivity of innovation resources. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation drives economic and productivity growth, and understanding the 
characteristics of firms that successfully conduct innovation activities is thus important. 
Moreover, innovation comes in many shapes and sizes (e.g., product versus process and radical 
versus incremental) and can originate inside or outside a firm’s boundaries. 
Although no recipe for successful innovation exists, a growing body of literature 
concludes that firms at different stages of their lifecycle show different efforts and abilities to 
generate innovations. In line with theoretical arguments, young and established firms differ in 
their efforts and abilities to pursue innovation primarily because, over time, firms accumulate 
knowledge and competences that enable them to efficiently manage existing assets (e.g., 
facilities, product lines, clients and relationships with additional stakeholders). In this process, 
firms increasingly organize themselves by establishing appropriate operational and organizational 
structures and routines. On the one hand, these structures (and routines) weaken established 
firms’ efforts and abilities to undertake exploration activities aimed at producing radical 
innovation, i.e., innovation that results in new products that potentially disrupt existing markets. 
On the other hand, these structures increase their efforts and abilities to undertake exploitation 
activities aimed at producing incremental innovation, i.e., innovation activities that improve 
existing product lines or processes (Arrow (1962), Henderson and Clark (1990), March (1991), 
Henderson (1993), Stein (1997), Loderer, Stulz and Wälchli (2016)). Moreover, as they have 
accumulated knowledge, established firms have developed abilities that increase their efficiency 
in using knowledge from the outside to produce innovations (Cohen and Levinthal (1989)). 
This paper seeks to empirically test these theoretical predictions that young and 
established firms differ in their efforts and abilities to engage in innovation. The paper thus 
examines inputs and outputs in the firm innovation process. Studying inputs such as innovation 
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activity expenses enables me to test whether young and established firms differ in their efforts to 
pursue (incremental versus radical) innovations. Studying outputs relative to their inputs 
facilitates an investigation of whether young and established firms differ in their abilities to 
produce (incremental versus radical) innovations. 
More specifically, the paper studies the innovation process of young and established firms 
from three perspectives. First, it analyzes the process from the input perspective and explores 
whether young firms engage more in exploration activities and whether established firms engage 
more in exploitation activities.1 Second, this paper analyzes the process from the performance 
perspective and examines whether young firms are more efficient in producing radical innovation 
outputs and whether established firms are more efficient in producing incremental innovation 
outputs.2 Third, this work analyzes the process from the external knowledge perspective and 
examines whether established firms are more efficient than young firms in using external 
knowledge to produce innovation outputs. 
To study the innovation process from these three perspectives, I use unique data from six 
waves of the Swiss Innovation Survey between 1996 and 2011. The data source is a repeated 
cross-sectional sampling of listed and unlisted Swiss firms in the manufacturing and service 
sector. These data have distinct advantages relative to datasets used by other empirical studies 
that investigate innovation in the context of the firm lifecycle. First, the data facilitate the study 
of innovation in diverse firms and industries, whereas other datasets are limited to certain 
industries (e.g., Henderson (1993); Prusa and Schmitz (1994)), to industries with patentable 
                                                 
1
 Following the literature, the terms innovation inputs, innovation activities, and innovation efforts are used 
interchangeably, as are innovation performance, R&D productivity and innovativeness. 
2
 On the side of innovation input, firms are asked to indicate the amount of CHF invested in R&D activities 
(exploration), refinement activities and implementation activities (the latter two are exploitation). Refinements 
describe significant adoptions of existing or newly developed products that extend beyond R&D activities. On the 
side of innovation output, firms are asked to indicate the proportion of sales attributed to remarkably improved 
products (incremental), products that are new to the firm and products that are new to the market (radical). See 
section  2.2 for a more detailed discussion and the appendix for a definition of these measures. 
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inventions (e.g., Akcigit and Kerr (2015); Balasubramanian and Lee (2008)), to the 
manufacturing sector (e.g., Foster, Grim and Zolas (2013); Kastl, Martimort and Piccolo (2013)) 
or to listed firms (e.g., Loderer et al. (2016)). Second, the dataset contains some unique 
information regarding innovation efforts and outputs that other datasets do not. For example, it 
contains quantitative and qualitative information on firm efforts associated with exploration 
versus exploitation activities.3 Third, my output measures, i.e., sales related to innovations, are 
likely superior to patents in measuring the economic rents generated by an innovation. Acs and 
Audretsch (1987) note that patents are a “notoriously weak measure” of innovation because many 
never bear fruit and some are used simply to impede the innovations of others. This observation 
may be particularly relevant in a lifecycle study such as this one, as established firms have an 
incentive to patent to prevent other firms from entering the market, although these patents may 
never yield economic rents (see Etro (2004)). Fourth, the data allow me to control for many 
factors that could confound the relationships among my lifecycle measure, foundation age, and 
innovation. One prominent factor is firm size, as lifecycle dynamics of many innovation-related 
models are driven by the fact that older firms are typically larger and not necessarily by the fact 
that they have been active for a longer time period (see Akcigit and Kerr (2015); Klette and 
Kortum (2004)). Finally, using Swiss data is suitable for studying firm innovation because 
Switzerland is the world’s leading country in innovation according to the Global Innovation 
Index of 2015.4 
                                                 
3
 Most similar information on firms’ innovation efforts is used by Mansfield (1981) and Cohen and Klepper (1996). 
In a more general way, these studies distinguish expenses (patents) associated with product (treated as radical) 
versus process (treated as incremental) innovations.  
4
 The popular Global Innovation Index is co-published by Cornell University, INSEAD, and the Word Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). For further information on ranking details and methodology, see 
http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=GII-Home. Switzerland ranks among the top five 
countries (ranks in parentheses) in terms of gross expenditure on R&D performed by business enterprises as a 
percentage of GDP (5), innovation output (2), and university-industry research collaboration (3). 
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In line with the three innovation perspectives, the empirical analyses proceed in three 
parts. The first part examines innovation efforts (inputs) and investigates whether young and 
established firms differ in their exploration and exploitation activities. The results indicate that, 
relative to young firms, established firms invest significantly less in R&D (exploration) and 
refinement activities and invest equally in implementation activities (the latter two together 
constitute exploitation). The main differences emerge in the first 30 years of a firm’s existence. 
The input results are partly inconsistent with the theoretical predictions, as established firms also 
engage less in exploitation activities that aim to produce incremental innovations, such as the 
improvement of existing products. A possible explanation is that routines and accumulated 
knowledge enable established firms to be more efficient in these exploitation activities. Among 
other things, this possibility will be investigated in the second part of the analysis. 
The second part considers innovation performance and examines whether young and 
established firms differ in how efficiently they produce incremental and radical innovations. The 
results show that established firms produce both less incremental (significantly improved 
products) and radical (new-to-market products) innovation outputs for a given level of innovation 
inputs. On average, the main decline in innovation performance occurs between 20 and 40 years 
of a firm’s existence, which occurs approximately 10 years after the decline in a firm’s 
innovation efforts. Further analysis reveals that both R&D and refinement activities lead to lower 
innovation outputs in established firms than in young firms. Together, the results provide novel 
evidence that established firms are less innovative than young firms are in terms of both 
innovation inputs and innovation outputs. The reduction in innovativeness over the course of the 
firm’s lifecycle occurs because established firms exist for a longer time, not because they are 
larger in size. 
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The third part examines whether young and established firms differ in terms of their 
efficiency in using external knowledge to produce innovations. To do so, I build a measure of 
how important innovation knowledge from external sources is (e.g., customers, suppliers, 
consultant, universities) to firm innovations. The results show that, as firms grow older, they 
become more efficient in using external knowledge to produce innovations. Thus, by using 
external knowledge, established firms can reduce the observed difference in innovativeness 
relative to young firms. This evidence is consistent with the theory from Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989) that firms accumulate innovation-related knowledge over time (absorptive capacities), 
which enables them to efficiently screen and exploit external knowledge to produce innovations. 
Overall, the results show that, during the first 30 years of the lifecycle, firms’ innovation 
efforts and abilities change significantly. More specifically, relative to its younger counterparts, 
firms that have been operating for more than 30 years invest less in innovations and are less 
efficient in producing innovations within the firm; however, they are more efficient in using 
external knowledge to produce innovations. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that, as firms grow older, they establish organizational structures and routines that stifle 
innovation within the firm, on the one hand, and they build up absorptive capacities that foster 
the efficient use of external knowledge to produce innovations, on the other hand. Furthermore, 
the findings provide evidence that, in terms of innovation, firms undergo significant changes 
when they are young (fewer than 30 years in operation) and then enter into a sort of “innovation 
steady state” when they are established. 
The findings of the paper contribute to several strands in the literature on innovation. 
First, this work contributes to a growing number of endogenous innovation and growth models of 
the innovativeness of young and established (incumbent) firms (Acemoglu and Cao (2015); 
Akcigit and Kerr (2015); Klette and Kortum (2004)). One key implication of these models is that 
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differences in firm innovativeness emerge because of size differences between young and 
established firms rather than because of age differences. My results are inconsistent with these 
predictions because firm age rather than firm size is the main variable that drives firm 
innovativeness. These results are in line with theories that predict that older firms are 
organizationally more rigid and, hence, less innovative (e.g., Henderson (1993); Holmstrom 
(1989); March (1991)). 
Second, this work relates to papers that test specific differences in the innovativeness of 
young and established firms. On the input side, Kastl et al. (2013) and Foster et al. (2013) find 
that R&D expenses decline as firm age increases. The present study adds to these studies by 
showing that both explorative R&D activities and exploitative refinement activities decline as 
firm age increases. 
On the output side, Bernstein (2015) and Loderer et al. (2016) find that, as listed firms 
grow older, their effort and abilities to produce radical innovation decline. Furthermore, Kueng, 
Yang and Hong (2014) examine a representative sample of Canadian firms and find that the 
likelihood to produce process (incremental) and product (radical) innovation is decreasing with 
firm age. My paper extends these studies by showing that, in a sample of listed and unlisted 
firms, the efficiency in producing both incremental and radical product innovations is decreasing 
with firm age. 
Third, more generally, I contribute to a better understanding of how firms use external 
knowledge to produce innovations. This study uses firm age as a measure of a firm’s ability to 
use external knowledge (absorptive capacities) and finds that a firm’s abilities to use external 
knowledge to produce innovation increase as firm age increases. This novel evidence is in line 
with the theory of absorptive capacities of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who claim that firms 
need time to learn and build a stock of knowledge on how best to exploit external knowledge to 
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produce innovation. Evidence from various case studies shows that firms increasingly recognize 
the importance of external knowledge in producing innovation, also referred to as “open 
innovation” (e.g., Chesbrough (2003); Cockburn and Henderson (1998)). An illustrative example 
is Holcim, one of the world’s leading building material companies that recognizes open 
innovation as a key factor in its innovation success.5 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main data and 
testing strategies. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
This section describes the survey data and the sample construction. It also presents the main 
measures and regression frameworks to analyze the innovation process of young and established 
firms. 
 
 Sample construction and survey method 2.1.
The firm-level data used in this paper are obtained from the 2nd to 7th Innovation Survey by 
the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) at ETH Zurich. The surveys were conducted in 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 with a sample of Swiss manufacturing and service firms with at least 
five employees. The triennial panel ends in 2011 because the KOF conducted a subsequent 
                                                 
5
 Extract from the 2013 annual report of the Swiss corporation Holcim: “Open Innovation is an essential factor for 
innovation success, as innovation happens at intersections. This is why Holcim has always sought out innovative 
partners willing to challenge the status quo. Combining the knowledge of the materials manufacturing processes 
with other expertise of selected partners allows to constantly provide better solutions for the changing demands. 
Holcim works closely with research institutes and equipment and technology suppliers. A partner network of 
leading universities such as ETH Zurich and MIT Boston enables Holcim to stay at the pulse of new 
developments and to transfer basic research insights into practical offerings for customers. Solutions are 
increasingly demanded in a faster way – another reason for working jointly with customers and partners. Open 
Innovation is strengthening Holcim’s ability to deliver fast and smart solutions.” 
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survey in 2013 based on a different questionnaire that resembled the European Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). 
The sample is stratified by 27 three-digit (NACE) industries from the Swiss business 
census and, within each industry, by three firm-size classes. Within each of the 81 (27×3) 
industry-size strata, an equal number of firms is randomly chosen, except for the largest size 
class, which is surveyed in full. The sampling procedure leads firms from smaller industries and 
larger firms to be overrepresented relative to the population of firms from the Swiss business 
census. The surveys collect, among other data, information on firm innovation inputs and outputs, 
firm characteristics and the market environment. 
Responses were received from 1,537 firms in 1996 (response rate of 33.5%), 1,470 firms in 
1999 (33.8%), 1,938 firms in 2002 (39.6%), 2,555 firms in 2005 (38.7%), 2,172 firms in 2008 
(33.8%), and 2,363 firms (35.9%) in 2011. The pooled dataset from 1996 to 2011 comprises 
12,035 firm-year observations. I refine the sample by excluding the following firms: (i) those 
with missing data on sales, firm age and competition and (ii) those that are younger than three 
years old. The latter sample restriction helps alleviate concerns that start-up firms are driving the 
results. Furthermore, my investigation is restricted to innovation-active firms, which are 
identified by their answer to a question regarding whether they have been actively engaged in 
product or process innovations within the previous three years. The final sample consists of 4,657 
firm-year observations of innovation-active firms; 2,648 observations are from firms that disclose 
their innovation expenditures, and 2,009 observations are from firms that do not disclose 
innovation expenditures. In some regression specifications, I control for possible sample selection 
biases using a Heckman selection model and missing information dummies (see section 3.2.3). 
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According to Weisberg (2005), empirical results from survey-based research might be 
biased for three prominent reasons: survey administration issues, measurement error, and non-
representativeness. Below, I briefly discuss why these issues should not affect my results. 
Survey administration: The KOF undertook remarkable efforts to reduce the possibility of 
data bias due to survey administration issues. For example, (1) the surveys are mailed during the 
same month in each survey year; (2) the questionnaire design is the same across survey waves 
and follows the established recommendations and definitions of the OECD Frascati (2002) and 
Oslo (2005) manuals; (3) the data are entered electronically, and all entries are double-checked 
manually; and (4) wrong or implausible answers to individual questions are treated as missing. 
Furthermore, both the survey administrators and external authors confirm the high 
methodological standards and strong validity of the data (see Keupp and Gassmann (2013) and 
the references therein). 
Measurement errors: Using a survey of self-reported firm data might raise concerns that 
firms potentially over- or understate their innovation activities and success. According to 
Mairesse and Mohnen (2010), bias is likely in subjective answers and scarcely observable 
measures in which the respondent’s judgment and knowledge matter. The authors state that 
innovation output measures from innovation surveys are more likely to suffer from such biases 
than innovation input measures are. For several reasons, I do not believe that measurement errors 
are systematically biasing my results. First, respondents are guaranteed anonymity, and they 
know that their answers will have no effect on them or their firms. Second, prior research shows 
that measures of innovation reported in the CIS are highly correlated with other observable 
measures of innovation outputs, such as patents in the same firms (e.g., Hall and Mairesse 
(2006)). Third, pure measurement error in the dependent variable would primarily bias the results 
if it were systematically related to the main variable of interest, namely, firm age. As a robustness 
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check, the exclusion of start-up firms (<8 years of firm existence) from the sample does not alter 
the baseline results and, thus, alleviates concerns that young firms possibly overstating their 
innovation efforts or outputs bias the results. 
Representativeness: As discussed above, the sample selection leads firms from smaller 
industries and larger firms to be overrepresented in my sample. For instance, the statistics for 
total employees (Table 2) shows that the firms in my sample are larger than those in the Swiss 
business census of 2008. While the average Swiss firm employs 11 employees, the average firm 
in my sample has an average of 234 employees. The firms in my sample are therefore larger and 
probably “more successful” than the representative Swiss firm. Determining the impact of this 
potential selection issue is difficult. Nevertheless, the baseline results are not altered by the 
exclusion of the top firm-size class (strata) or of firms from smaller industries. This alleviates 
concerns that the overrepresentation of larger firms or those from smaller industries could drive 
the results. Possible selection biases stemming from item non-responses in the questionnaire are 
addressed in the empirical section. 
As in all survey-based research, this study cannot completely avoid all potential sources of 
bias. However, I believe that the careful survey administration and data analysis has helped limit 
potential problems. 
 
 Variable definitions and measures 2.2.
By analyzing the innovation process from the three perspectives, I use measures that 
require some explanation, namely, those associated with innovation inputs, innovation outputs 
and the firm’s use of external innovation knowledge. 
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2.2.1. Measures of innovation input 
The traditional measures of innovation input (effort) are R&D expenses or patents. These 
measures have known limitations that may also bias the results of an empirical lifecycle analysis 
like mine. R&D measures only the initial input in the innovation process, capturing creative and 
explorative activities. However, it does not measure firms’ innovative efforts that are devoted to 
more informal (occurring outside of R&D labs) or exploitative activities, such as the adaptation 
of existing products and technologies and their implementation in the marketplace (e.g., Lerner 
and Seru (2015); Mairesse and Mohnen (2010)). In that sense, Kleinknecht (1987) provides 
evidence that R&D from large archival data underestimates firms’ innovation activities, and this 
underestimation is likely to be more pronounced for small (and presumably young) firms. 
Patents are commonly used to measure an invention’s degree of novelty. However, patents 
measure only successful inventions and neglect the efforts and resources needed to create an 
invention (Griliches (1990)). Moreover, because established firms are more incentivized to use 
patents for preemptive purposes, patents may overestimate innovation efforts of established firms 
relative to those of young firms (Etro (2004)). 
Addressing the limitations of these traditional measures, this study analyzes firm expenses 
for both types of innovation activities: exploration and exploitation. Following March (1991), (1) 
R&D expenses are treated as explorative, whereas (2) expenses for the refinement of existing 
products and (3) expenses for the implementation of innovations are understood as exploitative. 
Refinement activities are adaptations of new and existing products beyond R&D activities. 
Implementation includes activities that are associated with the introduction of an innovation in 
the marketplace, such as pilot projects and market tests, licensing, the patenting of own 
inventions, the introduction of process innovations and the training of employees.  
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These activities also follow the logic of the innovation process, which typically begins with 
R&D activities, proceeds with refinement activities and ends with the implementation of the 
innovation in the marketplace. Relative to more incremental innovations, radical innovations are 
known to require more innovation expenses, especially for R&D activities. 
Each of the three expense (effort) measures is defined as the sum of expenses over the past 
three years standardized by current sales, and it is thus defined as an intensity measure. 
 
2.2.2. Measures of innovation output 
To explore how efficient young and established firms are in producing innovation outputs 
that are associated with different degrees of novelty, I follow the literature and distinguish 
between three types of product innovation: incremental, mediocre, and radical (e.g., Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2002); Schneider and Veugelers (2010)). First, firms can innovate incrementally by 
introducing a significantly improved version of an existing product or service. Second, firms can 
imitate competitors’ products or produce close substitutes that are still new from the firm’s 
perspective. Third, firms can innovate more radically by introducing products that are new to the 
market, thereby enabling a market leadership role. In this study, the main focus will be on 
incremental and radical innovations. 
Accordingly, this study uses three innovation output variables, which are defined as a 
firm’s share of sales resulting from improved, new-to-firm, and new-to-market products. Because 
only questionnaires from 2005 onward distinguish between new-to-firm and new-to-market 
products, related investigations are based only on the 2005, 2008 and 2011 surveys. 
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2.2.3. Measure of external knowledge 
To test whether established firms are more effective in using external knowledge to 
produce innovation, this study defines a measure of how important knowledge from external 
sources actually is for a firm’s innovation process. In the questionnaire, firms rated the 
importance of knowledge from eight external sources for their innovations on a five-point scale, 
ranging from unimportant (1) to crucial (5). The external sources are clients, material suppliers, 
software suppliers, competitors, universities and other higher education institutions, government 
or private research institutions, consultants, and technology transfer offices. To generate a firm-
specific measure of the importance of external knowledge, I aggregate these answers by summing 
the scores for each of these questions and rescale the total score to a number between 1 and 5. A 
value of 1 (5) means that external knowledge is not relevant (crucial) to a firm’s innovation 
process (this approach is borrowed from Cassiman and Veugelers (2002)). 
Figure 1 graphically summarizes the descriptions in the section  2.2. 
 
 Model estimation 2.3.
To empirically investigate the innovation process of young and established firms from the 
three perspectives, I define two main regression specifications that are borrowed from the models 
developed by Cohen and Klepper (1996) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2002). In the first part of the 
analysis, I seek to document possible differences in the innovation efforts of young and 
established firms. To this end, I use the following econometric baseline specification: 
it it it j t itInput a b Age gX u= + × + + η + δ + , (1) 
where i denotes the firm and t denotes time. Inputit represents the different innovation effort 
measures introduced in section  2.2.1, and equation (1) is estimated separately for each effort 
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measure. The main coefficient of interest (b) is for a measure that distinguishes young from 
established firms. For identification purposes, I use a firm’s foundation age, defined as the 
difference in the current year and the year of a firm’s foundation (e.g., Haltiwanger, Jarmin and 
Miranda (2013); Kastl et al. (2013)). Because I use age as a proxy for the inflexibility of a firm’s 
organizational structures and routines, two situations speak in favor of using foundation age over 
incorporation age. First, a firm can run its operations and undergo organizational changes before 
its legal incorporation. Second, incorporation age can be reset to one if a firm changes its legal 
form, reincorporates in a different state, or undergoes corporate restructuring (e.g., a statutory 
consolidation), but organizational structures and routines are typically not reset in such events. In 
both situations, using incorporation age might lead to an underestimation of organizational 
structures and routines.6 
Following the hypothesis that young firms engage more in exploration activities and 
established firms engage more in exploitation activities, the age coefficient should be positive 
when R&D expenses are the dependent variable and negative when refinement and 
implementation expenses are the dependent variables.  
Following the literature, Xit is a vector of standard control variables (e.g., Cohen and 
Klepper (1996); Kastl et al. (2013); Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)), including firm size, five 
dummy variables that measure the strength of perceived competition, and two dummy variables 
that identify firms that have export activities and that are owned by a foreign company. Firm size, 
measured by the natural logarithm of sales, reflects access to finance, scale economies and the 
number of product lines (see also Akcigit and Kerr (2015)). I also include value added per 
employee, which is used as a proxy for the firm’s productivity or distance from the technological 
                                                 
6
 An argument that speaks against the use of foundation age is that, before its legal incorporation, a firm might not be 
operatively active and thus is not building formal organizational structures and routines. Incorporation age is not 
available in the used dataset. 
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frontier in other studies (see Acemoglu and Cao (2015); Kastl et al. (2013)). Finally, all 
regressions include industry- (ηj) and time- (t) fixed effects to capture the average effect in an 
industry and macro effects in a given year, respectively.7 
In the second and third part of the analysis, I seek to document efficiency differences 
(abilities) between young and established firms in transforming innovation inputs into innovation 
outputs. This study relies on the regression framework of Mairesse and Mohnen (2002), in which 
the production of innovation follows the logic of a standard production function: 
it it it it it it it t j itOutput a b Age c Input d K e Age K f X u= + × + × + × + × × + × + δ + η + , (2) 
where innovation outputs (Outputit) result from innovation inputs, such as innovation 
expenditures (Inputit), firm characteristics and other contextual variables. Again, the main 
variable of interest is firm age (Ageit), which is used to determine whether a firm’s abilities to 
turn innovation inputs into innovation outputs is increasing or decreasing with age.8 Equation (2) 
is estimated separately for the different innovation output measures, ranging from incremental to 
radical. Relative to other studies, this refers to a test of the innovativeness (e.g., Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2002)), innovation performance (e.g., Mairesse and Mohnen (2010)) or R&D 
productivity (e.g., Seru (2014)) of firms of different ages. 
Outputit is the proportion of sales from innovative products that have been introduced 
within the last three years (see section  2.2.2), and Inputit represents innovation expenditures, i.e., 
the sum of expenses associated with exploration and exploitation activities (see section  2.2.1). 
Again, I include a vector of controls (Xit) that is also used in equation (1). The correction for size 
                                                 
7
 The baseline results are robust to the inclusion of a human capital index, which is defined as the fraction of 
employees with tertiary education (not shown). However, its inclusion may cause a mechanical relationship 
because innovation expenditures may largely consist of expenditures on wages of workers with tertiary education 
(see Kastl et al. (2013)). 
8
 Please note that firm age is defined as the natural logarithm of a firm’s foundation age. Similar results are obtained 
when age is defined alternatively as industry-adjusted age or standardized age (age minus the industry mean 
divided by the standard deviation). 
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also takes into account that young firms, which typically have a lower sales base, find it easier to 
obtain higher scores for innovative outcomes. The results are similar when the total number of 
employees is used as a measure of firm size. The estimations again control for industry- (ηj) and 
time- (t) fixed effects. 
To analyze the innovation process from the external knowledge perspective, I also include a 
variable (Kit) that measures the importance of external knowledge to a firm’s innovation process, 
as introduced in section  2.2.3. The main coefficient estimate of interest is the interaction term 
between this variable and firm age (Ageit × Kit). In line with the prediction that established firms 
are better able to use external knowledge to produce innovations, I expect to find a positive and 
significant coefficient estimate (e). 
To accurately cope with the different scale levels and distributional characteristics of the 
dependent variables in the regression specifications, this study uses different econometric 
estimation techniques. Most of the innovation input measures are extremely left-skewed with a 
non-trivial fraction of zeros. Therefore, I use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimation of regression 1 (Foster et al. (2013)), but the results are similar if ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or Tobit models are used. Furthermore, my innovation output variables are 
fraction data that take values between zero and one.9 Therefore, I estimate a generalized linear 
model (GLM) with a logit link, a binomial distribution family and robust standard errors, 
following Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
Given the sampling procedure and the long time lag between the surveys (three years), only 
33% of the firms are present in more than one survey, which limits my ability to exploit the panel 
feature of the data. 
                                                 
9
 Previous studies have estimated Tobit-censored regression models (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers (2006)) or have 
performed a logit transformation of the variable and used OLS (e.g., Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)). However, 
both approaches have well-known limitations (see Baum (2008); Ramalho, Ramalho and Murteira (2011)). 
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3. Empirical results 
In these section, the following predictions from the theoretical literature (e.g., Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989); Henderson and Clark (1990); Henderson (1993); Loderer, Stulz and Wälchli 
(2016)) are tested: As firms grow older, organizational structures and routines associated with 
existing assets decrease (increase) their efforts and abilities to produce radical (incremental) 
innovation. Furthermore, by growing older, firms build up a stock of knowledge that increases 
the efficient use of external knowledge to produce innovations. 
 
 Descriptive statistics 3.1.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables from 1996 to 2011 that are also 
entered into the baseline regressions. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the appendix. 
Except for binary variables, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to prevent 
any influence of extreme outliers.  
Panel A summarizes information about innovation outputs, which are measured as the 
proportion of sales attributed to different types of innovations that have been introduced within 
the last three years. On average, 15% and 18% of the firms’ sales are attributed to significantly 
improved and new products, respectively. The 32% figure for average innovative sales (attributed 
to significantly improved or new products) suggests that the average sample firm renews its 
product lines every nine years, assuming uniform renewal across its product lines. The proportion 
of sales from new-to-market products is 13%, based on the short sample period from 2005 to 
2011. A significant number of firms have introduced innovations but do not disclose innovation 
expenditures (N = 2009); consequently, they are not entered into the baseline regressions. The 
descriptive statistics suggest that innovation output is almost the same for firms that disclose 
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innovation expenditures (32%) and those that do not disclose innovation expenditures (33%). The 
latter subsample is further analyzed in the section on robustness checks. 
Panel B presents the distribution properties of the reported innovation input measures, 
which consist of expenses for exploration and exploitation activities within the last three years. 
On average, within the last three recent years, firms spent approximately 5% on innovation 
activities relative to their current revenues, consisting of equal parts of exploration (2.1%) and 
exploitation (2.6% = 1.2% + 1.4%) expenses. Dividing innovation expenditures by three years 
leads to annual innovation expenditures (relative to sales) of approximately 1.6%. The magnitude 
of the innovation input and output measures are comparable to the ones in Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006), who use data from the Belgian Innovation Survey. 
Finally, panel C summarizes the firm characteristics that typically covary with firms’ 
innovation inputs and outputs. The main variable of interest, firm foundation age, shows a mean 
value of 57 years, and the distribution is right-skewed (see also Figure 2). Following previous 
discussions, in this study, young and established firms are identified by whether a firm was 
founded fewer or more than 30 years ago. Accordingly, approximately 30% of the observations 
consist of young firms, and approximately 70% consist of established firms. The mean value of 
foundation age in this study is greater than those in other studies, e.g., 36 years in Schneider and 
Veugelers (2010) and 31 years in Kastl et al. (2013). Another Swiss study based on a different set 
of survey data shows a comparable foundation age with a mean value of 51 years (Waelchli and 
Zeller (2013)). The authors further note that, in Switzerland, a firm’s foundation age is, on 
average, 20 years greater than its incorporation age (see section  2.3 for a discussion of possible 
reasons). As noted above, because of the stratified sample selection, my sample is also tilted 
toward larger firms. The average firm has 236 employees and sales of CHF 78 million. As in this 
study, the sample in Kastl et al. (2013) is also selected based on size- and industry-strata, and 
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their sample firms show comparable mean values in terms of size, i.e., 358 employees and sales 
of EUR 27.1 million.10 Moreover, relative to the results of other studies, the value added per 
employee is high at CHF 145,900. Moreover, 16% of firms are owned by a foreign firm, and 75% 
of firms conduct export activities. 
Table 2 reports correlation coefficients for innovation output and input measures and other 
important firm characteristics. Largely consistent with theoretical arguments and existing 
empirical evidence, innovation outputs are positively related to innovation inputs and exporting 
activities and negatively related to firm age (e.g., Aw, Roberts and Xu (2008); Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2002); Schneider and Veugelers (2010)). Furthermore, for innovation inputs, the 
negative age coefficients decrease in magnitude the more exploitative an innovation activity is 
(see the age coefficients in columns 6 to 8). The negative input-age coefficients reveal that 
established firms engage in fewer exploration and exploitation activities. The negative output-age 
coefficients indicate that older firms have lower innovation outputs. Finally, the two firm size 
measures, sales and the total number of employees, are unrelated to the innovation input and 
output measures. This notable finding indicates that neither the input nor the output results are 
driven by small (and presumably young) firms with lower sales or smaller employee bases. 
Because firm size is an important determinant of innovation in firm lifecycle models, the 
innovation–sales relationship will be addressed in the subsequent multivariate regression 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Their monetary variables are expressed in 2003 prices, and the exchange rate in 2003 was, on average, CHF/EUR 
1.52. 
 21 
 Multivariate regression results 3.2.
This section documents the empirical results from the multivariate analysis from the three 
perspectives of the innovation process. First, it investigates whether young firms differ from 
established firms in their exploration versus exploitation efforts. Second, the section analyzes 
whether these firms differ in their efficiency (performance) in producing incremental versus 
radical innovations. Third, this section examines whether these firms differ in their abilities to use 
external knowledge to produce innovations. 
 
3.2.1. Innovation input results 
The first set of empirical tests is used to investigate whether firms of different ages differ in 
their innovation efforts. Table 3 presents the results from regressions of innovation effort 
(expense) measures on firm age. The measures are standardized alternatively by firm sales and 
total number of employees. The latter standardization ensures that the results are not driven by 
young firms that have no or low sales. The inclusion of firm sales as a control variable and the 
exclusion of observations of firms younger than 3 years further alleviate this concern. 
The results in column 1 and 2 show that established firms spend significantly less for 
innovation activities than their younger counterparts do. To explore the functional form of the 
relation between innovation expenditures and firm age, I estimate specification 1 by using age 
dummies that cover 10 years each (not shown) and using non-parametric kernel regressions 
(Figure 3). The results indicate that most of the differences in innovation expenditures occur at 
early lifecycle stages, i.e., in the first 30 years of a firm’s existence. As an illustration of 
magnitudes, innovation expenditures (relative to sales) are 4.4%, 3.6% and 3.4% for firms that 
are 9 (5th percentile), 27 (25th percentile) and 49 (50th percentile) years old. Thus, on average, a 9-
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year-old firm invests approximately 20% more in innovation activities than a 27-year-old firm 
does. The results related to firm age are similar when innovation expenditures are standardized by 
the number of employees or are not standardized at all, following Kastl et al. (2013).11 
The finding that established firms show relatively lower innovation expenditures raises the 
question of whether they spend less for exploration or exploitation activities. The results in 
column 3 to 8 shed light on this question. Established firms spend less for both R&D and 
refinement activities. Therefore, these firms seem to engage less in activities to explore new 
opportunities and activities to improve existing opportunities. As refinement activities are defined 
as the refinement of existing and new products, in regression 5 and 6, I also control for R&D 
expenditures that aim to generate new products. The negative age coefficient remains significant, 
which indicates that the refinement of existing products is actually declining with firm age (not 
shown). With regard to implementation expenditures, young and established firms do not differ. 
Hence, firms of different ages have a similar focus on activities associated with the 
implementation of innovations in the marketplace. 
The coefficient estimates associated with the control variables provide further interesting 
insights into the determinants of innovation input intensity. The coefficient estimates associated 
with firm size provide rather inconclusive results. Larger firms seem to invest less in innovation 
activities per unit of sales, but they invest more per unit of employees. These results underscore 
the inconclusive evidence from studies on the relationship between firm size and R&D intensity 
(innovation inputs). The relationship is U-shaped in Bound, Cummins, Griliches, Hall and Jaffe 
(1984); not significant in Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987); and negative in Acs and Audretsch 
(1988) and Akcigit and Kerr (2015). Furthermore, the positive and highly significant coefficients 
of the export dummy indicate that exporting firms invest more in innovation activities, which is 
                                                 
11
 Please note that R&D expenditures in the paper of Kastl et al. (2013) and the innovation expenditures in this paper 
are defined similarly. 
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in line with the evidence of Aw et al. (2008). This finding is consistent with arguments that larger 
export markets provide higher returns on R&D investments. 
The negative R&D-age relationship raises an additional question on whether the lower 
R&D expenditures of established firms can be attributed to their lower engagement in research or 
development activities. The questionnaire does not distinguish between expenditures for research 
versus development activities, but it does include qualitative items related to this issue. In 
particular, firms rated how much of their innovation expenditures are allocated to either in-house 
research or development on five-point scales, ranging from none (1) to very much (5), 
separately.12 Using this information, I create dummy variables that represent whether a firm has a 
strong (values of 4 and 5) or weak focus on research activities and development activities. 
Table 4 shows the results from logit regressions of these measures of research versus 
development focus on firm age and the other determinants in equation (1). The coefficient 
estimates suggest that the previously documented lower R&D expenditures of established firms 
primarily stem from lower engagement in research activities but not in development activities. 
Accordingly, established firms are less focused on generating basic innovation knowledge from 
research activities. Consistent with this result, also the size of the R&D lab, measured as the 
proportion of R&D employees among all employees, significantly decreases with firm age (not 
tabulated). Furthermore, the results show that larger firms focus more on both research and 
development activities, which is consistent with the results in Table 3 that R&D expenditures (per 
employee) are increasing with firm size.  
Overall, the results from the input analysis indicate that established firms spend less on 
exploration and exploitation activities than young firms do. Established firms’ relatively lower 
                                                 
12
 In the survey, research activities are defined as basic and applied research activities with possible applications. 
Development activities are defined as the use of existing scientific knowledge to produce new or improved 
products and processes. See also the appendix for variable definitions. 
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expenditures on exploration primarily stem from their lower engagement in research rather than 
development activities. These results are only partly consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
The main inconsistency stems from the fact that established firms are also less involved in 
exploitation activities, such as refinement and implementation. A possible explanation is that 
established firms engage less in exploitation activities because they are more efficient in 
producing incremental innovations. This possibility will be investigated in the subsequent output 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2. Innovation performance results 
In this section, I test the predictions that young firms are more efficient in producing radical 
innovations and that established firms are more efficient in producing incremental innovations. 
To do so, I present regressions using the specification in equation (2). Additionally, an interaction 
term for firm age and innovation expenditures is included. In such a specification, the age 
coefficient is interpreted as the differences in innovation outputs for firms of different ages, 
holding firms’ innovation inputs (including innovation expenditures) fixed. Moreover, the 
interaction term makes it possible to test whether one CHF of innovation expenditures leads to 
higher or lower CHFs in sales from innovations in firms of different ages. 
Table 5 shows the performance results for innovation outputs with different degrees of 
novelty. The coefficient estimates associated with firm age suggest that young firms are more 
efficient in producing innovations. This finding holds for all innovation types, but the effect is 
stronger for radical innovations (i.e., new-to-market products) than for incremental innovation 
(i.e., significantly improved products). By analogy to the input analysis, I estimate non-
parametric kernel regressions to illustrate the functional form of innovation performance and firm 
age. Figure 4 shows that most of the decline in innovation performance emerges from age 20 to 
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age 40. In terms of the firm’s lifecycle, this decline happens approximately 10 years after the 
decline in innovation efforts. 
The coefficient estimates associated with “innovation expenditures” and the interaction 
term (Firm age × innovation expenditures) reveal further insights into possible efficiency 
differences in the innovation activities of firms of different ages. The estimates suggest that 
innovation expenditures significantly contribute to sales related to the different innovation types. 
Established firms, however, are less able to transform one CHF of innovation expenditures into 
sales related to new-to-market products (column 5). No such differences are observable for 
improved products or for new-to-firm products (see columns 1 and 4). The significant results in 
column 2 and 3 emerge because the innovation output measure includes new-to-market products.  
The overall effect of firm age on innovation performance is economically meaningful. A 
change in firm age from 9 years (5th percentile) to 49 years (50th percentile) lowers the output 
from 18.6% to 16.1% for incremental innovations and from 15.0% to 10.5% for radical 
innovations, at means of all other variables.13 This result corresponds to declines of 13 and 30 
percentage points in firms’ incremental and radical innovation outputs, respectively. 
With regard to firm size, another key determinant of innovation throughout the firm 
lifecycle, the results are not significant. Neither incremental nor radical innovation outputs are 
significantly related firm size. This result is inconsistent with the theory and evidence of Akcigit 
and Kerr (2015), who find that larger (and presumably older) firms with a larger operative basis 
should be at a relative advantage in producing incremental innovations and at a relative 
disadvantage in producing radical innovations. 
Additional checks show that the results are robust to the following changes (not tabulated). 
First, the main coefficient estimates remain significant when the dependent variables are 
                                                 
13
 Please note that, in GLM models, the economic effect cannot directly deduced from coefficient estimates. The 
economic effects of the age coefficients are calculated by using the margin command in STATA. 
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truncated at levels of 0.7 and 0.5, respectively. Thus, the results are not driven by “outliers” in the 
dependent variables. Second, the largest size strata, as defined by the KOF, is excluded because 
these firms are overrepresented. The documented effects are even stronger in the reduced sample. 
Third, following Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), the model is 
augmented with four additional determinants of innovation output, such as a dummy for 
continuous R&D, a dummy for collaborative R&D, and measures of financial and technical 
obstacles for innovations.14 Although the number of observations is significantly reduced 
(N = 1,462 in specification 1), the main coefficient estimates remain statistically significant. 
Finally, to obtain a better understanding of which innovation activities are performed less 
efficiently in established firms, this study regresses innovation outputs on the different expenses 
for exploration and exploitation activities. Table 6 shows the results. In columns 1 and 2, the 
interaction terms with firm age indicate that R&D and refinement activities lead to significantly 
lower innovation output in established firms. The results in columns 3 to 6 suggest that these 
inefficiencies stem from established firms’ lower efficiency in translating refinement activities 
into incremental innovations (columns 3 and 4) and in translating R&D activities into radical 
innovations (columns 5 and 6). No such differences can be documented for implementation 
activities (interaction term not shown). Finally, the highly significant coefficient estimates 
associated with R&D expenditures in all regressions indicates that R&D activities play a 
significant role for all types of innovation outputs. This does not apply to refinement and 
implementation activities. 
Overall, the comparison of young and established firms’ innovation efforts and 
performance reveals the following results: Firms’ innovation efforts are declining with firm age, 
                                                 
14
 The dummies are equal to one if a firm does R&D on a continuous basis and collaborates in R&D with other firms, 
respectively; and zero otherwise. The measures on financial and technological obstacles (5-point Likert scale) 
indicate by how much a firm’s innovation is hampered by financial and technological constraints, respectively 
(see Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006)). 
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primarily concentrated in the first 30 years of firm existence. The decline is primarily attributed 
to decreasing engagement in research activities and refinement activities. On the output side of 
innovation, a firm’s innovation performance is declining with firm age for both incremental and 
radical innovations. The efficiency drop occurs from 20 to 40 years of firm existence and hence 
starts 10 years after the drop in innovation efforts. A possible explanation for these patterns is 
that decreasing innovation efforts in established firms reduce their capabilities to produce 
innovations. This parallel decline of efforts and efficiency in these activities makes it difficult to 
argue that the decline in innovation efforts is an inefficient decision by established firms. 
The results support the notion that, as firms grow older, they establish organizational 
structures and routines that significantly stifle innovation efforts and abilities. To a great extent, 
the results are also consistent with those of other empirical studies that investigate innovation 
performance in the context of the firm’s lifecycle (e.g., Akcigit and Kerr (2015); Sauermann 
(2013); Sørensen and Stuart (2000)). The main differences in the findings emerge in the area of 
incremental innovations. Using patents, these studies demonstrate that established firms are more 
engaged or more efficient in producing incremental innovations. By contrast, using investment 
and sales figures, I find that established firms invest less in incremental innovations and draw 
lower economic rents from incremental innovations. Extending these studies, I also assess 
different activities along the innovation process in terms of efficiency and find relative 
inefficiencies in established firms’ exploration activities and in some of their exploitation 
activities. 
 
3.2.3. Robustness checks: selection-corrected and industry analysis 
In this section, I examine whether the construction of my sample may drive the baseline 
results. Two main issues are considered. First, I test whether the selection of innovation-active 
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firms with non-missing innovation expenditure information produces biased results. Second, 
most empirical studies in the literature analyze innovation in manufacturing firms. Because my 
sample also includes service firms, I test whether age-related effects on innovation in service 
firms differ from the effects on innovation in manufacturing firms. 
As noted, the baseline regression results are based on observations of innovation-active 
firms with non-missing information on innovation expenditures. This selection procedure may 
result in a non-random sample and cause bias in the coefficients in the baseline regressions. To 
assess whether selection produces biased results, I apply a two-stage Heckman (1979) selection 
procedure. The first stage in the procedure models a firm’s decision to engage in innovation 
(innovation: yes/no) with a probit model that regresses the indicator variable on the common 
innovation determinants and an instrument introduced by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). The 
instrument is a three-digit industry average of a variable that measures the extent to which firms’ 
innovation activities are hampered by market regulations. The instrument should be valid because 
regulation-induced costs are expected to be fixed and should thus exclusively affect a firm’s 
decision to engage in innovation but not its decision regarding innovation intensity. The second 
stage in the procedure is the performance regression, which now includes a selection correction 
term, the Mills ratio. 
Moreover, concerns about bias in the baseline results may arise because a non-random 
selection of firms with missing information on innovation expenditures is excluded from the 
analysis. To alleviate these concerns, I replace the missing innovation expenditures with zero and 
include an indicator variable that takes a value of one if innovation expenditures are missing for a 
firm and zero otherwise (see also Seru (2014)). If the main results are not biased by that type of 
selection, the inclusion of observations with missing innovation expenditures should not alter the 
age-related coefficients. 
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Panel A of Table 7 shows the results from the Heckman analyses accounting for possible 
sample selection bias. The results in columns 1–3 demonstrate that the regression results are not 
biased because of the selection of innovation-active firms. The first-stage selection equation 
indicates that the likelihood of engaging in innovation is significantly related to a firm’s age, its 
size and the regulation of the market environment (column 1). Supporting the evidence of 
Criscuolo, Nicolaou and Salter (2012) and Kueng et al. (2014), the results show that younger and 
larger firms are more likely to engage in innovation. Because the inverse Mills ratio is 
statistically insignificant, there is no evidence of selection bias (column 2). Likewise, the age 
coefficients in the performance regression are not statistically and economically different from an 
OLS estimation that does not account for selection bias (column 3). 
The results in columns 4 and 5 show that the selection resulting from the exclusion of firms 
with missing innovation expenditures does not bias the baseline results. The age coefficients in 
the sample of firms with missing innovation expenditures (column 4) and in the entire sample 
(column 5) are not statistically and economically different from those in Table 5, column 1.15 In 
sum, the selection of innovation-active firms that disclose innovation expenditures does not cause 
the baseline results to be biased. This also applies to other regression specifications in which the 
dependent variables are related to other innovation types (e.g., improved products or new-to-
market products). 
A second area of interest is whether the documented age effects differ in service firms 
compared with manufacturing firms, as many empirical innovation studies solely focus on 
manufacturing firms. Following Criscuolo et al. (2012) (and the literature cited therein), the 
nature and conditions of innovation in services are substantially different from those in 
manufacturing. More specifically, service innovations are typically more difficult to protect via 
                                                 
15
 I obtain similar results in specification 5 when using the previously presented two-stage Heckman selection 
procedure. 
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intellectual property rights, require less capital, and require a higher degree of interactivity 
between producers and consumers. These conditions typically increase the relative advantage of 
young firms in producing innovation. For example, if a young bank wants to launch an innovative 
investment product, it does not have to fear that preemptive patenting by established competitors 
or financial constraints hamper the development and success of the innovation. Moreover, it can 
flexibly customize the product. Typically, these conditions do not apply to a young 
pharmaceutical firm that wants to launch a new drug. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results from innovation performance regressions for 
subsamples of manufacturing versus service firms.16 Consistent with the previous prediction, the 
negative age effects on firm innovation performance are significantly stronger in service firms 
than in manufacturing firms. This especially applies to radical innovations (columns 8 and 9). In 
economic terms, a change in firm age from 9 years (5th percentile in the pooled distribution) to 49 
years (50th percentile in the pooled distribution) reduces the radical innovation output from 12.0% 
to 9.1% in manufacturing firms (column 8) and from 18.1% to 10.3% in service firms 
(column 9). 
In contrast to the performance results, no differences in the age effect between 
manufacturing and service firms are observable in the innovation effort regressions (same as in 
Table 3). Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the industry differences in the innovation-age 
relation is beyond the scope of this study and deserves further analysis. 
Taken together, the results from robustness checks demonstrate that the selection of 
innovation-active firms that disclose their innovation expenditures does not bias the baseline 
results. The results further indicate that the decline in innovation performance over the firm 
                                                 
16
 The most important service industries in my sample are retail trade, wholesale trade, hotels and catering, finance 
and insurance, transportation, telecommunications, real estate, computer services, business services and personal 
services. 
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lifecycle is stronger in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. In the subsequent 
section, firm innovation is examined from the third perspective: the external knowledge 
perspective. 
 
3.2.4. Firm age, external knowledge and innovation performance 
Thus far, my results show that established firms exhibit lower innovation performance than 
young firms. In particular, young firms’ innovation outputs exceed those of established firms, 
holding their innovation inputs fixed. I have thus far disregarded the hypothesis that a firm can 
benefit from innovation inputs that come from outside the firm. In line with Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989), experience and knowledge from past innovation activities (absorptive capacities) increase 
a firm’s efficiency in using external knowledge to generate further innovations. Because 
established firms have time to accumulate absorptive capacities, they should be more efficient in 
using external knowledge to produce further innovations. 
In the subsequent analysis, I test this prediction and use firm age as a proxy for a firm’s 
absorptive capacities. Existing studies use other proxies, such as a firm’s current R&D intensity 
(Cohen and Levinthal (1989)), the existence of R&D departments (Cassiman and Veugelers 
2002) or investments in scientific and technical training (Mowery and Oxley 1995). As an 
empirical proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity, firm age is superior to the other empirical 
measures for the following reasons. First, it is intuitively more in line with the logic of 
knowledge accumulation over time. Second, several observers argue that firm age is a key 
determinant of knowledge accumulation (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal (1990); Henderson (1993); 
Sørensen and Stuart (2000)). Third, because firm age is outside a firm’s control, it is less likely to 
suffer from endogeneity. 
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Table 8 presents the corresponding regression results, focusing on the variable measuring 
the importance of external knowledge for a firm’s innovation (see section  2.3) and also on its 
interaction with firm age. I measure firm age as a continuous variable (as before) and as a dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm is older than 25 years in the survey year and zero otherwise.17 
Additionally, it is worth noting that use of external innovation knowledge is not related to firm 
age; hence, established firms do not rely more on external knowledge than their younger 
counterparts do. 
The results show that established firms are indeed more efficient in using external 
knowledge to produce innovations, independent of the novelty of those innovations. The 
interaction terms in columns 1 and 2 show that firm age fosters a firm’s ability to use external 
knowledge to produce innovations. If the regression model in column 2 is used to predict the 
sales of young and established firms resulting from innovation depending on the importance of 
external knowledge (at the mean of all other controls), the results are as follows: Moving from 
the 25th to 75th percentile of the external knowledge distribution increases sales from innovation 
from 33.8% to 34.2% in young firms and from 28.0% to 32.0% in established firms (older than 
25 years). Thus, established firms can significantly reduce the innovation gap of 6 percentage 
points (33.8% - 28.0%) to 2 percentage points (34.2% - 32.0%) when relying more heavily on 
external innovation knowledge. 
The results in columns 3 to 6 indicate that established firms are more effective in using 
external knowledge to produce both incremental and radical innovations. Thus, in using external 
knowledge, established firms can reduce the performance gap to young firms with regard to 
incremental and radical innovations. For instance, in regression model 6, a move from the 25th to 
                                                 
17
 The most significant results are derived for a cutoff point of 25 years among alternative cutoff points within the 
first 40 years of firm existence. Thus, the cutoff point is motivated by an empirical search process rather than by a 
theoretical prediction. 
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75th percentile of the external knowledge distribution increases sales from radical innovation 
from 10.4% to 13.6% in established firms (older than 25 years) while they remain unchanged at 
15.1% in young firms. This corresponds to a decline of the innovation gap from 4.7 percentage 
points (15.1% - 10.4%) to 1.5 percentage points (15.1% - 13.6%). 
This evidence is consistent with the theory of Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and the 
arguments presented by Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson (1993) that established 
firms possess information-processing routines that facilitate innovation. More generally, the 
evidence contributes to a growing literature and a number of case studies that emphasize the 
importance of external knowledge for successful firm innovation (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers 
(2002); Cassiman and Veugelers (2006); Chesbrough (2003)). 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper provides novel evidence of the differences between young and established firms 
in terms of their innovation efforts and abilities. The results are based on a unique dataset from 
the Swiss Innovation Survey and an investigation of the innovation process of young and 
established firms from the input, performance and external knowledge perspectives. Established 
firms, which are identified as firms that have existed for longer than 30 years, differ from their 
younger counterparts in terms of the following innovation perspectives: From the input 
perspective, established firms engage less in both exploration and exploitation activities. From 
the performance perspective, established firms are consistently less efficient in producing 
incremental and radical innovations. From the external knowledge perspective, established firms 
are more efficient in using external knowledge to produce incremental and radical innovations. 
In general, the results support the hypothesis that, as firms grow older, they establish 
organization structures and routines that stifle the internal development of innovations. Moreover, 
 34 
the results are also in line with the hypothesis that firms accumulate knowledge over time 
(absorptive capacities), which helps them more efficiently use external knowledge to produce 
innovations. However, the results are at odds with arguments and evidence from other studies 
that established firms show greater efforts and abilities to produce incremental innovations. 
Possible explanations for the divergence in empirical results are that most comparable studies 
cannot distinguish inputs that aim to produce incremental versus radical innovations and that such 
studies use patents as innovation outputs. Following Acs and Audretsch (1987) and Etro (2004), 
patents are likely to overestimate the innovation success of established firms because they are 
more incentivized to produce patents for preemptive reasons that may never yield (directly 
observable) economic rents. Further research is needed to further elucidate this issue. 
The paper provides a better understanding of the innovation efforts and abilities of firms at 
different lifecycle stages. Nevertheless, several interesting issues remain unresolved, thereby 
offering potentially fruitful avenues for further research. First, the data do not enable an 
examination of the dynamic effects of young and established firms’ innovation behaviors. For 
example, this study could not investigate the effects of an innovation’s introduction on the firm’s 
or its competitors’ economic profits. One could investigate these issues using a comparable 
dataset with a better panel structure. Second, I argue that differences in young and established 
firms’ innovation abilities stem from differences in their organizational structures and routines. 
However, because of data limitations, I do not identify the actual underlying drivers of 
differences between young and established firms’ innovation abilities (e.g., management 
practices, corporate governance, changes in ownership or organizational structure). Inquiring this 
information from Swiss firms in the Innovation Survey could reveal why young and established 
firms actually differ in their innovation abilities. Third, I provide evidence that established firms 
can close the innovation gap relative to their younger counterparts by using external innovation 
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knowledge. It would be interesting to analyze whether young and established firms’ innovations 
also benefit differently from other external innovation activities, such as R&D collaborations 
(Cassiman and Veugelers (2006)), R&D outsourcing or firm acquisitions. Finally, the results 
indicate that the negative effect of age on innovation performance is stronger in service than in 
manufacturing firms. Further analysis is necessary for a careful assessment of this difference. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition   
 
Panel A: Innovation output variables (sales fraction attributed to…) 
Improved products Percentage of firms’ sales generated by remarkably improved products that have been introduced 
over the previous three years. 
New products Percentage of firms’ sales generated by new products that have been introduced over the previous 
three years. 
New-to-firm products Percentage of firms’ sales generated by new-to-firm products that have been introduced over the 
previous three years. 
New-to-market products Percentage of firms’ sales generated by new-to-market products (market novelties) that have been 
introduced over the previous three years. 
  
 
Panel B: Innovation input variables 
Innovation expenditures  Innovation expenditures (sum of R&D, refinement and implementation expenditures) of the 
previous three years divided by sales at the time of the survey (Size).  
R&D expenditures Research and development expenditures (basic and applied research and development activities) of 
the previous three years divided by sales at the time of the survey (Size). 
Refinement expenditures Refinement expenditures (e.g., additional refinements of newly developed and existing products 
beyond R&D activities) of the previous three years divided by sales at the time of the survey 
(Size). 
Implementation 
expenditures 
Implementation expenditures (e.g., pilot project, market tests, implementation costs, certification, 
licensing costs, employee training) of the previous three years divided by sales at the time of the 
survey (Size). 
High research focus Binary variable based on an ordinal variable ranging from “none” (value 1) to “very high” (value 
5) on a 5-point scale; firm’s assessment of innovation expenditures devoted to research activities 
for product innovations. The binary variable equals 1 for values of 4 and 5 and equals 0 for values 
less than 4. 
High development focus Binary variable based on an ordinal variable ranging from “none” (value 1) to “very high” (value 
5) on a 5-point scale; firm’s assessment of innovation expenditures devoted to development 
activities for product innovations. The binary variable equals 1 for values of 4 and 5 and equals 0 
for values less than 4. 
External knowledge Mean of eight ordinal variables ranging from “unimportant” (value 1) to “crucial” (value 5) on a 5-
point scale; importance of 1) clients, 2) material suppliers, 3) software suppliers, 4) competitors, 5) 
universities or other higher education institutions, 6) government or private research institutions, 
7) consultants, and 8) technology transfer offices as innovation knowledge providers. 
  
 
Panel D: Firm age and firm-level controls 
Firm age Natural logarithm of foundation age, computed as the difference between the survey year and the 
firm’s foundation year plus one.  
Firm size Natural logarithm of firm sales in the last full year before the survey. 
Value added per employee Natural logarithm of value added, computed as sales less the cost of materials, expenditures on 
plant machinery and other fixed assets, and expenditures on buildings. Both this measure and 
employment refer to the last year-end before the survey. 
Human capital index Fraction of employees with tertiary-level education 
Competition  Five dummy variables identifying the number of competitors declared by the firm (≤ 5, 6–10, 11–
15, 16–50, < 50 competitors) 
Foreign-owned firm Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a foreign conglomerate and equal to 0 otherwise 
Exporting firm Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm exhibits export activities in the survey year and equal to 0 
otherwise 
Market regulation Average industry (three-digit level) score of the importance of Swiss market regulations to hamper 
firms' innovation activities. The original variable is an ordinary variable ranging from "very low" 
(value 1) to "very high" (value 5). 
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Figure 1: The innovation process. This figure summarizes the innovation process. Within a firm, the 
process starts with explorative R&D activities and ends with exploitative implementation activities 
(Perspective 1). Innovation outputs result from innovation inputs: Radical (incremental) innovation 
outputs require relatively more explorative (exploitative) innovation inputs (Perspective 2). Innovation 
outputs also result from external innovation knowledge (Perspective 3). 
 
 
 
R&D activities 
Exploration Exploitation 
Innovation inputs 
Refinement 
activities 
 Implementation 
activities 
New-to-market 
products 
New-to-firm 
products 
Improved 
products 
Radical innovation Incremental innovation 
Innovation outputs 
Knowledge from 
outside the firm 
Within firm 
  
Perspective 1 
Perspective 2 Perspective 3 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics. Detailed information on the sample construction can be found in section 
2.1. Variable definitions are in the appendix. The sample includes observations from the KOF surveys in 1996, 
1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. The “long” and “short” subscripts indicate whether the innovation output 
variable is based on data from 1996 to 2011 or 2005 to 2011, respectively. 
Variable Mean Std. Min p25 p50 p75 Max N 
 
Panel A: Innovation outputs (sales fraction attributed to...) 
Improved products (incremental) long 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.25 0.90 2701 
New products long 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.90 2701 
New-to-firm products (mediocre)
 short 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.85 1394 
New-to-market products (radical)
 short 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.80 1394 
Improved or new products long 0.32 0.27 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2879 
Improved or new products (firms with 
missing innovation expenditures)
 long 
0.33 0.28 0.01 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2009 
         
 
Panel B: Innovation inputs 
Innovation expenditures 0.049 0.074 0.000 0.007 0.022 0.060 0.520 2879 
   R&D expenditures 0.021 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.286 2879 
   Refinement expenditures 0.012 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.161 2879 
   Implementation expenditures 0.014 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.190 2879 
External knowledge 2.57 0.62 1.00 2.10 2.55 3.00 4.85 2654 
         
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Firm age 57 40 4 28 49 82 177 2879 
Firm size (in millions of CHF) 78.1 210 0.4 6.5 20 56.7 1,800 2879 
Total number of employees 232 1,154 5 28 75 183 39,899 2879 
Value added per employee (in TCHF) 146 72 41 108 138 187 821 2879 
Dummy foreign-owned 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2879 
Dummy export 0.73 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2879 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Firm age distribution 
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Table 2: Spearman partial rank order correlations 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Improved products (1) 1.00 
              
New products (2) 0.07 1.00 
             
New-to-market product (3) 0.76* 0.70* 1.00 
            
Improved or new products (1) + (2) (4) 0.72* 0.75* 0.66* 1.00 
           
Innovation expenditures (5) + (6) + (7) (5) 0.17* 0.22* 0.26* 0.26* 1.00 
          
   R&D expenditures (6) 0.17* 0.20* 0.29* 0.25* 0.84* 1.00 
         
   Refinement expenditures (7) 0.15* 0.15* 0.17* 0.20* 0.64* 0.41* 1.00 
        
   Implementation expenditures (8) 0.09* 0.13* 0.08 0.14* 0.61* 0.24* 0.23* 1.00 
       
External knowledge (9) 0.05 0.09* 0.11 0.09* 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 1.00 
      
Firm age (10) -0.10* -0.10* -0.13* -0.14* -0.14* -0.15* -0.10* -0.04 0.09* 1.00 
     
Value added per employee (11) 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.05 1.00 
    
Firm size (12) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.29* 0.14* 0.16* 1.00 
   
Total number of employees (13) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.08* 0.06 0.55* 1.00 
  
Foreign-owned firm (14) 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.21* 0.13* -0.08* 0.06 0.01 1.00 
 
Exporting firm (15) 0.12* 0.13* 0.17* 0.17* 0.16* 0.18* 0.14* 0.06 0.07 0.15* 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.14* 1.00 
Comment: The symbol * indicates statistical significance when testing against the null hypothesis that the correlation is zero with a confidence level of 0.95. 
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Table 3: Firm age and investments in innovation activities 
The table presents the results from regressions that test the effect of firm age and size on various innovation expenditure components. The dependent variables are 
defined as ln(1+Innovation exp./Sales) in regression (1), as ln(1+R&D exp./Sales) in regression (3), as ln(1+Refinement exp./Sales) in regression (5) and as 
ln(1+Implementation exp./Sales) in regression (7). In even-numbered columns, the innovation expenditure components are standardized by the total number of 
employees. Regressions in odd-numbered columns are pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimations and include industry-year fixed effects, and standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level (see Foster et al. 2013). Regressions in even-numbered columns are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations and include industry-year 
fixed effects with Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation at the firm level (see Kastl et al. 2013). The symbols ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample includes observations from surveys in 
1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
   Exploration  Exploitation 
Dependent variable: Innovation exp./   R&D exp./   Refinement exp./   Implementation exp./ 
 
Sales Employees 
 
Sales Employees 
 
Sales Employees 
 
Sales Employees 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Firm age -0.111*** -0.127*** 
 
-0.125*** -0.149* 
 
-0.169*** -0.144* 
 
-0.045 -0.054    
 
(0.036)    (0.043) 
 
(0.046) (0.082) 
 
(0.048) (0.081) 
 
(0.048) (0.069)    
Firm size -0.091*** 0.005 
 
-0.087*** 0.166*** 
 
-0.066** 0.107** 
 
-0.112*** 0.066   
 
(0.021)    (0.025) 
 
(0.028) (0.045) 
 
(0.028) (0.044) 
 
(0.026) (0.041)    
ln(Value added per employee) -0.077    0.736*** 
 
-0.151* 0.556*** 
 
-0.164** 0.340** 
 
-0.050 0.703*** 
 
(0.078)    (0.084) 
 
(0.087) (0.142) 
 
(0.088) (0.155) 
 
(0.091) (0.137)    
Foreign-owned firm -0.053    -0.228** 
 
0.046 -0.164 
 
-0.087 -0.473*** 
 
-0.227** -0.533*** 
 
(0.074)    (0.095) 
 
(0.093) (0.161) 
 
(0.097) (0.174) 
 
(0.097) (0.163)    
Exporting firm 0.260*** 0.533*** 
 
0.474*** 1.005*** 
 
0.372*** 0.713*** 
 
0.089 0.121    
 
(0.075)    (0.094) 
 
(0.117) (0.178) 
 
(0.117) (0.170) 
 
(0.093) (0.145)    
Constant -0.809    -0.261 
 
-1.447 -3.197** 
 
-1.516 -0.533 
 
-1.611 -2.985**  
  (0.895)    (0.928) 
 
(1.105) (1.631) 
 
(1.040) (1.765) 
 
(1.055) (1.555)    
Competition dummies yes yes   yes yes   yes yes   yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 2826 2826 
 
2826 2826 
 
2826 2826 
 
2826 2826 
Adjusted R2 0.220        0.258     0.162     0.098   
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Table 4: Firm age and research vs. development focus 
The table presents the results from regressions that test the effect of firm age on the focus on 
research and development activities. The dependent variables are dummy variables based on a 
firm's assessment (on a 5-point scale) of the magnitude of innovation expenditures devoted to 
research or development activities. The variables equal 1 for values of 4 (high) and 5 (very 
high) and equal 0 for values less than 4. All logit estimations include standard control 
variables (value added per employee, competition dummies and a foreign-owned firm 
dummy) and industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with 
confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample includes observations 
from surveys in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
 
High research focus High development focus 
  (1) (2) 
Firm age -0.307*** -0.049 
 
(0.089) (0.067) 
Firm size 0.197*** 0.257*** 
 
(0.061) (0.038) 
ln(Value added per employee) -0.056 0.012 
 
(0.191) (0.124) 
Exporting firm 0.413* 0.654*** 
 
(0.221) (0.138) 
Constant -4.058** -4.888*** 
 
(2.329) (1.421) 
Further controls yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Observations 2578 2578 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.144 
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Table 5: Firm age and innovation performance 
The table presents the results from regressions that test the effect of firm age on innovation performance for given innovation expenditures. 
The dependent variables of regression 1 to 5 are defined as follows: the proportion of sales from significantly improved products (1), from 
new products (2), from significantly improved or new product of products (3), from products that are new to the firm (4), and from 
products that are new to the market (5) that have been introduced within the last three years. Innovation expenditures are defined as 
demeaned Log(1+Innovation Exp./Sales). Firm age is also demeaned. All regressions are GLM estimations with a logit link and the 
binomial family. Furthermore, they include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The 
sample includes observations from surveys in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
Dependent variable: Proportion of sales 
from 
Improved 
products New products 
Improved or 
new products   
New-to-firm 
products 
New-to-market 
products 
Sample period 1996–2011 
 
2005–2011 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
Firm age 
-0.081*** -0.122*** -0.136*** 
 
-0.100** -0.195*** 
 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.033)    
 
(0.046) (0.054) 
Innovation expenditures 1.674*** 2.517*** 2.948*** 
 
2.456*** 1.465** 
 
(0.451) (0.460) (0.451)    
 
(0.692) (0.656) 
Firm age × Innovation expenditures 
-0.149 -0.706* -1.134*** 
 
0.436 -1.305* 
 
(0.536) (0.387) (0.437)    
 
(0.685) (0.697) 
Firm size 0.001 0.020 0.015    
 
-0.017 0.033 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018)    
 
(0.029) (0.029) 
Value added per employee 0.266*** 0.101* 0.240*** 
 
0.063 0.180** 
 
(0.070) (0.063) (0.063)    
 
(0.084) (0.106) 
Constant 
-4.996*** -3.294*** -3.956*** 
 
-2.768*** -5.115*** 
  
-0.801 -0.71 -0.702   (0.936) (1.147) 
Further controls yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 2701 2701 2701 
 
1394 1394 
p(chi2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
Akaike IC  1965 1801 2578   926 900 
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Table 6: Firm age and the efficiency of innovation activities 
The table presents the results from regressions that test the effect of firm age on the efficiency of different innovation activities. The dependent 
variables in columns 1–6 are defined as follows: the proportion of sales from significantly improved or new products in columns 1–2, from 
improved products in columns 3–4, and from new-to-market products in columns 5–6 that were introduced within the last three years. Innovation 
expenditures are defined as demeaned Log(1+Innovation Exp./Sales). Firm age is also demeaned. All regressions are GLM estimations with a 
logit link and the binomial family. Furthermore, they include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The 
sample includes observations from surveys in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
Dependent variable: Proportion of sales from Improved or new products   Improved products   New-to-market products 
  (1) (2) 
  
(3) (4) 
  
(5) (6) 
Firm age 
-0.135*** -0.134*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.151*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) 
R&D expenditures 3.339*** 3.894*** 3.817*** 3.255*** 3.701*** 4.728*** 
 
(0.811) (0.782) (1.514) (1.285) (1.286) (1.259) 
Firm age × R&D expenditures 
-1.456** 0.540                -1.976* 
 
(0.692) (1.452)                (1.183) 
Refinement expenditures 2.635** 1.966* 2.599 0.756 -0.882 -1.113 
 
(1.274) (1.159) (2.236) (2.234) (2.316) (2.376) 
Firm age × Refinement expenditures 
-1.941* -4.290* -0.906 
 
(1.083) (2.230) (2.534) 
Implementation expenditures 2.981*** 2.910*** 2.327 2.215 -1.011 -0.881 
 
(1.071) (1.072) (1.873) (1.875) (1.679) (1.670) 
Constant 
-4.072*** -4.019*** -3.485*** -3.449*** -5.209*** -5.153*** 
 
(0.670) (0.669) (0.994) (0.996) (1.156) (1.155) 
Further controls yes yes   yes yes   yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 1364 1364 
p(chi2)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike IC  2725 2726   1962 1962   861 862 
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Table 7: Robustness checks: Selection biases and industry analysis 
The table presents the results of tests to determine whether the results of the innovation performance regressions in 
Table 6 are driven by sample selection biases or by differences between service and manufacturing firms. Sample 
selection may bias the results because only innovation-active firms and firms disclosing innovation expenditures are 
included in the baseline regression. In panel A, selection biases resulting from the selection of innovation-active firms 
are investigated in columns 1–3, and those pertaining to the selection of firms disclosing innovation expenditures are 
investigated in columns 4–5. In column 4, the sample is restricted to firms that do not disclose innovation expenditures. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of sales from significantly improved or new products. In Panel B, firm 
innovation performance is investigated separately for manufacturing and service firms. Innovation expenditures are 
defined as demeaned Log(1+Innovation Exp./Sales). Firm age is also demeaned. Regressions in columns 4–9 are GLM 
estimations with a logit link and the binomial family. All regressions include standard control variables (firm size, value 
added per employee, competition dummies, an export dummy and a foreign-owned firm dummy). They also include 
industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample 
includes observations from surveys in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
 Panel A: Selection bias correction 
Selection bias correction due to Innovation-active firms   Firms with non-missing innovation expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
Firm age -0.069*** -0.027** -0.021*** 
 
-0.168*** -0.168*** 
 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) 
 
(0.035) (0.024) 
Innovation expenditures 
 
0.610*** 0.613*** 
  
3.171*** 
  
(0.087) (0.103) 
  
(0.411) 
Firm age × Innovation expenditures 
 
-0.150** -0.151*  
   
  
(0.070) (0.085) 
   
Market regulations -0.417*** 
     
 
(0.104) 
     
Inverse Mills ratio 
 
0.140 
    
  
(0.209) 
    
Nondisclosure dummy 
     
0.145*** 
      
(0.042) 
Firm size 0.125*** 0.013 0.003 
 
-0.006 0.000 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.004) 
 
(0.019) (0.013) 
Constant -1.511*** -0.694 -0.286** 
 
-2.171*** -2.513*** 
  (0.415) (0.534) (0.136)   (0.742) (0.530) 
Equation Selection Performance 
    
Observations 6491 2701 
 
2415 4859 
Censored observations 3790 
    
Model estimation Heckman correction OLS 
 
GLM GLM 
Model Wald χ2 (46) = 543.0*** Adj. R2 = 
0.186 
 Akaike = 
2266 
Akaike = 
4594 
  Panel B: Industry analysis 
Dependent variable: Proportion of sales 
from Improved or new products   New-to-market products 
Industries Manufacturing Service   Manufacturing Service 
 (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Firm age -0.089** -0.215*** 
 
-0.097 -0.451*** 
 
(0.035) (0.066) 
 
(0.062) (0.128)    
Innovation expenditures 2.841*** 2.861*** 
 
1.352* 1.664    
 
(0.457) (1.076) 
 
(0.733) (1.428)    
Firm age × Innovation expenditures -1.196*** -0.769 
 
-1.307* -3.328 
 
(0.468) (0.761) 
 
(0.779) (2.057)    
Observations 2221 762   1027 347 
p(chi2)  0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Akaike 2115 680   676 225 
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Table 8: Firm age, external knowledge and innovation performance 
The table presents the results from regressions that test the effect of firm age on the effectiveness of using external innovation knowledge for 
innovation. The dependent variable is the proportion of sales from significantly improved or new products in columns (1) and (2), from 
significantly improved products in columns (3) and (4), and from new-to-market products in columns (5) and (6). The age measure in odd-
numbered columns is the demeaned natural logarithm of the firm’s foundation age, and, in even-numbered columns, it is a dummy equal to 
one if the firm exists for longer than 25 years and zero otherwise. External knowledge is a demeaned index that measures how important 
external knowledge sources are for a firm's innovation (see the appendix for variable definitions). All regressions are GLM estimations with a 
logit link and the binomial family. Furthermore, they include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 
0.90, respectively. The sample includes observations from surveys in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
Dependent variable: Proportion of sales from Improved or new products 
 
Improved products 
 
New-to-market produces 
Age measure Firm age Old dummy 
 
Firm age Old dummy 
 
Firm age Old dummy 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Age measure -0.128*** -0.197*** 
 
-0.092*** -0.140*** 
 
-0.201*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.034) (0.051) 
 
(0.035) (0.056) 
 
(0.056) (0.084) 
External knowledge 0.128*** 0.012 
 
0.061 -0.036 
 
0.130* -0.072 
 
(0.042) (0.058) 
 
(0.045) (0.062) 
 
(0.074) (0.103) 
Age measure × External knowledge 0.142*** 0.231*** 
 
0.139*** 0.191** 
 
0.253*** 0.426*** 
 
(0.046) (0.078) 
 
(0.051) (0.085) 
 
(0.083) (0.130) 
Innovation expenditures 2.835*** 3.705*** 
 
1.567*** 1.898*** 
 
1.297** 2.847*** 
 
(0.457) (0.547) 
 
(0.458) (0.551) 
 
(0.686) (0.809) 
Age measure × Innovation expenditures -1.169*** -1.425* 
 
-0.135 -0.739 
 
-1.330** -2.973*** 
 
(0.443) (0.832) 
 
(0.533) (0.870) 
 
(0.756) (1.196) 
Firm size -0.000 -0.009 
 
-0.005 -0.007 
 
0.025 0.020 
 
(0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.021) (0.020) 
 
(0.032) (0.032) 
Constant -3.797*** -3.627*** 
 
-4.985*** -4.911*** 
 
-5.025*** -4.922*** 
  (0.712) (0.714) 
 
(0.812) (0.816) 
 
(1.181) (1.192) 
Further controls yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 2654 2654 
 
2654 2654 
 
1300 1300 
p(chi2)  0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Akaike IC  2535 2539 
 
1936 1937 
 
849 850 
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Figure 3: Non-parametric regressions for innovation expenditures. The figure shows the results of kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions to investigate the functional relationship between innovation input measures 
and firm age. As the dependent variable, the graph uses residuals from OLS regressions of innovation expenditures 
on the control variables in equation (1), except for firm age. The independent variable is firm age, winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The values are obtained using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a rule-of-thumb 
bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. The dashed lines plot the 90% confidence band. 
 
 
Figure 4: Non-parametric regressions for innovation performance. The figure shows the results of kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions to investigate the functional relationship between innovation performance and 
firm age. As the dependent variable, the graph uses residuals from OLS regressions of innovative sales (improved 
and new products) on the control variables in equation (2), except for firm age. The independent variable is firm age, 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The values are obtained using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a rule-
of-thumb bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. The dashed lines plot the 90% confidence band. 
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II. Precautionary cash holdings 
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According to the precautionary motive, firms facing future 
financing constraints hold cash to ensure that they can make 
investments or meet obligations. This paper examines the 
importance of the precautionary motive relative to other 
motives as a determinant of corporate cash holdings. I 
develop an index that includes the precautionary information 
of six popular firm-level measures: cash flows, cash flow 
volatility, R&D intensity, market-to-book, net working 
capital and product market competition. The index explains 
32% of the variation in corporate cash holdings and increases 
to 41% when using the debt and equity constraint indices of 
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) as additional precautionary 
measures. As the predominant cash determinant, the 
precautionary motive is particularly strong for firms that face 
greater opportunity costs of disclosing proprietary 
information. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
these firms are more reliant on precautionary cash to protect 
proprietary information that they otherwise have to disclose 
to investors to reduce equity constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
When observing cash holdings of U.S. industrial firms, stark patterns emerge. On one 
hand, over time, the average cash-to-assets ratio has more than doubled, from 10.5% in 1980 
to 23.2% in 2006 (Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009)). On the other hand, in 2005, 25% of the 
firms have a cash-to-assets ratio of less than 3.6% and another 25% of the firms have one that 
is more than 32.4%. 
BKS demonstrate that the dramatic increase of cash holdings over time was a response 
mainly to firms’ increasing business and financing risk. Accordingly, firms facing the 
increasing risk that adverse cash flow shocks coupled with costly external financing can lead 
to underinvestment or default hold more cash for precautionary reasons. While these results 
allow for the conclusion that precautionary considerations for holding cash must have become 
more important over time, little is known about their actual importance. One exception is the 
international survey evidence of Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2010), who indicate that 
precautionary considerations are key when CFOs assess a firm’s cash situation.18 
Nevertheless, these findings are qualitative in nature, are restricted to a small sample of 
(responding) firms and depict the situation at the point in time when the survey was 
conducted. 
In this paper, by addressing these limitations, I assess whether the precautionary 
motive is actually the predominant driver of corporate cash holdings in a large sample of U.S. 
industrial firms. I exploit the previously presented, substantial variation in cash holdings 
across firms to figure out whether the precautionary motive dominates other popular motives 
for holding cash (i.e., tax, agency and transactional). To do so, based on multivariate cash 
holding regressions developed by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and BKS, I 
                                                 
18
 Among the top reasons why firms hold non-operating cash, the following ones relate to precautionary 
considerations: 1) preparation for possible shortfalls in future cash flows, 2) excessive time and cost to raise 
money when funds are needed, and 3) uncertainty about future investment opportunities. 
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decompose the cash holding variation attributed to empirical measures for the various 
motives. 
The economics and finance literatures have identified four motives for firms to hold 
cash; they are grounded on the following ideas (and measures): First, firms hold 
precautionary cash to prevent themselves from the possibility that an adverse cash flow 
shock, coupled with costly external financing, leads to underinvestment or default. Therefore, 
firms’ precautionary cash holdings are increasing in the need for external funds (due to shocks 
to their cash flows or investment opportunities) and in the costs of external funds (see, among 
others, Denis (2011)). Second, firms require cash to support their day-to-day operations, as 
suggested by the transaction cost motive of Keynes (1936). The idea is that firms hold cash to 
reduce recurring transaction costs of converting non-cash assets to cash. Since transaction 
costs are subject to scale economies, cash holdings are decreasing in firm size. Third, U.S. 
firms may incur tax consequences from repatriating foreign earnings; therefore, multinational 
firms are likely to hold more cash (see Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007)). Fourth, the 
agency motive predicts that managers of badly governed firms are more likely to retain 
excessive cash to realize projects that maximize their own but not the shareholders’ value 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)).19 
In the existing cash holding literature, the four motives, but not the precautionary 
motive, are typically approximated by a single measure (e.g., firm size, governance indices, 
and foreign income information). In the case of the precautionary motive, numerous firm-
level measures are used to approximate a firm’s need and cost of external finance, such as 
R&D intensity, cash flow level, cash flow volatility, growth opportunities (market-to-book), 
net working capital and competitive threats (see Opler et al. (1999), BKS and Hoberg, Phillips 
and Prabhala (2014)). In principle, these measures are good proxies for a firm’s precautionary 
                                                 
19 For an overview of theoretical contributions related to the different cash holding motives, see BKS or 
Almeida, Campello, Cunha and Weisbach (2014). 
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motives. Yet they are likely to contain information both related and unrelated to precautionary 
motives. Thus, based on a principal component analysis (PCA), I develop an index that 
captures the precautionary information in the six proxies mentioned above. The index 
represents a novel unidimensional measure of precautionary motives at the firm level and 
allows for a better and more realistic comparison of precautionary motives across firms than 
the use of the six proxies separately. A further major advantage of the index is that it can be 
easily replicated, modified and used in other samples. Finally, the PCA approach does not 
require a fixed weighting of the various proxies and is thus more flexible than comparable 
indices, such as the constraint indices of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) or Whited and Wu 
(2006). 
Using a sample of 78,378 firm-quarter observations between 1998 and 2005, basic 
regression analysis provides evidence of the central role precautionary motives play in 
explaining firms’ cash holdings. The regression results from the BKS cash holding model 
show that the precaution index is significantly and positively related to corporate cash 
holdings. For instance, a one-interquartile range (1-IQR) increase in the index is associated 
with an increase in the cash-to-assets ratio of 14.2 percentage points, which is economically 
meaningful, given that the mean (median) value of the ratio is 18.8% (8.8%). More 
importantly, results from the variance decompositions reveal that 32% of the cash holding 
variation is attributed to the precaution index, which represents approximately 70% of the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal variation explained by the regression model. Empirical 
measures associated with other motives for holding cash do not come close to explaining the 
same level of variation in cash holdings as the precaution index, i.e., the transactional motive 
(firm size: 5.3%), the agency motive (entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009): 2.2%), and the tax motive (foreign income: 0.2%). 
In a next step, I include the financial constraint indices of Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015) (henceforth, HM) as additional explanatory variables associated to the precautionary 
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motive. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), HM obtain information on constraints directly 
from firm disclosures by analyzing the MD&A section in firm 10-Ks. Based on this 
information, they create four continuous measures of financial constraints, indicating whether 
a firm faces potential underinvestment due to broad liquidity challenges or due to specific 
liquidity challenges related to costly financing from debt, equity and private placements.20 I 
consider these measures as suitable complementary precautionary variables for my index 
since they may contain additional and more detailed information about the cost/supply-side of 
external financing. Including these measures of financial constraints in the regression model 
increases the variation in cash holdings explained by precautionary measures to 41%. 
Although the precaution index loses some explanatory power (23%), it nonetheless explains 
more cash holding variation than the HM constraint indices (18%). From these results, I 
conclude that the precautionary motive is by far the predominant driver of corporate cash 
holdings. 
Finally, I examine subsamples to understand whether the baseline results are driven by 
certain types of firms. According to BKS, the new listing wave of high-tech firms in the 
1980s to the early 2000s has led the precautionary motive for holding cash to become more 
important. Thus, it is expected that the precautionary motive is more important for young and 
high-tech firms than for their mature and manufacturing counterparts. I test this by examining 
the effect of the precautionary measures on cash holdings in subsamples of young versus 
mature firms and of high-tech versus manufacturing firms. I find that precautionary 
considerations are significantly more important for cash holdings among young and high-tech 
firms. Most significant differences between the groups result from the HM private placement-
constrained index. Accordingly, young and high-tech firms are relatively more reliant on 
                                                 
20
 HM demonstrate that private placement is primarily associated with the private placement of equity (private 
SEOs). Further, they show that private placement constraints are a more extreme version of equity 
constraints. Consequently, firms facing high constraints in private equity markets are also facing high 
constraints in public equity markets. 
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precautionary cash if they are concerned about insufficient equity financing in the future. The 
most plausible explanation why equity constraints result in relatively higher cash holdings in 
young and high-tech firms is the following: Young and high-tech firms engage more in 
innovation and, thus, face higher opportunity costs of disclosing proprietary information (see 
Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009), HM and Loderer, Stulz and Wälchli (2016)). Proprietary 
information, in turn, is typically disclosed by firms to reduce information asymmetry with 
investors and, thus, to reduce equity constraints. Consequently, young and high-tech firms are 
more reliant on precautionary cash to reduce the reliance on equity capital, which may cause 
them to disclose proprietary information (see also Farre-Mensa (2015)). To verify this 
explanation, I split the sample based on an indicator variable introduced by HM for whether 
or not a firm explicitly mentions a need to protect proprietary information in its 10-Ks. I find 
that firms mentioning a need for the protection of proprietary information tend to be young 
and high-tech and consistently have a significantly higher motive for holding cash, which is 
again driven by equity constraints. 
In this paper, I provide novel evidence on the relative importance of alternative 
determinants of corporate cash holdings. I demonstrate that concerns about the insufficient 
funding of future growth opportunities are key determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
Understanding what determines corporate cash holdings is interesting for both practitioners 
and academics. For practitioners: Not least because U.S. corporations are holding record-high 
amounts of cash, corporate cash holdings are currently under close scrutiny, especially by 
activist investors (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008)). Corporations are 
increasingly criticized for their excessive cash holding at the cost of shareholders. To 
objectively assess whether a firm actually holds cash in excess of an “optimal” level as 
justified by its business model, assessors such as inside managers or outside analysts and 
shareholders need to know the key determinants of cash holding. Knowing that precautionary 
considerations are key, assessors can use a measure such as my precaution index to build a 
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peer group of firms with similar precautionary motives that allows for an assessment of a 
firm’s cash holding level. 
For academics: My paper contributes to various strands of the academic literature. 
First, it is most closely related to empirical papers studying the determinants of firm cash 
holdings, including Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler et al. (1999), BKS, Lins et al. 
(2010) and Graham and Leary (2015). It also relates to empirical studies that focus on specific 
cash holding determinants, such as taxes (Foley et al. (2007)), agency issues (Harford, Mansi 
and Maxwell (2008)) and product market competition (Fresard (2010) and Hoberg et al. 
(2014)). It also connects to studies demonstrating that firms with higher financial constraints 
and precautionary motives save more cash out of operating cash flows and stock issues, 
respectively (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and McLean (2011)).21 
Second, it contributes to a strand of literature that investigates the connections among 
financial constraints, cash holdings and the value of these cash holdings. Acharya, Davydenko 
and Strebulaev (2012) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that cash holdings are positively 
related to firm credit risk and financial constraints. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) and Harford, 
Klasa and Maxwell (2014) find that firms facing higher financial constraints and refinancing 
risks have higher cash reserves and that these cash reserves have higher value. Using HM’s 
financial constraint measure, I show that both debt and equity constraints are relevant cash 
determinants. The distinction between debt and equity constraints is important in that debt 
constraints (indicating distress) are negatively related and equity constraints are positively 
related to corporate cash holdings. Thus, firms hold cash primarily for precautionary reasons 
because they are concerned about the risk of insufficient equity financing in the future. 
Finally, my evidence contributes to studies that emphasize the importance of 
proprietary information in shaping firms’ cash holdings. For instance, Farre-Mensa (2015) 
                                                 
21
 Recent theoretical contributions based on the precautionary notion are provided by Acharya, Almeida 
and Campello (2007), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Han and Qiu (2007), Denis (2011), and Almeida et al. 
(2014). 
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show that, relative to private firms, public firms hold more precautionary cash to avoid having 
to publicly disclose proprietary information when issuing equity that is otherwise misvalued. 
While similar, my setting is different from the one of Farre-Mensa (2015) in two main 
regards. First, Farre-Mensa (2015) uses the listing status (listed vs. unlisted) to identify firms 
with different opportunity costs of disclosing proprietary information.22 In contrast, among 
listed firms, I use age, technology and firms’ statements to identify firms with different 
opportunity costs of disclosing proprietary information. Second, Farre-Mensa (2015) uses 
proxies at the industry level to identify firms with high and low potential for equity 
misvaluation (resulting in equity constraints). In contrast, I use a direct measure of equity 
constraints at the firm level. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the construction 
of the precaution index and the econometric approach to measure the importance of the 
various motives in explaining corporate cash holdings. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measurement of precautionary motives and cash holdings 
In this study, I am interested in measuring the relevance of the different motives of 
holding cash, especially the relevance of the precautionary motive. In this section, I first 
present the established empirical proxies for a firm’s precautionary cash holding motives. 
Second, I explain why and how I create a one-dimensional precaution index based on these 
precautionary proxies. Third, I introduce the financial constraint indices from HM as 
complementary measures to the precaution index. Finally, I present a regression framework 
                                                 
22
 According to Farre-Mensa (2015), public firms face higher costs of disclosing proprietary information than 
private firms do. The SEC Regulation “Fair Disclosure” only prohibits public firms from disclosing material 
information selectively. If a public firm wants to reduce information asymmetry with investors it has to 
disclose the information publicly. This comes at higher costs because the information may be exploited by 
product-market competitors. 
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that allows me to empirically measure how important the four motives are as drivers of cash 
holdings. 
 
 Precautionary proxies and index 2.1.
Based on the precautionary savings motive for corporate cash holdings, firms facing 
financial friction hold cash to ensure that they can realize future investment projects. 
Therefore, as their needs (i.e., growth opportunities and cash flow variability) and the costs of 
external finance increase, firms should hold more cash. The recent empirical literature has 
identified several proxies for a firm’s needs and costs of external finance, both of which 
significantly relate to cash holdings. The following list captures the most commonly used 
precautionary proxies in the recent empirical cash holding literature. 
• Cash flow levels: Firms with lower operating cash flows require more external funds, all 
else equal. To avoid having to rely on costly external financing in the future, firms with 
weaker operating cash flows should hold more cash (Dittmar and Duchin (2011)). 
• Cash flow volatility: Firms in industries with high cash flow volatility tend to have less 
reliable internal cash flows and a greater need for external capital. These firms are more 
likely to suffer from a negative liquidity shock and should therefore hold more cash 
(Opler et al. (1999) and McLean (2011)). 
• R&D intensity: Firms with high R&D spending tend to have more valuable investment 
opportunities and are more likely to experience financial distress, so these firms should 
hold more cash (McLean (2011)). Further, R&D expenses are a form of investment in 
which information asymmetries are particularly prevalent and, therefore, are costly to 
finance with external capital. Consequently, R&D-intensive firms require a greater buffer 
against future shocks to internally generated cash flows (see Opler and Titman (1994)). 
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• Market-to-book: Firms with better investment opportunities value cash more because it is 
costly for these firms to be financially constrained (BKS). 
• Net working capital (without cash): Net working capital can be converted into cash 
relatively quickly and is a close substitute for cash. Further, it is also treated as a tangible 
and pledgeable asset that may reduce the cost of external financing. Net working capital 
reduces the need and cost of external finance and, therefore, reduces the need for holding 
cash. 
• Product market competition: Firms operating in more competitive product markets face 
more competitive threats to the stability of their future cash flows. Firms hold cash as a 
hedge against future cash flow shocks due to competitive threats (Haushalter, Klasa and 
Maxwell (2007), Fresard (2010), Hoberg et al. (2014)). 
Taken together, firms with lower and more volatile cash flows, lower net working 
capital, higher R&D spending, growth opportunities and competitive threats should have a 
higher precautionary demand for cash. In their cash holding regressions, Opler et al. (1999), 
BKS and Hoberg et al. (2014) show that individual precautionary measures are related to cash 
holdings in the predicted way. However, these precautionary proxies are correlated with one 
another, and each measure also contains information unrelated to precautionary motives. I 
will use principal component analysis to extract the factor, if there is one, that represents firm-
level motives to hold precautionary cash. The possibly resulting factor can be interpreted as 
an index that measures the precautionary motives of firm i at time t (for more detail, see 
section 3.1). 
 
 Financial constraint measures as determinants of precautionary cash 2.2.
As discussed above, precautionary motives are positively associated with needs and 
costs of external finance. Therefore, financially constrained firms, facing costly and limited 
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access to external finance, should have higher precautionary motives for holding cash. Not 
surprisingly, certain firm characteristics are used to measure both financial constraints and 
precautionary motives. For example, cash flows, Tobin’s Q and cash holdings are part of 
established constraint indices, namely, the indices of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited 
and Wu (2006). 
Following the recent constraint literature, additional firm characteristics may be good 
proxies for financial constraints and, thus, for precautionary motives. For instance, it has been 
shown that younger, smaller and non-dividend paying firms are relatively more financially 
constrained (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). 
However, I do not consider age, size and dividends as additional precautionary proxies for the 
following reasons. Firm age and size are not considered as precautionary measures by the 
literature. Instead, firm size is understood as a primary measure associated to the transaction 
motive of cash holdings (BKS). Furthermore, the relation between dividends and cash 
holdings may be mechanical because, all else equal, if a firm pays dividends, it has less cash. 
In untabulated robustness tests, I define an augmented version of the precaution index, 
including size, age and dividends. As theory predicts, the three additional measures negatively 
load on the precaution index when they are included in the PCA (see section  3.2). However, 
the baseline results do not change substantially when I use the extended index version.23 
Instead of augmenting the precaution index with further precaution or constraint 
proxies based on common firm characteristics, I use the recently developed constraint indices 
from HM as additional explanatory variables for firm cash holdings. As mentioned above, 
using information from the MD&A section in firm 10-Ks, HM create four constraint indices 
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 I do not consider capex as a precautionary measure in my precaution index. All else equal, capex increases the 
need for external finance but reduces the costs of external finance (since investment in tangible assets) at the 
same time (see also the discussion in BKS). In additional tests, I find that capex does not significantly 
contribute to my index. 
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that allow for distinguishing constraints stemming from alternative funding sources, such as 
debt and equity.24 
I derive two important advantages by using the four text-based constraint indices to 
complement the precaution index as an explanatory variable for corporate cash holdings. 
First, my precaution index captures both the need (demand) and costs (supply) of external 
finance. The HM constraint indices are more likely to specifically capture the supply side of 
external finance. Second, using the HM constraint indices allows me to distinguish between 
precautionary cash attributed to debt and equity constraints, respectively. In the next 
subsection, I present the empirical test strategy. 
 
 Measuring the importance of cash holding motives 2.3.
To empirically examine the importance of the different motives of holding cash, I use 
the standard empirical model of cash holdings introduced by Opler et al. (1999) and BKS. The 
cross-sectional regression model is specified as follows: 
it it it it t itCash Precaution index X HM= α +β× + γ× +σ× +δ + ε , (1) 
where Cashit denotes the cash holdings of firm i at time t. The main explanatory variable is 
the precaution index, which is the first principal component of the six precautionary proxies 
from the PCA. This simple precautionary cash holding model allows for a first test of the 
importance of precautionary motives for holding cash. I then augment this model by measures 
associated to the other cash holding motives and further control variables (Xit), such as 
dividend dummy, capital expenditures, acquisition activities, firm age, firm size, a foreign 
income dummy and governance indices. Following the literature, I use the following 
measures to approximate the other three cash holding motives: firm size for the transactional 
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 Please see Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) for a detailed description of the employed methods to build 
the different financial constraint measures. 
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motive (BKS), a foreign income dummy for the tax motive (Foley et al. (2007)) and the 
popular governance indices, i.e., GIM-index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)) and e-index 
(Bebchuk et al. (2009)) for the agency motive. Finding novel empirical proxies for these 
motives is beyond the scope of this paper. This augmented cash holding model allows 
measuring the relative importance of the different motives as determinants of cash holdings. 
Finally, I extend the model with the constraint indices from HM (HMit), which results in the 
comprehensive cash model. 
To control for time trends in cash holdings and macroeconomic shocks, I include time 
fixed effects (t) in all the models. Further, to account for serial correlation in the error term, I 
cluster standard errors at the firm level throughout the investigation (Petersen (2009)). It 
should be noted that this regression framework does not allow clean causal inferences to be 
drawn. 
Thus far, the cash holding literature has focused mainly on the statistical and 
economic significance of the various cash determinants presented above. The main interest of 
my study is different because I aim to determine the relative importance of the different 
motives as determinants of corporate cash holdings. Thus, I am interested primarily in the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in cash holdings explained by the various 
determinants. To obtain this information from the cash holding regressions presented above, I 
employ the variance decomposition procedure suggested by Lindeman, Merenda and Gold 
(1980), which averages the marginal contribution that each variable makes to the R2 of the 
regression (Kruskal (1987)). Specifically, the procedure averages the increase in explained 
variance obtained when adding the precautionary variable(s) to all possible variations of the 
cash holding model. 
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3. Sample selection and data description 
 Sample description and variable definition 3.1.
I construct my sample of observations from the WRDS merged CRSP/Compustat 
quarterly files for the 1998–2005 period. The sample period is limited because of data 
availability at the beginning and by the onset of the financial crisis at the end. Specifically, the 
(lack of) availability of product market fluidity and financial constraints data from Hoberg et 
al. (2014) and HM restricts my sample period at the beginning. Further, in a follow-up and 
out-of-sample study, I examine whether the equity or debt supply shock of the recent financial 
crisis caused firms to use precautionary cash (Aebischer (2016)). However, I obtain almost 
identical results when I extend my sample period to 2011. 
I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4000-4999) and 
require that firms have positive assets and positive sales to be included in a given quarter. I 
restrict the sample to firms incorporated in the U.S. Finally, for the relatively few firms that 
changed their fiscal year during the sample period, I maintain the most recent fiscal year 
convention. The final sample consists of 3,995 firms and 78,378 firm-quarters. 
The main variables of interest are a firm’s cash holdings and its precautionary motives 
for holding cash. Cash holdings are defined as the cash-to-asset ratio, namely, cash and 
marketable securities divided by book assets. I also employ alternative definitions of the cash 
ratio, including the log of cash to net assets (where net assets equal book assets minus cash) 
and cash to sales (results not shown). The signs of the coefficient estimates associated with 
the main variables remain, as does their relative importance within the model. However, the 
variation in cash holdings explained by these models drops by approximately 50% to 0.24. 
Following the empirical literature on precautionary cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al. 
(1999), BKS, Dittmar and Duchin (2011), McLean (2011), and Hoberg et al. (2014)) and the 
discussion in section  2.1, I use the following variables in the precautionary motive index: (1) 
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operating cash flows, (2) industry cash flow volatility, (3) R&D intensity, (4) market-to-book 
ratio, (5) net working capital (without cash) and (6) product market threat. Variables (1) to (5) 
are normalized by total assets. To measure product market threats, I utilize the fluidity 
measure from Hoberg et al. (2014).25 Higher fluidity indicates higher potential threats to the 
firm’s own product success due to changes in the competitors’ product offerings. 
Furthermore, I use the HM constraint indices as additional precautionary measures. To 
build these indices, HM use information from the MD&A section in firm 10-Ks, in which 
managers implicitly or explicitly state to what extent liquidity challenges in general 
(investment delay) and due to insufficient financing from debt (debt delay), equity (equity 
delay) and private placements of equity (private placement delay) may lead to potential 
underinvestment in the future. 
To investigate whether the precautionary saving motive is stronger in younger and 
high-tech firms, I split the sample based on firm age and a firm’s affiliation to either the high-
tech or the manufacturing sector. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s initial 
appearance on the CRSP/Compustat quarterly tapes (e.g., Loderer et al. (2016)). The high-
tech industries are defined as in Brown et al. (2009) and special industry machinery firms are 
included as well: drugs (SIC 283), special industry machinery (SIC 355), office and 
computing equipment (SIC 357), communications equipment (SIC 366), electronic 
components (SIC 367), scientific instruments (SIC 382), medical instruments (SIC 384), and 
software (SIC 737). These two sorting criteria are relatively exogenous because age is outside 
the firm’s control and because industry affiliation is difficult to alter in a short period of time.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, I winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their pooled distribution. 
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. Mean cash holdings have a pooled mean of 
                                                 
25
 I thank Gerard Hoberg, Gordon Phillips and Nagpurnanand Prabhala for making these data available 
online at http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/. 
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18.8% and a pooled standard deviation of 22.1%. The median is 8.8%, indicating that the 
distribution of cash is right-skewed. The precautionary measures, consisting of the precaution 
index and the HM constraint measures, have similar distributional properties, means close to 
zero and standard deviations between 0.57 and 1.36. The average values of the other variables 
are in line with previous studies. In particular, the average firm is 17 years old, has quarterly 
R&D and capital expenditure ratios of 1.66% and 1.63%, a market-to-book ratio of 1.8, and a 
net working capital-to-asset ratio of 7.8%. Further, 37% of the firm-quarter observations have 
positive dividends, 39% have non-zero foreign income and 35% are from high-tech industries. 
 
 Construction and properties of the precaution index 3.2.
As discussed in section  2.1, the six precautionary proxies are likely to contain 
components related and unrelated to precautionary motives. With this in mind, I use PCA to 
isolate the common component of the cross section of the six proxies for firm-level 
precautionary motives. Table 2 shows the first three orthogonal components resulting from 
the analysis. The first component seems to fulfill the requirements of being a good precaution 
index. Each precautionary proxy enters the index with the right sign, meaning that the index is 
highest for firms with low but volatile cash flows, high R&D intensity, growth opportunities, 
competitive pressures and low net working capital. The index explains 36% of the 
corresponding cross-sectional sample variation, and its eigenvalue is significantly larger than 
one. Notably, as the index increases, the precautionary motives of firm i in fiscal quarter t 
increase. The properties of the second and third components are less appealing in this context. 
The individual measures do not enter the components with the expected and economically 
meaningful signs, the components explain remarkably less of the proxies’ variance, and the 
eigenvalues are not significantly greater than one (for a discussion of PCA outcomes, see 
Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009)). 
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Next, I investigate whether firms with different levels of precautionary motives exhibit 
distinguishing characteristics. Based on the precaution index, I group firms into five quintiles. 
Table 3 shows several basic characteristics of firms across the five quintiles. Firms with 
higher precautionary motives actually hold more cash. Firms in the lowest quintile hold 6% 
cash as a percentage of assets, whereas firms in the highest quintile hold 44%. Although there 
seems not to be any clear size pattern across the precaution ranking groups, there is a negative 
one for firm age, meaning that younger firms show higher precautionary needs for cash 
holdings. Further, the industry composition within each precaution group is remarkably 
different: 79% of the observations in the high-precaution group are in high-tech industries, 
whereas only 4% of the observations in the low-precaution group are in high-tech. Finally, I 
examine financing policies across the different quintile groups. I observe no differences in net 
debt issuance across the groups but find remarkable differences in equity issuance activities. 
Firms in high-precaution groups issue substantially more equity than firms in low-precaution 
groups. Firms with high precautionary motives seem to rely more heavily on external equity 
capital, which is known to be a volatile financing source over time in terms of availability and 
cost (see Brown et al. (2009) and McLean (2011)). This suggests that precautionary cash is 
increasingly held by young and high-tech firms whose predominant external financing source 
is equity. I will resume this discussion in the subsequent section in which multivariate results 
are presented. 
 
4. Importance of cash holding motives 
In this section, I present the results of the multivariate analysis, in which I empirically 
investigate the importance of precautionary motives relative to other motives in explaining 
corporate cash holdings. I begin with the results of the basic cash holding model from BKS. I 
then extend this model and consider the financial constraint indices of HM as additional 
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precautionary variables. Finally, in subsample tests, I investigate whether the precautionary 
motive of holding cash is of greater importance for some firms than for others. 
 
 Results from basic cash holding models 4.1.
I start the multivariate analysis by documenting basic associations between cash 
holdings and their determinants in the precautionary and augmented cash holding models (see 
Panel A of Table 4). Consistent with the precautionary savings motive and the univariate 
results, the precaution index is positively associated with firm cash holdings (column 1). The 
R2 indicates that the index can explain 40% of the variation in cash holdings, which is a 
substantial fraction. This should be interpreted as an upper boundary because the index may 
correlate with other explanatory variables of the cash holding models. Replacing the index 
with the six proxies yields similar explanatory power, and the proxies enter the regression 
with the expected signs (not shown).  
Next, columns 2 and 3 show the results from the augmented cash holding models 
without and with industry fixed effects, respectively. Including additional cash determinants 
in the model leads to a slightly lower coefficient of the precaution index and slightly higher 
R2 of 0.47. Similar cash holding variation is explained by the empirical models of Haushalter 
et al. (2007), BKS and Dittmar and Duchin (2011). The signs of the additional cash 
determinants are in line with the theoretical predictions and the empirical results of these 
empirical studies. For instance, dividend-paying firms hold less cash. Firms with higher 
capital and acquisition expenditures hold less cash because these investments are likely to 
generate pledgeable assets and are thus easier to finance. Further, larger and more mature 
firms hold less cash, and firms with non-zero foreign income hold more cash. The foreign 
income dummy is not significant when industry fixed effects are included. 
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Panel B of Table 4 illustrates the economic significance of the results of specification 
2 in Panel A and shows the predicted cash holdings at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentiles of the precaution index, holding the other variables at their mean values. Thus, an 
increase of 1-IQR in the precaution index is associated with an increase of 14.2 percentage 
points in firm cash holdings. Cash holdings seem to have an economically meaningful 
sensitivity to precautionary motives, given that the mean (median) value of cash holdings (as 
of assets) is 18.8% (8.8%). Moreover, the 14.2 percentage points amounts to 50% of the 
initially presented IQR-range in corporate cash holdings in 2005. 
 
 Importance of cash holding motives 4.2.
Next, I assess the importance of the cash holding motives and conduct two tests. First, 
I re-estimate the augmented cash model by using standardized explanatory variables. 
Standardizing consists of subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This 
allows for a simple comparison of the variables with different units and for the interpretation 
of what effect a one-standard-deviation change in a certain variable has on firm cash holdings. 
Second, I decompose the explained variation in cash holdings from the various explanatory 
variables. 
Table 5 reports the results from these tests. The coefficient estimates of standardized 
variables indicate that the precaution index is by far the most important explanatory variable 
for firm cash holdings (see specification 1). For instance, a standard deviation change in the 
precaution index results in a cash-holding change that is 3.5 times (12.38/3.47) larger than 
that caused by a standard deviation change in firm size, the second most important variable in 
the model. 
Even more distinct differences are found in the variance decomposition in 
specification 2, which shows the explained variation from each variable: 32% of the cross-
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sectional variation in cash holding is explained by the precaution index, which corresponds to 
nearly 70% of the variation explained by the model. The next most important explanatory 
variables are firm size and firm age, which explain 5% and 4% of the cash holding variation, 
respectively. 
In specification 3, I show results when considering the entrenchment index of 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) as a proxy for possible agency problems in firms. The general idea is 
that entrenched managers and poorly governed firms pursue cash policies that are not in 
shareholders’ interest. Regression results show that agency issues are not substantial drivers 
of corporate cash holdings: The cash holding variation explained by the precaution index is 
29.6%, whereas the variation explained by the E-index is only 2.2%. The coefficient index 
associated to the E-index indicates that firms with weaker governance hold less cash, which 
may result because these firms spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures 
rather than hoarding it (Harford et al. (2008)). Alternatively, I include the GIM index of 
Gompers et al. (2003), which explains 1.2% of the cash-holding variation (not shown). I do 
not consider these governance indices in further analyses because they substantially reduce 
the sample size and have no economically significant effect on firm cash holdings. 
Together, the results indicate that the precautionary motive is the predominant cash 
holding determinant, explaining 31.9% of corporate cash holding variation. In that regard, the 
empirical measures associated with the other motives, such as taxes (foreign income dummy: 
0.2%), transaction costs (firm size: 5.3%) and agency costs (E index: 2.2%), are of second-
order importance. 
These results are consistent with the evidence of other empirical studies on the 
importance of cash holding motives. BKS show that the secular increase in the average cash-
to-asset ratio for U.S. industrial firms from 1980 to 2006 can be explained partly by the 
increasing demand for precautionary cash over time. Their precautionary proxies jointly 
explain 53% of the aggregated increase in cash holdings over this period (12.7 percentage 
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points). However, it should be noted that their results from time trend analyses are driven by 
changes in the composition of the sample over time, namely, by the influx of newly listed 
technology firms. This allows for the conclusion that the precautionary motive has become 
more important for the sample firms in 2006 relative to those in 1980. Going beyond BKS, 
my results show that the precautionary motive actually is the predominant corporate cash 
holding motive. In a more general way, my results also confirm the survey evidence of Lins et 
al. (2010) that the precautionary motive is key when firms consider their cash holding levels. 
 
 Results from the comprehensive cash holding model 4.3.
In a next step, I extend the cash holding model by the constraint indices of HM. As 
already mentioned, these are good precautionary proxies because they measure firms’ 
concerns about underinvestment due to either insufficient debt or equity financing.  
Before I examine the contribution of the HM constraint measures in the cash-holding 
model, I explore their relation to the precaution index. Table 6 reports Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the precaution index and the HM constraint measures. Not surprisingly, 
the correlations among the constraint measures are almost identical to the ones displayed by 
HM. Following HM, the positive correlations among the investment delay, equity delay and 
private placement delay measures, and their negative correlations with the debt delay measure 
suggest that constraints are most severe for firms that are focused on the equity markets 
relative to those focused on debt markets. HM also show that private placement constraints 
are a more extreme version of equity constraints and that equity constraints, in turn, are a 
more extreme version of the general investment constraint measure. The correlations with the 
precautionary index suggest that the precaution index is most closely related to equity-related 
constraint measures. Therefore, the index seems to identify equity-constrained rather than 
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debt-constrained firms, which is in line with my univariate evidence (Table 3) that the 
primary financing source of firms with high precautionary motives is equity. 
In Table 7, I investigate how the HM constraint measures are related to cash holdings. 
With the exception of debt market constraints, more financially constrained firms show higher 
cash holdings, as predicted by the precautionary savings motive (see columns 1 to 4). 
Inconsistent with the precautionary savings motive is that debt constraints are negatively 
related with corporate cash holdings. According to HM, debt-constrained firms resemble 
distressed firms because they have high leverage and low Q’s but invest more than their 
industry peers. Borrowing from this information, distressed firms seem to have limited 
opportunities to maintain financial flexibility and, thus, hold systematically less cash. 
The R2 in columns 1 to 4 indicate that the debt (distress) and private placement-
focused measure can explain remarkably more variation in cash holdings than the other two 
constraint measures. In the analysis in column 5, in which the precaution index is also 
included as an explanatory variable, the coefficient of the investment delay index becomes 
insignificant, and the coefficient of the equity delay-focused reverses its sign and now 
disagrees with the precautionary logic. Thus, I exclude these two measures from subsequent 
analyses, which leads to a marginal reduction in the model’s R2 of only 0.005. Because the 
private placement delay measure deals with firms’ constraints in public and private equity 
market, following HM, I will refer to it as equity constraints.26 Together, the precaution, the 
debt and equity constraint indices explain 47.2% of the cross-sectional variation in cash 
holdings. This analysis assumes that the measures are orthogonal to the other firm 
characteristics. Next, the three measures are stepwise integrated in the augmented cash 
holding model. 
                                                 
26
 In the subsequent analyses, I find similar results when using an equity constraint index based on the first 
principal component of the equity-focused and private placement delay measures (not shown). 
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Table 8 presents the regression results and corresponding variance decompositions 
based on the comprehensive cash-holding model. Similar to the previous analysis, debt-
related constraints are negatively related to cash holdings, and their inclusion in the model 
leaves the explanatory power of the precaution index mostly unaffected, which indicates that 
these two measures explain different dimensions of firm cash holdings (see specification 1). 
The situation is different for equity constraints. The inclusion of the private placement index 
lowers the coefficient estimates and the explained variance associated with the precaution 
index (see specification 2). Consequently, the two measures seem to capture a common 
precautionary dimension in cash holdings, namely, the ones pertaining to costly equity 
financing in the future. Beyond this, each measure independently explains a significant share 
of a firm’s cash holdings; the precautionary index most likely the share pertaining to the need 
for external financing (because the HM measures control for costs/constraints) and the private 
placement index most likely the share pertaining to costly equity financing. 
When including the three measures together, they can jointly explain 40.6% of the 
variation in firm cash holdings, which is 20 percent higher than that explained solely by the 
precaution index (see specification 3). Interestingly, the precaution index can explain more 
variation (22.8%) in cash holdings than the two HM measures together (17.7%). Overall, the 
results suggest that the three measures explain specific dimensions in corporate cash holdings, 
namely, the ones pertaining to external financial needs (precaution index), financial distress 
(debt constraints), and financial constraints in equity markets.27 
Table 9 presents a second set of results to illustrate the economic significance of the 
results in Table 8. Panel A shows how much each of the three measures contributes to cash 
holdings when taking on a value equal to its respective unconditional mean (at the means of 
                                                 
27
 The three precautionary measures are fairly robust to the inclusion of additional financing control 
variables, such as net debt issuance, equity issuance and leverage and industry fixed effects measured at the 
2- or 3-digit SIC level (not shown). These variables are also included in some of the specifications in BKS. 
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all other variables). Given that the relevant mean cash-to-asset ratio is 19.11%, the measures 
play an important role in explaining this figure. The precaution, debt and private placement 
indices justify values of 15.1%, -7.5% and 6.5%, respectively. Similarly, Panel B illustrates 
predicted cash holdings at specific quantiles of the precautionary variables, when the other 
variables are held at their mean values. A 1-IQR increase in the precaution and private 
placement index is associated with an increase in cash holdings of 11.4 and 4.5 percentage 
points, respectively. An increase of the same magnitude in debt constraints is associated with 
a decrease in cash holdings of 5.2 percentage points. 
 
 Subsample analysis 4.4.
The previous results show that the precautionary motive is the predominant 
determinant of U.S. industrial cash holdings. By estimating the cash holding model for the 
entire sample, it is assumed that the precautionary motive is of equal importance for all firms. 
However, BKS find evidence that technology and newly listed firms decisively contribute to 
the increasing importance of precautionary cash over time. This leads me to assume that the 
precautionary motive is likely more important for young firms than for mature firms and for 
high-tech firms than for manufacturing firms. I therefore examine the importance of the 
precautionary measures in explaining cash holdings in subsamples of young versus mature 
firms and high-tech versus manufacturing firms. I will first present the results and then 
explain why possible differences between the subsamples are likely to emerge. 
Table 10 presents the regression results by differentiating between young firms and 
mature firms. Columns 1 and 2 show the results from the augmented cash holding model. The 
coefficient estimates and the explained variation in cash holdings attributed to the 
precautionary index indicate that the precautionary motive of holding cash is almost twice as 
important for young firms than for mature firms. For instance, the index explains 33.5% of the 
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cash holding variation in young firms and 19.5% in mature firms. In economic terms, a 1-IQR 
increase in the precaution index leads cash holdings to increase by 16.9 percentage points in 
young firms and by only 7.9 percentage points in mature firms. 
When augmenting the model by the HM constraint indices, the previously documented 
differences in the importance of the cash holding motive among young and mature firms 
remain the same (see columns 3 and 4). The jointly explained variation in cash holdings 
determined using the three precaution measures is 43.2% (22.2% + 9.2% + 11.8%) for young 
firms and 25.4% (16.0% + 5.9% + 3.5%) for mature firms. A substantial part of these 
differences can be attributed to the different importance of equity constraints in explaining 
cash holdings of young firms (11.8%) versus mature firms (3.5%). To emphasize the 
difference in economic terms, a 1-IQR increase in equity constraints leads cash holdings to 
increase by 6.0 percentage points in young firms and only by 1.9 percentage points in mature 
firms. These results suggest that young firms are more reliant on precautionary cash if they 
are concerned about equity constraints in the future. Next, I investigate whether the same is 
also true for high-tech and manufacturing firms. 
By analogy to the previous analysis, Table 11 presents the regression results by 
separating high-tech from manufacturing firms. In the augmented model, the coefficient 
estimates, the economic significance and the explained variation associated with the 
precaution index are substantially higher in high-tech than in manufacturing firms (see 
columns 1 and 2). For instance, the variation in cash holdings explained by the precaution 
index indicates that the precautionary motive is again almost twice as important for high-tech 
firms (26.9%) than for manufacturing firms (14.9%). 
The comprehensive model shows a similar picture as the case of young firms versus 
mature firms (columns 3 and 4): substantial differences in the documented importance of the 
precautionary motive between high-tech and manufacturing firms stem from different effects 
of equity constraints on cash holdings. The cash holding variation (and economic effects) 
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explained by variation in equity constraints is substantially higher for high-tech firms, with 
10.4% (1-IQR: 6.3%), than it is for manufacturing firms, with 4.4% (1-IQR: 2.1%). Similar to 
the age-related results, this suggests that concerns about equity constraints in the future lead to 
higher precautionary cash holdings in high-tech than in manufacturing firms. 
The question that arises from these results is why young and high-tech firms are 
relatively more reliant on precautionary cash when facing equity constraints. The most 
plausible explanation is the following: One important difference between these firm groups is 
that young and high-tech firms engage relatively more in innovation in order to be at the 
competitive edge. These firms therefore have higher levels of undisclosed proprietary 
information and face higher opportunity costs from publicly disclosing such information 
(Brown et al. (2009), HM and Loderer et al. (2016)). Proprietary information, in turn, is 
typically disclosed by firms to reduce information asymmetry with investors in order to 
reduce equity constraints (see Farre-Mensa (2015)). Consequently, young and high-tech firms 
are more reliant on precautionary cash to reduce the reliance on external equity capital which 
may cause them to costly disclosure of proprietary information. 
To verify this explanation, I perform the same subsample tests based on a more direct 
split criterion (than age and high-tech) on whether or not a firm faces high opportunity costs 
from disclosing proprietary information. To do so, I use an indicator variable created by HM 
for whether or not a firm explicitly mentions the need to protect proprietary information in its 
10-K. Firms that mention the need to protect proprietary information tend to be young and 
high-tech firms.28 Consistently, the subsample results based on this split criterion are almost 
identical to the previous subsample results (see Table 12). It shows that the precautionary 
motive of holding cash is almost twice as important for firms with a high need to protect 
proprietary information than for firms with low needs. Again, important differences emerge 
                                                 
28
 The proprietary information indicator is positively correlated with a young firm indicator (0.38) and with a 
high-tech firm indicator (0.57). 
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due to equity constraints (see columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with the notion that firms 
with a higher need to protect proprietary information hold relatively more precautionary cash. 
In doing so, they reduce the reliance on external equity financing because restrictions in 
equity markets (information asymmetries) may force them to disclose valuable proprietary 
information. 
Overall, the subsample results show that the precautionary motive of holding cash is 
significantly stronger among firms with a higher need to protect proprietary information, such 
as young and high-tech firms and firms that explicitly state these needs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using a large sample of listed U.S. industrial firms, this paper studies whether 
precautionary motives predominantly determine the substantial differences in the cash-to-
asset ratio across firms. To do so, based on multivariate regressions, I investigate how much 
variation in firm cash holdings can be attributed to empirical measures associated to 
alternative cash holding motives, such as the precautionary, transactional, tax and agency 
motive. Furthermore, to properly measure precautionary motives at the firm level, I create a 
novel unidimensional precaution index, which is the first principal component of six popular 
proxies for firm precautionary motives, such as the level and volatility of operating cash 
flows, R&D intensity, market-to-book ratio, product market threats, and net working capital. 
My evidence shows that the substantial variation in cash holdings across firms is 
explained predominantly by differences in firms’ precautionary motives. For instance, the 
precaution index can explain 32% of the cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in 
corporate cash holdings, corresponding to 70% of the variation explained by the cash holding 
model. Empirical measures associated with other motives for holding cash do not come close 
to explaining the same level of variation in cash holdings as the precaution index. Further 
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tests reveal that the debt and equity financial constraint indices from Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015) are also relevant precautionary measures in explaining corporate cash holdings. It 
shows that the precaution, debt-focused delay and private placement delay indices tend to 
explain specific dimensions in corporate cash holdings, namely, those pertaining to the need 
for external financing, to financial distress and to costly equity financing. Together, the 
measures explain 41% of the corporate cash holding variation. Finally, I document that as the 
predominant cash holding determinant, the precautionary motive is particularly strong for 
firms with a higher need to protect proprietary information, such as young and high-tech firms 
and firms that explicitly state these needs. This finding is consistent with the notion that these 
firms are more reliant on precautionary cash to reduce the reliance on equity capital because 
restriction in equity markets may force them to costly disclosure of proprietary information. 
Although the comprehensive cash model does a good job of describing firm cash 
holdings, a substantial cross-sectional variation in cash holdings (39%) remains unexplained 
by the model. Future research efforts aiming at identifying further cash determinants might 
provide a better understanding of firm liquidity management. Further, I have examined the 
importance of the precautionary savings motive for cash holdings of listed U.S. industrial 
firms, a sample that has experienced dramatic changes in its composition in the past three 
decades. According to Fama and French (2004), the increasing supply in equity capital has 
enabled listings of technology firms that are characterized by unprecedentedly low cash flows 
and high R&D intensities and growth opportunities. My analysis and the one by BKS provide 
evidence that the listing of technology firms has increased the importance of the precautionary 
motive in explaining corporate cash holdings. It would be interesting to investigate whether 
the importance of the precautionary motive for holding cash systematically varies across 
countries with different industry compositions and different development of equity markets. 
Finally, the precautionary savings motive suggests that firms hoard cash to finance their 
activities and investments when other sources of funding are not available or are excessively 
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costly. Therefore, it would be interesting to test whether firms with high amounts of 
precautionary cash really use more cash to sustain investment in the presence of an exogenous 
cash flow shock. Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010), Brown and Petersen (2014) and 
Aebischer (2016) use the exogenous capital supply shock of the recent financial crisis in 
2007-2009 to test this prediction.  
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Appendix: Tables 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition (Compustat item name) 
Cash Cash and short-term investments (cheq)/total assets (atq). 
  
Panel A: Precaution variables 
Cash flow Operating income before depreciation (oibdq)/total assets (atq). 
Industry sigma The mean of the standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 20 quarters (minimum of 8 
consecutive quarters) for firms in the same industry, as defined by the two-digit SIC code. 
R&D R&D expenses (xrdq)/total assets (atq). 
Market-to-book The market value of assets (total assets (atq) + market value of common equity (cshoq × 
prccq) – common equity (ceqq))/(0.9 × book value of assets(atq) + 0.1×market value of 
assets). This definition follows Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
NWC Net working capital without cash (current assets (actq) – current liabilities (lctq) – cash 
(cheq))/total assets (atq). 
Product market fluidity Text-based fluidity measure (product market threats) according to Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2014). 
  
Panel B: Precaution and constraint indices 
Precaution index First principal component from principal component analysis (PCA) of cash flow, industry 
sigma, R&D, Tobin’s Q and product market fluidity.  
Investment delay Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to liquidity 
challenges, according to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Debt-focused delay Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to debt financing 
constraints, according to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Equity-focused delay Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to equity financing 
constraints, according to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Private placement delay Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to private placement 
financing constraints, according to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  
Panel C: Further control variables 
Leverage Short-term debt (dlcq) plus long-term debt (dlttq)/total assets (atq). 
Dividend dummy A quarterly dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends ((dvp+dvc) > 0) in the 
fiscal year and equal to zero if it did not. 
Capex Quarterly capital expenditure/total assets (atq). Because capital expenditure is reported on a 
year-to-date basis in quarterly financial statements, I subtract the previous quarter’s capital 
expenditure from the current quarter’s capital expenditure (capxy) for fiscal quarters 2, 3, and 
4. 
Acquisitions Quarterly acquisitions (aqcq)/total assets (atq). 
Net debt issuance (Long-term debt (dlttq) at t + short-term debt (dlcq) at t – long-term debt (dlttq) at t-1 – short-
term debt (dlcq) at t-1)/total assets (atq). 
Equity issuance Quarterly sale of common and preferred stock (sstky)/total assets (atq). Because the sale of 
common and preferred stock (sstky) is reported on a year-to-date basis in quarterly financial 
statements, I subtract the previous quarter’s sstky from the current quarter’s sstky for fiscal 
quarters 2, 3, and 4. 
Foreign income dummy A quarterly dummy variable equal to one if the firm reported non-missing pretax foreign 
income in the fiscal year and equal to zero if it did not. 
Age Natural logarithm of listing age, computed as one plus the difference between the year under 
investigation and the firm’s birth year. The birth year is computed as the minimum value of: 
(a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year the firm appears on the 
COMPUSTAT tapes; or (c) the first year in which I find a link between the CRSP and the 
COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
High-tech Dummy variable for firms in high-tech industries with SICs 283 (Drugs), 355 (Special 
Industry Machinery), 357 (Computer and Office Equipment), 366 (Communications 
Equipment), 367 (Electronic Components and Accessories), 382 (Measuring and Controlling 
Devices), 384 (Medical Instruments & Supplies), and 737 (Computer and Data Processing 
Services). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 
2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. 
(2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  Mean Median SD Min Max Observations 
Cash  19.11 9.18 22.28 0.01 90.50 78,378  
       
Precautionary variables 
Cash flow 2.64 3.19 4.76 -18.82 13.65 78,378  
Industry sigma 4.14 4.26 1.26 0.64 8.35 78,378  
R&D 1.69 0.15 3.08 0.00 19.06 78,378  
Market-to-book 1.84 1.51 1.05 0.16 9.88 78,378  
NWC 7.76 6.12 17.23 -42.40 52.41 78,378  
Product market fluidity 6.91 6.39 3.39 1.42 17.46 78,378  
Precaution and constraint indices 
Precaution index -0.01 -0.29 1.42 -2.23 5.33 78,378  
Investment delay -0.13 -0.24 0.94 -1.90 2.34 67,018  
Debt-focused delay 0.01 -0.03 0.58 -1.11 1.54 67,018  
Equity-focused delay -0.18 -0.28 0.87 -1.80 2.34 67,018  
Private placement delay -0.07 -0.14 0.79 -1.62 2.03 67,018  
Further financial policies and firm characteristics 
Capex 1.64 1.00 1.98 -0.04 12.19 77,416  
Acquisitions 0.79 0.00 3.08 -0.28 21.97 75,463  
Size 2,108  347  6,218  9  55,574  78,378  
Age 16.79 11.00 16.20 1.00 79.00 78,378  
Dividend dummy 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 77,555  
Foreign income dummy 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 78,378  
High-tech dummy 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 78,378  
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Table 2: Precaution index with principal component analysis (PCA) 
The table reports results from a principal component analysis (PCA) of six precautionary 
measures. Columns 1 to 3 show factor loadings of the six precautionary measures on the 
first three principal components. The loadings in column 1 indicate the weight by which 
each of the six standardized original variables should be multiplied to compute the first 
component. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. 
Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K 
database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Component 1 
(Prec1) 
Component 2 
(Prec2) 
Component 3 
(Prec3) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Cash flow -0.408*** 0.603*** -0.347*** 
 
(0.003) (0.016) (0.027) 
Industry sigma 0.328*** 0.421*** 0.251*** 
 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.028) 
R&D 0.492*** -0.021 0.426*** 
 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.010) 
Market-to-book 0.359*** 0.643*** -0.083*** 
 
(0.004) (0.032) (0.031) 
NWC -0.356*** 0.187*** 0.734*** 
 
(0.004) (0.032) (0.010) 
Product market fluidity 0.477*** -0.097*** -0.298*** 
 
(0.003) (0.014) (0.009) 
Eigenvalues 2.16 1.02 0.94 
Proportion of explained variance  0.36 0.17 0.16 
Observations 78,378 
 
Table 3: Firm characteristics across precaution quintiles 
The table reports average firm characteristics and financial policies within each quintile of the 
precaution index. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data 
are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. 
(2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Means 
Precaution index -1.56 -0.85 -0.28 0.43 2.23 -0.01 
Cash  6.44 8.88 14.20 22.28 43.74 19.11 
Size 1,456  2,334  2,667  2,888  1,193  2,108  
Age 21.99 20.37 17.85 15.03 8.72 16.79 
High-tech firms 0.04 0.15 0.31 0.49 0.79 0.36 
Net debt issuance 0.52 0.63 0.64 0.59 0.68 0.61 
Equity issuance 0.36 0.54 0.91 1.22 3.56 1.32 
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Table 4: Precaution index and cash holdings 
The table examines the effects of the precautionary index on firm cash holdings. In Panel A, the 
panel regressions are estimated based on the cash holding model of Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009). 
The dependent variable is equal to firm cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. All 
specifications include year fixed effects, and specification 3 includes industry (SIC 3-digit) fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Panel B displays 
the economic effects of the precaution index on cash holdings based on specification 2 in Panel A. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, 
and 0.90, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 
2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of 
Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Panel A: Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Precaution index 9.874*** 8.631*** 7.452*** 
 
(0.176) (0.183) (0.252) 
Dividend dummy 
 
-2.660** -0.886** 
  
(0.437) (0.429) 
Capex 
 
-1.424*** -0.773*** 
  
(0.083) (0.079) 
Acquisitions 
 
-0.450*** -0.417*** 
  
(0.020) (0.020) 
Size 
 
-1.988*** -1.685*** 
  
(0.143) (0.159) 
Age 
 
-1.890*** -1.949*** 
  
(0.266) (0.269) 
Foreign income dummy 
 
1.531*** -0.051 
  
(0.455) (0.487) 
Constant 19.428*** 38.591*** 35.699*** 
 
(0.345) (0.883) (0.937) 
Time FE yes yes yes 
Industry FE (SIC 3 digit) no no yes 
Observations 78,378 73,920 73,920 
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.466 0.528 
Panel B: Economic significance (Specification 2) 
Percentile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Precaution index 6.26% 10.70% 16.81% 24.93% 35.18% 
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Table 5: Importance of cash holding determinants 
The table examines the importance of firm policies and characteristics in determining cash holdings. The 
dependent variable is equal to firm cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. In specification 1, 
all independent variables are standardized prior to fitting regressions to permit more intuitive 
comparisons across variables. From specifications 2 and 3, OLS coefficient estimates and the percentage 
of the variation coming from each variable are displayed. The method used in the variance 
decomposition takes the average of all R-squared from all possible orderings of all regressors (see 
Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1980) and Kruskal (1987)). All specifications include time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the 
quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg 
and Maksimovic (2015). 
  (1) 
  
(2)   (3) 
  
Coeff.  
(se)   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
Precaution index 12.382*** 
 
8.631*** 31.9% 
 
9.372*** 28.9% 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.183) 
  
(0.437) 
 
Dividend dummy -2.660*** 
 
-2.660*** 2.7% 
 
-2.902*** 5.1% 
 
(0.437) 
 
(0.437) 
  
(0.859) 
 
Capex -2.831*** 
 
-1.424*** 2.0% 
 
-1.598*** 2.9% 
 
(0.166) 
 
(0.083) 
  
(0.170) 
 
Acquisitions -1.391*** 
 
-0.450*** 0.6% 
 
-0.469*** 0.5% 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.020) 
  
(0.047) 
 
Size -3.468*** 
 
-1.988*** 5.3% 
 
-3.096*** 5.6% 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.143) 
  
(0.313) 
 
Age -1.764*** 
 
-1.890*** 4.1% 
 
0.307 2.6% 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.266) 
  
(0.510) 
 
Foreign income dummy 1.531*** 
 
1.531*** 0.2% 
 
0.119 0.1% 
 
(0.455) 
 
(0.455) 
  
(0.770) 
 
E-index 
     
-1.583*** 2.2% 
      
(0.302) 
 
Constant 19.512*** 
 
38.591*** 
  
46.574*** 
 
 
(0.435) 
 
(0.883) 
  
(2.209) 
 
Time FE yes   yes     yes   
Observations 73,920 
 
73,920 
  
10,059 
 
Adjusted R2 0.466   0.466     0.501   
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Table 6: Pearson correlation coefficients 
The table displays Pearson correlation coefficients between the precaution index 
and the financial constraint indices of Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken 
from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of 
Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Precaution index (1) 1 
    
Investment delay (2) 0.317 1 
   
Debt-focused delay (3) -0.304 -0.037 1 
  
Equity-focused delay (4) 0.420 0.926 -0.127 1 
 
Private placement delay (5) 0.501 0.460 -0.497 0.642 1 
 
 
Table 7: Constraint/precautionary measures and cash holdings 
The table examines the effect of the financial constraint measures from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) 
on firm cash holdings. The dependent variable is equal to firm cash and cash equivalents divided by 
firm assets. All specifications include time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests at 
confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from 
the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Investment delay 5.439*** 
   
0.725 
 
(0.373) 
   
(0.631) 
Debt-focused delay 
 
-16.818*** 
  
-6.970*** 
  
(0.390) 
  
(0.372) 
Equity-focused delay 
  
8.355*** 
 
-1.589** 
 
  
(0.392) 
 
(0.807) 
Private placement delay 
   
14.539*** 5.354*** 
    
(0.342) (0.427) 
Precaution index 
    
7.845*** 
     
(0.185) 
Constant 18.722*** 18.464*** 19.264*** 18.710*** 19.649*** 
  (0.432) (0.406) (0.416) (0.377) (0.368) 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 76,802 76,802 76,802 76,802 67,018 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.180 0.104 0.254 0.473 
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Table 8: Importance of cash holding determinants in the comprehensive cash model 
The table examines the effect of the precautionary measures on cash holdings. The dependent variable is equal to 
firm cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. All specifications include time fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in 
two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-
K database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  (1) 
  
(2)   (3) 
  
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
Precaution index 7.600*** 27.6% 
 
7.022*** 25.1% 
 
6.801*** 22.8% 
 
(0.192) 
 
 
(0.194) 
 
 
(0.193) 
 Debt-focused delay -8.932*** 10.4% 
  
 
 
-6.694*** 7.7% 
 
(0.332) 
 
  
 
 
(0.361) 
 
Private placement delay 
 
 
 
6.505*** 13.1% 
 
4.213*** 10.1% 
  
 
 
(0.288) 
 
 
(0.308) 
 
Dividend dummy -2.870*** 2.4% 
 
-2.965*** 2.4% 
 
-2.977*** 2.3% 
 
(0.424) 
 
 
(0.441) 
 
 
(0.422) 
 
Capex -1.314*** 1.8% 
 
-1.401*** 2.0% 
 
-1.309*** 1.7% 
 
(0.080) 
 
 
(0.082) 
 
 
(0.079) 
 
Acquisitions -0.431*** 0.5% 
 
-0.457*** 0.6% 
 
-0.437*** 0.5% 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
Size -1.698*** 4.7% 
 
-2.038*** 4.9% 
 
-1.782*** 4.4% 
 
(0.146) 
 
 
(0.149) 
 
 
(0.145) 
 
Age -2.271*** 3.8% 
 
-1.274*** 3.2% 
 
-1.712*** 3.1% 
 
(0.262) 
 
 
(0.265) 
 
 
(0.258) 
 
Foreign income dummy 0.753* 0.1% 
 
1.665*** 0.2% 
 
1.035** 0.1% 
 
(0.447) 
  
(0.455) 
  
(0.440) 
 
Constant 37.770*** 
  
37.486*** 
  
36.977*** 
 
 
(0.894) 
  
(0.907) 
  
(0.881) 
 
Time FE yes     yes     yes   
Observations 63,450 
  
63,450 
  
63,450 
 
Adjusted R2 0.514 
  
0.506 
  
0.527 
 
Variance from precaution   38.0%     38.2%     40.5% 
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Table 9: Economic Significance 
The table displays the economic effects of the precaution and constraint indices on 
cash holdings using on the estimates from Table 8, specification (3). Panel A 
presents the effect of a variable (at its mean) on cash holdings. Panel B shows 
predicted cash holdings at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of a 
variable, holding the other variables at their mean values. Variable definitions are 
in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the 
quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. 
(2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  
Precaution index Debt-focused 
 delay 
Private placement 
 delay 
Panel A: Effects at mean of variable 
Effect at mean 15.1% -7.5% 6.5% 
Panel B: Predicted cash holdings 
Percentile 
   10 9.7% 25.0% 15.9% 
25 13.2% 22.8% 17.7% 
50 18.1% 20.3% 19.8% 
75 24.6% 17.6% 22.2% 
90 32.8% 14.9% 24.6% 
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Table 10: Precautionary determinants of cash holdings: Young vs. mature firms 
The table examines the effect of the precautionary measures on firm cash holdings by young versus mature firms. The dependent variable is equal to firm 
cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. A firm is classified as young if it is less than 12 years after the year it first appears in the 
Compustat/CRSP tapes, and as mature otherwise. All specifications include time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K 
database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  Young   Mature   Young   Mature 
 
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
  
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
Precaution index 9.278*** 33.5% 
 
5.611*** 19.3% 
 
7.044*** 22.2% 
 
4.726*** 16.0% 
 
(0.241) 
  
(0.318) 
  
(0.263) 
  
(0.323) 
 
Debt-focused delay 
      
-7.232*** 9.2% 
 
-5.453*** 5.9% 
       
(0.507) 
  
(0.591) 
 
Private placement delay 
      
5.061*** 11.8% 
 
2.189*** 3.5% 
       
(0.437) 
  
(0.499) 
 
Constant 51.108*** 
  
31.957*** 
  
45.440*** 
  
33.489*** 
 
  (1.405) 
  
(2.431) 
  
(1.384) 
  
(2.543) 
 
Precaution index (25th to 75th) 16.7%     7.9%     12.7%     6.9%   
Debt-focused delay (25th to 75th) 
   
 
  
-6.0% 
  
-3.9% 
 
Private placement delay (25th to 75th) 
   
 
  
6.0% 
  
1.9% 
 
Further controls yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Time FE yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Observations 36,080 
 
 
37,840 
  
30,434 
  
33,016 
 
Adjusted R2 0.477 
  
0.299 
  
0.537 
 
0.364 
 
Variance from precaution   33.5%     19.3%     43.2%     25.4% 
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Table 11: Precaution determinants of cash holdings: High-tech vs. manufacturing firms 
The table examines the effects of the precautionary measures on cash holdings by high-tech versus manufacturing firms. The dependent variable is equal 
to firm cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. High-tech firms operate in industries with SIC codes 283, 355, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, and 
737. All specifications include time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample 
period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015). 
 
High-tech 
 
Manufacturing 
 
High-tech 
 
Manufacturing 
 
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
  
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
 
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
 
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
 
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
Precaution index 7.579*** 26.9% 
 
4.783*** 14.8% 
 
6.079*** 16.5% 
 
4.041*** 11.9% 
 
(0.313) 
  
(0.250) 
  
(0.325) 
  
(0.226) 
 
Debt-focused delay 
      
-7.236*** 5.4% 
 
-5.384*** 6.2% 
       
(0.679) 
  
(0.408) 
 
Private placement delay 
      
5.569*** 10.4% 
 
2.277*** 4.4% 
       
(0.558) 
  
(0.338) 
 
Constant 51.454*** 
  
27.967*** 
  
46.756*** 
  
28.548*** 
 
  (1.687) 
  
(1.058) 
  
(1.694) 
  
(1.064) 
 
Precaution index (25th to 75th) 14.1% 
  
6.7% 
  
11.4% 
  
5.8% 
 
Debt-focused delay (25th to 75th) 
      
-4.9% 
  
-4.1% 
 
Private placement delay (25th to 75th) 
      
6.3% 
  
2.1% 
 
Further controls yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Time FE yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Observations 26,369 
  
47,551 
  
23,430 
  
40,020 
 
Adjusted R2 0.345 
  
0.251 
  
0.424 
  
0.316 
 
Variance from precaution 
 
26.9% 
  
14.8% 
  
32.2% 
  
22.5% 
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Table 12: Precaution determinants of cash holdings: low vs. high need to protect proprietary information 
The table examines the effects of the precautionary measures on cash holdings by firms low versus high needs to protect proprietary information. The 
dependent variable is equal to firm cash and cash equivalents divided by firm assets. Firms with needs to proprietary information are firms that mention 
concerns about the risk of losing proprietary information in their 10-Ks. All specifications include time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests at confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The sample period is 1998 – 2005. Data are taken from the quarterly Compustat/CRSP data files and from the 10-K 
database of Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Needs to protect proprietary information Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
  
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained   
Coeff.  
(se) 
Variance 
explained 
Precaution index 8.250*** 25.0% 
 
4.734*** 12.1% 
 
6.535*** 18.1% 
 
4.045*** 9.8% 
 
(0.281) 
  
(0.270) 
  
(0.297) 
  
(0.259) 
 
Debt-focused delay 
      
-7.797*** 6.9% 
 
-5.145*** 6.2% 
       
(0.613) 
  
(0.411) 
 
Private placement delay 
      
5.081*** 10.3% 
 
2.026*** 3.1% 
       
(0.509) 
  
(0.332) 
 
Constant 52.359*** 
  
25.474*** 
  
48.061*** 
  
26.601*** 
 
  (1.563) 
  
(1.082) 
  
(1.585) 
  
(1.104) 
 
Precaution index (25th to 75th) 14.9%     7.5%     11.9%     6.0%   
Debt-focused delay (25th to 75th) 
      
-5.7% 
  
-3.9% 
 
Private placement delay (25th to 75th) 
  
6.2% 
  
1.8% 
 
Further controls yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Time FE yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 
Observations 29,006 
  
43,707 
  
26,253 
  
36,460 
 
Adjusted R2 0.392 
  
0.210 
  
0.463 
  
0.277 
 
Variance from precaution   25.0%     12.1%     35.3%     19.1% 
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In this paper, I investigate whether the debt or equity capital 
supply shock of the recent financial crisis (2007-2009) caused 
firms to use precautionary cash holdings to mitigate 
underinvestment. I find that precautionary cash was used to 
substitute for the decline in net equity issuance but not net 
debt issuance. I also find that precautionary cash was used by 
equity- but not debt-constrained firms to mitigate 
underinvestment during the crisis. Consistently, precautionary 
cash was not used in the absence of the equity supply shock, 
i.e., during placebo crises or during the economy-wide 
demand shock following the financial crisis. This paper 
provides new evidence on the importance of corporate 
liquidity management for equity-constrained firms and 
identifies the crisis’ equity capital supply shock as a dominant 
first-order effect on corporate financial policies. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether costly debt or equity financing caused firms to use 
precautionary cash holdings to mitigate underinvestment during the recent financial crisis of 
2007-2009. Following the precautionary motive, firms hold cash to protect against cash flow 
shocks, which would force firms to underinvest or default in the future when coupled with costly 
external financing. The financial crisis is well-suited to analyzing the use of corporate 
precautionary cash because there was a large exogenous shock to the supplies and costs of debt 
and equity capital (Kahle and Stulz (2013) and Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2015)). The central 
insight of this paper is that only costly equity financing caused firms to use precautionary cash. 
The majority of the existing literature on the crisis uses the (subprime mortgage) credit 
crisis of 2007-2009 as an experimental setting to investigate the impact of the crisis’ external 
finance shock on corporate policies, such as liquidity management and investment (e.g., Duchin, 
Ozbas and Sensoy (2010), Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011), Brown and 
Petersen (2014)). Consistent with a capital supply shock affecting the real sector, these studies 
show that more financially constrained firms experienced greater declines in investment and drew 
more on alternative funding sources, such as credit lines or cash. Strikingly, Kahle and Stulz 
(2013) show that bank- and credit-dependent firms did not experience changes in their cash 
positions or investment that differed from the changes of matched firms that did not depend on 
banks or credit. They highlight one additional important fact: relative to the pre-crisis period, 
corporate borrowing was not systematically reduced during the period from August 2007 to 
September 2008 when the Lehman Brothers investment bank declared bankruptcy. This is the 
crisis period during which a presumably major capital supply shock took place. Given these 
results, the authors cast doubt that a bank lending shock or a credit supply shock were first-order 
determinants of corporate financial policies during the crisis (referred to as credit rationing). This 
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raises the question of which alternative capital shortage had a first-order effect on corporate cash 
and investment policies during the crisis. 
One possible answer to that question is equity. The hypothesis is as follows: The 
uncertainty associated with the emerging crisis, starting in late 2007, induced a “flight to quality” 
leading investors to shift capital away from risky investments and toward safer investments.29 
The perception of increasing risk led investors to require higher risk premiums, especially for 
risky investments, i.e., bonds of lower credit quality and especially equities (Brunnermeier 
(2009), Gorton (2009); Gorton (2010), and Kahle and Stulz (2013)). Such episodes of high 
investor uncertainty primarily lead to shortage of equity capital and cause “equity rationing” 
among firms in the real economy (Krasker (1986)). 
In this paper, I seek to solve the puzzle of whether credit or equity rationing during the 
financial crisis caused firms to use precautionary cash to mitigate possible underinvestment. To 
solve this puzzle, I employ a difference-in-differences (diff.-in-diff.) approach in which I 
compare the financing (i.e., net equity issuance, net debt issuance, and cash savings) and 
investment policies of firms before and after the onset of the crisis as a function of their 
precautionary cash holdings, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying firm 
characteristics, such as market-to-book, cash flows, and leverage (see Duchin et al. (2010) and 
Bliss et al. (2015) for similar model specifications). Thus, the empirical analysis proceeds in two 
main steps. First, by analyzing financing policies, I seek to determine whether firms used 
precautionary cash holdings to substitute for a decline in net debt or net equity issuance. Second, 
by analyzing investment policies, I seek to determine whether firms actually used precautionary 
cash to mitigate underinvestment induced by costly debt or equity financing. 
                                                 
29
 Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) build a model in which investors’ flight to quality results from 
capital/liquidity shortages and Knightian uncertainty (Knight (1921)). Knightian uncertainty is triggered by 
unusual events and financial innovations that lead agents to question their worldviews. 
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Most of my analysis focuses on the five consecutive quarters from January 1, 2008 to 
March 30, 2009 (2008Q1-2009Q1), which define the crisis period in this paper. This definition of 
the crisis period closely follows Kahle and Stulz (2013) but starts two quarters later. My 
definition is derived from changes in macroeconomic indices and aggregate corporate financial 
policies indicating that the corporate sector was most likely affected by a capital supply shock 
during these quarters (see the discussion in Section 2). Following the literature, I define a pre-
crisis period of equal length to the crisis period, extending from July 1, 2006 to September 30, 
2007 (2006Q3-2007Q3).30 
The variable of primary interest in my regression framework is precautionary cash 
holdings. Because firms also hold cash for other reasons than precaution, I define precautionary 
cash following Aebischer (2016) instead of using observed cash as in Duchin et al. (2010).31 
Accordingly, precautionary cash is based on a prediction from a cash-holding model in which a 
precaution index constitutes the main explanatory variable. The precaution index itself is the first 
principal component of the following popular precautionary proxies: R&D intensity, cash flow 
level and volatility, market-to-book ratio (growth opportunities), net working capital, and 
competitive threats.32 To address endogeneity concerns, precautionary cash is measured six 
quarters before the start of the crisis, namely, at the end of the last fiscal quarter ending before 
July 1, 2006. The estimator of main interest, the “diff.-in-diff.” estimator, includes an interaction 
between a crisis indicator and pre-crisis precautionary cash holdings. 
                                                 
30
 My crisis definition covers a similar period as studies that use annual data and define 2008 as the crisis year (e.g., 
Campello et al. (2011), Brown and Petersen (2014), Bliss et al. (2015)). Moreover, my baseline results are not 
sensitive to alternative (pre-)crisis definitions. To show robustness, I will also discuss the results in certain sub-
periods of the crisis. 
31
 I obtain similar results when using observed instead of precautionary cash. Exceptions will be discussed in the 
context of the investment results in Tables 7 and 10. 
32
 For a more detailed discussion of the established precautionary proxies and the creation of the precaution index, 
see Aebischer (2016) and the literature cited therein. 
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As an additional test of whether costly debt or equity financing drove corporate cash and 
investment policies, I estimate the same regressions using subsamples of firms facing different 
degrees of financial constraint. In doing so, I utilize the firm-level measures of debt and equity 
financial constraints recently developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). Based on text-based 
analysis, they score Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) sections in 10-Ks to obtain 
measures of debt and equity constraints, which capture a firm’s inability to obtain debt or equity 
financing for planned investment. Among others, a main advantage of these constraint measures 
over other existing measures (e.g., firm size, firm age, dividends, KZ index, SA index) is that 
they enable better identification of the source of a firm’s financing constraints. Similar to 
precautionary cash, I build the subsamples based on firms’ financial constraints, as measured at 
the end of the last fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006. 
Based on a sample of 2,322 listed U.S. industrial firms, univariate statistics of financial 
policies over time and across terciles of firms with different pre-crisis precautionary cash 
holdings yield interesting results. As the crisis started, cash was used and net equity issues 
plunged. This applies to a greater extent to firms with more pre-crisis precautionary cash. After 
the crisis, net equity issuance rebounded to pre-crisis levels and firms started to save cash again. 
In contrast, net debt issuance plunged later, i.e., immediately after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008Q4, and recovered later, i.e., in early 2010. More importantly, the magnitude of 
the decline in net debt issuance was not sensitive to firms’ precautionary cash holdings. Taken 
together, this evidence suggests that firms use precautionary cash holdings to offset declines in 
equity issuance but not debt issuance. 
The results of multivariate regressions, accounting for time-varying observable firm 
characteristics and unobservable firm fixed effects, confirm this conclusion. Firms with more 
precautionary cash used more of this cash and experienced greater declines in net equity issuance 
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during the financial crisis. The results are economically meaningful; a one-interquartile range 
(IQR) increase in pre-crisis precautionary cash holdings reduced quarterly cash savings and net 
equity issuance by 1.14% and 0.49% (as a percentage of assets), respectively. These figures 
correspond to declines of 305% and 57%, respectively, relative to the levels of these financial 
policies during the last five quarters of the boom. In contrast, I find no statistically significant 
effect of precautionary cash holdings on changes in net issuance of debt. Furthermore, estimating 
cash saving regressions in subsamples of firms facing different degrees of debt and equity 
constraints reveal consistent results with firms using precautionary cash in reaction to costly 
equity but not costly debt financing during the crisis. 
To complete the precautionary analysis, I estimate investment regressions to ascertain 
whether costly debt or costly equity financing caused firms to use precautionary cash to alleviate 
underinvestment. Consistent with equity rationing altering cash and investment policies during 
the crisis, I find that only equity-constrained firms reduced investment and used precautionary 
cash to counteract the negative consequences of insufficient equity funding on investment. To 
illustrate the magnitudes, firms with high equity constraints and zero precautionary cash holdings 
experience a decline in quarterly investment of 0.367% (as a percentage of assets); a decline of 
9.2 percentage points relative to average pre-crisis investment. A one-IQR increase in 
precautionary cash mitigates the decline by 0.525 percentage, which corresponds to 143% of the 
decline for a firm with zero precautionary cash. In contrast, firms with low equity constraints 
show neither a significant decline in investment nor significant use of precautionary cash. 
 I perform several robustness checks to address concerns that the results may be driven by 
confounding effects. First, I test whether the diff.-in-diff. estimator is 0 in the absence of the 
treatment (i.e., the equity capital supply shock), which constitutes the key identifying assumption 
of the diff.-in-diff. strategy. To do so, I estimate the financing and investment regressions using 
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placebo (nonexistent) crises occurring on January 1, 2005 and 2006. During these placebo crises, 
none of the diff.-in-diff. estimators is significantly different from 0, and thus, the parallel trend 
assumption regarding the various financial policies is satisfied. Second, to validate the claim that 
cash was only used to counteract the negative consequence of the (equity) capital supply shock 
on investment, I extend the crisis period by another five quarters (2009Q2-2010Q2). During these 
quarters, an economy-wide demand shock is considered to dominate a capital supply shock (e.g., 
Kahle and Stulz (2013)); therefore, financial constraints should be less binding, and 
precautionary cash should no longer be used. Consistent with this prediction, the results show 
that compared to the crisis period, firms experience a more pronounced decline in investment and 
issuance of net debt and precautionary cash was no longer used to counteract these trends.Finally, 
I test the validity of my instrument, precautionary cash, by comparing its explanatory power with 
that of the non-precautionary component of cash holdings, defined as the difference between 
observed and precautionary cash. Non-precautionary cash is held for other than precautionary 
reasons, most likely to support day-to-day operations or held in excess of an optimal cash level.33 
Surprisingly, I find that the non-precautionary component can also explain significant changes in 
cash savings and investment during the crisis. However, the explained effects are significantly 
smaller in the cash regression, and the magnitude of those effects is independent of financial 
constraints in the investment regression. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the financial crisis 
and possible financing channels through which the corporate sector was affected. Section 3 
discusses the related literature. Section 4 introduces the data and the basic empirical strategy. 
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
33
 Following Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), firms hold cash for other than precautionary reasons, namely, for 
transactional (supporting day-to-day operations), tax and agency (inefficient management) reasons. 
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2. The capital supply shock of the financial crisis 
In this section, I describe the timeline of the financial crisis and the dynamics of U.S. 
capital markets that might cause an exogenous capital supply shock to firms in the real sector. 
Understanding the dynamics of debt and equity markets helps determine whether and when the 
real sector was affected by shocks to the supplies of debt and equity. In doing so, I continue the 
existing literature and provide additional evidence of whether and when the original panic in the 
financial sector spilled over into debt markets or into capital markets in general. Upheavals that 
are limited to debt markets imply that risky borrowers in the corporate sector are most negatively 
affected by a debt supply shock. General upheavals in capital markets imply that risky firms are 
most negatively affected by a capital supply shock, in particular, by a shock to the availability of 
equity capital. 
 
 Was there a debt supply shock before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy? 2.1.
The onset of the credit and financial crisis is dated to August 2007, as financial 
institutions became concerned about their “toxic” asset holdings, which was mainly caused by 
write-downs of bad loans and plummeting values of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The 
continuing meltdown of these bank assets resulted in increased counterparty risk in the interbank 
market, which in turn led to an increased interest in risk management and stricter lending 
standards on the part of financial institutions (see Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2010)). 
Consequently, the TED spread, which is a popular indicator of the perceived counterparty risk in 
the interbank market, spiked in August/September 2007.34 Around the same time, uncertainty in 
the financial sector spilled over into credit markets, which led to increases in corporate bond 
                                                 
34
 The TED spread is defined as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. 
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spreads across the credit quality spectrum until they spiked after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
in September 2008 (see Figure 1). Based on this evidence, several authors argue that the phase 
before the Lehman’s bankruptcy represents a dramatic negative shock to the supply of credit 
(e.g., Duchin et al. (2010), Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) and Bliss et al. (2015)). 
There is, however, evidence that casts doubts on this view. Although credit spreads and 
yields were increasing before Lehman, their levels during the pre-Lehman period were not so 
high that they would suggest a credit crisis (see Figures 1 and 2). For example, yields and spreads 
were lower before the Lehman bankruptcy than they were in 2002, a year that is not typically 
associated with a credit crisis (see also Kahle and Stulz (2013)). The yields of corporate bonds 
did not change remarkably from August 2007 to August 2008 (Aaa: -0.09%, Baa: +0.24%). 
Furthermore, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that syndicated lending fell by 22% before 
Lehman, but most of the decline is attributed to corporate restructuring loans (for LBOs, M&As, 
and stock repurchases) rather than to real investment loans. They also show that commercial and 
industrial loans increased, mainly due to drawdowns by corporate borrowers on existing credit 
lines. The described conditions in credit markets cast serious doubt on whether a shock to the 
supply of debt capital really occurred before bankruptcy of Lehman. 
 
 The investors’ flight to quality and an equity supply shock 2.2.
There exists an alternative view and channel through which a capital supply shock may 
have predominantly affected the corporate sector during the financial crisis: investors’ discovery 
of the financial system’s fragility and realization that some investments that they had thought 
were safe (e.g., highly rated CDOs and bonds) had become risky and illiquid led to general panic 
and upheaval in capital markets (Gorton (2009), Gorton (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013)). The 
emerging and profound uncertainty about the environment led to a flight to quality among risk-
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averse investors. Investors fled from risky investments, such as equities or lower quality debt, to 
safer investments, such as US Treasuries. Consequently, for the corporate sector, equity capital 
became increasingly costly and unattractive relative to other sources of capital. 
Flight-to-quality episodes are typically characterized by the joint occurrence of higher 
economic uncertainty, lower equity prices and higher prices of safer investment (e.g., US 
Treasuries) (see, e.g., Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009)). Such episodes in the US in the 
twenty-first century included events that followed the attacks of 9/11, the bankruptcy of 
Worldcom, the later phases of the dot-com bubble, the financial crisis and the events of the 
European sovereign debt crisis (Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht and Wei (2013)). 
Figures 1 to 3 provide evidence that is consistent with the description above. During these 
flight-to-quality episodes, uncertainty among investors (measured by the S&P 500 volatility 
index VIX) was high, equity prices dropped and yields of US Treasuries decreased in absolute 
terms and relative to riskier corporate bonds. The most interesting period is the financial crisis. 
This flight-to-quality episode likely began in October/November 2007, which is when equity 
markets prices began to fall and volatility increased dramatically. By the time of Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy, the S&P 500 index had lost 20% of its value, and the VIX stayed 
well above the 20% level. In the same period, yields of safe US Treasuries decreased (-1.49%), 
and corporate bond spreads increased (Baa: +1.73%). These documented events intensified when 
Lehman declared bankruptcy in September 2008 and abruptly ended in March 2009. 
Together, these patterns suggest that before the Lehman bankruptcy, investors’ flight to 
quality led to a disproportionate increase in the cost of risky capital, especially of equity capital. 
The panic in capital markets following the Lehman collapse led to a more general increase in the 
cost of firms’ external capital. 
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 The demand shock of the economy-wide crisis 2.3.
As the financial crisis spilled over into the real economy in 2009, demand-side effects are 
assumed to dominate supply-side effects in corporate financing policies. Specifically, the 
economic crisis led to a shift away from consumption toward saving and led firms to reassess the 
value of their investment opportunities, which in turn led to lower corporate investment and 
lower demand for external financing (e.g., Duchin et al. (2010) and Bliss et al. (2015)). As a 
result, costly external financing should have become less restricting for non-financial firms. 
Overall, the documented dynamics in U.S. debt and equity markets give rise to doubts 
about whether a credit supply shock to the corporate sector took place before the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. Instead, they suggest that investors’ flight to quality led 
to increasing costs of raising equity capital and rationing in investment of firms with more 
abundant and risky projects. The ensuing panic in financial markets, mainly due to Lehman’s 
failure in September 2008, led to a serious shock to the availability of all forms of finance. The 
crisis and uncertainty in financial markets increasingly spilled over into the real economy, which 
led to lower consumption, corporate investment and demand for corporate financing. Table 1 
summarizes the shocks to the financial markets and the real economy, and when they were most 
likely to affect the corporate sector. This table will be referenced when describing the 
development of the financial policies in my sample (Section  5.1). 
 
3. Related literature 
This paper contributes to several strands of the extant literature. First, it most closely 
relates to papers studying the effects of the recent financial crisis on corporate financing, liquidity 
management, and investment in financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Consistent with 
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a first-order effect of a finance supply shock on corporate investment, Duchin et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that financially constrained firms had to decrease investment by a greater degree, 
and cash holdings played a more important role in sustaining investment in these firms. Similarly, 
Brown and Petersen (2014) show that cash holdings were primarily used by financially 
constrained firms to protect R&D instead of fixed investment (capital expenditures). Although 
these studies claim that the crisis period they analyze is particularly well suited to examining the 
impact of a credit supply shock, they do not explicitly compare the development of financing 
policies of constrained and unconstrained firms during the crisis. In addition, they use constraint 
measures (e.g., firm size, firm age, dividends, Withed-Wu index, KZ index) that are general in 
nature. Thus, their empirical approaches do not identify the critical capital supply channel 
causing capital rationing in non-financial firms. 
Studies that focus on proper identification of the critical capital supply channel provide 
mixed evidence on whether credit rationing had a systematic effect on corporate outcomes during 
the crisis. In support of a first-order effect of the credit supply shock on corporate policies, 
international survey evidence presented by Campello et al. (2010) indicates that credit-
constrained firms made deeper cuts in technology, employment and capital spending relative to 
unconstrained firms during the crisis (2007Q3-2008Q4).35 Moreover, Almeida, Campello, 
Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012) show that firms with a substantial fraction of long-term debt 
(more than 20%) maturing within the crisis period (i.e., 2008) reduced their investments 
compared with other firms. In these studies, the number of observations related to U.S. firms is 
limited, and the samples are skewed toward larger and “better quality” firms than the 
representative Compustat firm, which may explain why other studies find conflicting evidence. 
                                                 
35
 See Kahle and Stulz (2013) for a critical assessment of the survey approach to identifying a credit supply shock. 
They note that similar results could have emerged from a demand shock leading to a reduction in the net worth of 
a firm after which credit becomes too expensive from CFOs’ perspectives.  
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For instance, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find no evidence for a bank lending or credit supply shock 
as a first-order determinant of firm financing and investment policies during the crisis. They 
show that bank-dependent firms do not adapt financing and investment policies that differ from 
those of matching firms. Finally, based on their newly developed and more detailed financial 
constraint indices, Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) reveal that equity-constrained, but not debt-
constrained, firms experienced a significant decline in capital expenditures and R&D spending 
during the crisis. This paper contributes to these studies by showing that the crisis’ equity supply 
shock caused firms to use precautionary cash to sustain investment. 
Second, it adds to the literature on corporate cash holdings that points to the importance 
and origins of the precautionary motive. In general, the motive is grounded in Keynes’ (1936) 
initial contention that if a firm can always access external capital markets at no cost, then it has 
no reason to save cash internally. Recent studies (Bates et al. (2009), Lins, Servaes and Tufano 
(2010), Aebischer (2016)) demonstrate that over the last three decades, increasing concerns about 
accessing external capital markets have made the precautionary motive the primary consideration 
in firm decisions about how much cash to hold. McLean (2011) further demonstrates that due to 
the growing importance of the precautionary motive, firms increasingly save cash from share 
issuance during times of low issuance costs (during economic expansions) to avoid issuing shares 
when costs are high (during economic contractions). Additionally, Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015) and Aebischer (2016) find that corporate cash holdings are negatively related to debt 
constraints and positively related to equity constraints, indicating that firms hold more 
precautionary cash when they are concerned that equity financing will be insufficient in the 
future. Consistent with this evidence, this paper demonstrates that in the presence of a debt and 
equity capital supply shock, firms actually use their precautionary cash holdings to substitute for 
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a decrease in the issuance of equity.36 This patterns is consistent with evidence presented by 
Farre-Mensa (2015) that precautionary cash is held primarily by public firms to time their equity 
issues optimally. 
Finally, this paper is closely related to one of my previous papers that develops a 
precaution index to explain cash holdings (Aebischer (2016)). In cross-sectional cash-holding 
regressions, the index is by far the predominant variable in explaining corporate cash holding 
variation. In this paper, I use the index to determine firms’ precautionary cash at the onset of the 
financial crisis and find that it is a good predictor of firms’ use of cash in the presence of the 
capital supply shock of the financial crisis – the type of situation for which precautionary cash 
positions are built. 
 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
 Sample description 4.1.
My sample consists of quarterly data collected from the CRSP/CompustatMerge (CCM) 
Fundamentals Quarterly database for 2005–2011. This particular sample horizon is utilized to 
obtain a balanced timeframe around the crisis period. The utilization of quarterly data is well 
suited to the analysis of the financial crisis because, as discussed in Section  2 and as will be 
shown later, capital market conditions and financial policies exhibit dramatic changes from one 
quarter to the next. As also shown in Section 2, the real sector was likely affected by a dominant 
capital supply shock starting in November 2007 and lasting to March 2009. The five quarters 
covering the period from January 2008 to March 2009 (2008Q1-2009Q1) are therefore defined as 
                                                 
36
 This paper also adds to recent theoretical contributions based on the precautionary notion, such as Acharya, 
Almeida and Campello (2007), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Han and Qiu (2007), Denis (2011), and Almeida, 
Campello, Cunha and Weisbach (2014). It also provides an example-based rationalization for why the marginal 
value of cash holdings is greater for financially constrained firms, as found by Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
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the crisis period.37 They represent the early phase of the crisis, and according to the literature, 
they are well suited to analyzing the capital supply shock to the financing and investment policies 
of non-financial firms. In the later phase of the crisis, capital supply- and demand-side effects 
become difficult to disentangle. I define this as the later crisis period, extending from 2009Q to 
2010Q2. To divide the main sample into equal pre-crisis and crisis periods, the pre-crisis period 
is defined as extending from 2006Q3 to 2007Q3. The pre-crisis and crisis periods do not cover 
quarters equally, but additional checks reveal that the baseline results are not driven by 
seasonality. 
I eliminate financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949 and 6000-6999, 
respectively) because of their statutory capital requirements and other regulatory restrictions. For 
the relatively few firms that changed their fiscal year during the sample period, I preserve the 
most recent fiscal year convention. I delete observations with negative total assets (atq) and cash 
holdings (cheq), cash holdings greater than total assets, and firms that are not incorporated in the 
U.S. Following Duchin et al. (2010), I also exclude firms that experienced quarterly asset or sales 
growth greater than 100% at any point during the sample period, as these firms might have 
experienced mergers or major restructurings that might skew the results. 
I examine multiple financial policies, including cash savings, net equity issuance, net debt 
issuance, and investment. Cash savings is defined as the difference between cash at the end of the 
quarter and cash at the beginning of the quarter divided by assets at the beginning of the quarter 
(lagged assets). Net equity issuance is defined as aggregate equity issuance (sstky) minus 
aggregate equity repurchase (prstkcy) divided by lagged assets. Net debt issuance is calculated 
from balance sheet data and includes changes in current liabilities (dlcq) and long-term debt 
                                                 
37
 Because the crisis started in the middle of 2007Q4, I exclude this quarter from the analysis. The results are not 
sensitive to this choice. 
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during the quarter divided by lagged assets. Following Bliss et al. (2015), investment is defined 
as capital expenditures (capxy) plus R&D expenses (xrdq) divided by lagged assets. 
The main explanatory variable is precautionary cash holdings, measured at the end of the 
last fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006. Following Aebischer (2016), I estimate the cash 
level for each firm, which is attributed to its precautionary motives. Precautionary motives are 
measured based on a precaution index that is the first principal component of six established 
precautionary proxies discussed in the literature: cash flows, cash flow volatility, R&D intensity, 
market-to-book ratio (growth opportunities), net working capital, and product market fluidity 
(product market competition). The index thus aims to capture the precautionary component of 
these variables. 
To analyze whether costly debt or equity financing drove corporate cash and investment 
policies, I estimate the baseline regressions subsamples of firms facing different degrees of debt 
and equity constraints. To do so, I utilize the debt and equity constraint measures of Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015), which are based on text analysis of 10-K MD&A sections. Debt constraints 
are measured by their debt-focused constraint variable. Equity constraints are measured by their 
private-placement constraint variable because it approximates a firm’s constraints in private and 
public equity markets.38 As in the case of precautionary cash, equity and debt constraints are 
measured six quarters before the onset of the crisis. Empirically, the measures are distinctly and 
negatively correlated (-0.597), suggesting that firms with high debt constraints face low equity 
constraints, and vice versa. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main variables for the July 1, 2006 – March 
30, 2009 sample period. On average, no cash was burned during the sample period because cash 
savings before the crisis equated to cash burning during the crisis. The average quarterly levels of 
                                                 
38
 For a detailed description of the constraint measures and methodology, see Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
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the other financial policies are consistent with previous studies of the financial crisis (i.e., Duchin 
et al. (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013)): net equity issuance is 0.64%, net debt issuance is 
0.53%, and investment is 2.6% of total assets. Precautionary and observed cash (relative to 
assets) have a mean value of 19.5%, which correspond to the mean cash-to-asset ratios in other 
studies (e.g., Bates et al. (2009)). The other control variables are also comparable with those in 
other studies. 
 
 Empirical Strategy 4.2.
To determine whether the debt or equity supply shock caused firms to use precautionary 
cash to mitigate underinvestment during the financial crisis, the following diff.-in-diff. regression 
models are estimated: 
 
where “Financial policyit” depicts the set of financial policy variables (cash savings, net equity 
issuance, net debt issuance, and investment) for firm i at quarter t. I regress the firm-level 
quarterly variables over July 1, 2006–March 30, 2009 on an indicator variable for whether the 
quarter in question is after the onset of the crisis (“after”) and on the interaction between this 
indicator variable and firm precautionary cash measured once six quarters before the start of the 
crisis, controlling for market-to-book, cash flows, leverage, and firm fixed effects. The firm fixed 
effect captures the precautionary cash and time-invariant characteristics of individual firms (see 
also Duchin et al. (2010)). The approach tests whether firms with different pre-crisis 
precautionary cash adapted their financial policies differently in the presence of the exogenous 
capital supply shock. If equity rather than debt was the main restricting financing channel for 
it 1 2 it 3 it i 4 it
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Financial policy after after Precautionary cash Tobin 's Q
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= β + β × + β × × + β × +
β × + β × + + µ
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non-financial firms, the diff.-in-diff. estimator is negative for the cash and equity regression, zero 
for the debt regression, positive for the investment regression, and highest for the investment of 
firms with high equity constraints. 
The key identifying assumption behind the diff.-in-diff. strategy is that precautionary cash 
holdings are not correlated with unobserved within-firm changes in financing conditions or 
investment opportunities (e.g., demand shocks). This implies that in the absence of the treatment 
(i.e., the capital supply shock), the diff.-in-diff. estimators should be 0, an assumption that is 
often referred to as the parallel trend assumption (Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). Technically, the 
assumption requires similar trends in the financial variables during non-crisis periods for firms 
with different precautionary cash holdings. Economically, this means that firms with different 
precautionary cash should not experience different changes in financial policies in the absence of 
the capital supply shock. I will formally test this assumption by estimating the regression models 
during nonexistent (placebo) crises before the financial crisis and during the late financial crisis, 
when an economy-wide demand shock is likely to be at work. 
 
5. Results 
 Nonparametric results 5.1.
I begin the empirical analysis by showing the development of the main financing policies 
during the defined sample horizon for terciles based on their precautionary cash (motives) at the 
end of the last fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006.39 Figure 1 shows that firms saved cash 
during normal times, whereas they used cash during the crisis period from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1. 
Moreover, consistent with the precautionary notion, firms with higher pre-crisis precautionary 
                                                 
39
 Because precautionary cash is a linear prediction based on precautionary motives (index) both measures lead to the 
same grouping of firms and conclusions. In splitting the sample into terciles, I follow Duchin et al. (2010) and 
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
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cash used more cash during the crisis. For instance, firms with high precautionary cash reduced 
their cash holdings (as a percentage of assets) by 6.5 percentage points, measured cumulatively 
over the five crisis quarters (see Figure 2). This corresponds to a reduction in cash holdings of 
20% relative to their pre-crisis cash holdings (as a percentage of assets) of 32%. In contrast, firms 
with low precautionary cash did not use cash at all. Beginning in 2009Q2, firms started to hoard 
cash again, possibly to prepare for further shocks. 
I perform a more formal test to examine whether the use of cash during the crisis and the 
subsequent hoarding of cash can be explained by precautionary motives: The precautionary cash-
holding model is estimated cross-sectionally at different points in time. If cash is first used and 
then hoarded for precautionary reasons, the model’s explanatory power and the coefficient 
estimate associated to the precaution index should be low during the crisis period and higher 
before and after the crisis. The results in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction; the R2 
substantially decreases from 0.41 before the crisis (2006Q1) to 0.23, after which cash was used 
on an aggregated basis (2009Q1) and steadily rebounded to 0.34 after the crisis (2011Q1). The 
same applies to the coefficient estimates of the precaution index. These results indicate that 
because firms use precautionary cash during the financial crisis, observed cash holdings can be 
less explained by precautionary motives. 
To provide preliminary evidence of whether the equity or debt supply shock caused firms 
to use precautionary cash, the development of net equity and debt issuance are plotted. The 
issuance of equity declined in the wake of plummeting and volatile stock markets during the 
same five crisis quarters (see Figure 6). The lowest issuance levels can be observed two quarters 
after the Lehman bankruptcy (2008Q4-2009Q1) when uncertainty in capital markets peaked (see 
Figure 3). The group of firms with high precautionary cash (motives) was most affected because 
it showed the highest issuance levels before the crisis. After the crisis, the issuance levels 
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rebounded quickly. This development is consistent with the evidence presented by Dittmar and 
Dittmar (2008) and McLean (2011), according to whom phases of low uncertainty (economic 
expansions) are associated with low cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, which drives equity 
issues, especially by firms with high precautionary motives. 
Net debt issues seem to have followed a different logic. Although some forms of credit 
(i.e., syndicated loans) had already experienced initial declines in late 2007 and early 2008 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)), corporate net debt issuance started to fall post-Lehman and 
continued to decrease in 2009 when corporate bond yields peaked (see Figure 7).40 Additionally, 
in contrast with cash savings and net equity issuance, the development of net debt issuance 
during the sample period was identical for the different precautionary terciles. 
The fact that the use of cash and the decline in net debt issuance started at different times 
and that the latter decline was identical across the precautionary tertiles, raises doubts about 
whether a credit supply shock was a first-order determinant of firms’ use of precautionary cash. 
Finally, I note that financial policies exhibited different levels across the precautionary terticles 
before (and after) the crisis, but they did not follow different trends during these periods, which is 
consistent with the parallel trend assumption (see Section  5.4 for more formal tests). 
Next, Table 4 shows the pre-crisis and crisis levels of the main financing and investment 
policies and tests whether crisis-induced changes are significantly different from zero. Panels A-
C, showing the three financing policies, confirm the evidence presented in Figures 4-7. The 
declines in cash savings and net equity issuance were driven by firms with higher precautionary 
cash, whereas the decline in net debt issuance was not. 
Instead of an external equity supply shock causing firms to use precautionary cash, the 
following alternative scenario could have led to the same results: firms with high precautionary 
                                                 
40
 These trends fit the descriptions in Section 2.1, which are summarized in Table 1. 
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cash may be more affected by a negative demand shock (e.g., demand in their product markets). 
The ensuing lower investment opportunities lead to lower demand for external capital, and cash 
was used to substitute for a greater decline in operating cash flows. However, the results in 
Panels D-E are discordant with such a scenario because the group of high precautionary firms 
was the only one that did not experience a significant decline in operating cash flows and 
investment during the crisis. Instead, the results are consistent with firms using cash as a 
substitute source of equity to finance investment. 
In the following analyses, I investigate these relations in more detail using multivariate 
regressions. 
 
 Precautionary cash and crisis financing policies 5.2.
In Table 5, I use the baseline specification described in Section 3.2 to analyze the 
association between precautionary cash holdings and within-firm changes in financing policies 
around the financial crisis, controlling for simultaneous demand-side effects (i.e., cash flows and 
investment opportunities) and changes in leverage. Consistent with the precautionary motive of 
holding cash, columns 1 and 2 show that firms with more precautionary cash at the onset of the 
crisis used more cash during the financial crisis. The coefficient estimate of the “after” dummy 
variable in column 1 indicates a decline in average quarterly cash savings of 1.09 percentage 
points (as a share of assets) during the crisis.  
When the main variable of interest (i.e., the “after × precautionary cash” interaction term) 
is included, the coefficient estimate for “after” should be interpreted as the change in cash 
savings following the crisis in a firm with zero precautionary cash. Thus, a firm with zero 
precautionary cash before the crisis actually increased its quarterly cash savings by 0.79 
percentage points during the crisis (column 2). More importantly, the coefficient estimate of the 
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interaction term implies that a one-IQR increase in precautionary cash induced a decrease in 
quarterly cash savings of 1.14 (0.115×-9.647) percentage points. Overall, the results show that 
firms made use of precautionary cash during the financial crisis. 
The question of whether precautionary cash was used to substitute for an involuntary 
decrease in equity or debt issuance is considered next. The results in columns 3 and 4 provide 
evidence that firms used precautionary cash to substitute for the decrease in equity issuance 
during the crisis. Firms, on average, showed a significant decrease in net equity issuance during 
the crisis (column 3). Similar to the cash saving results, firms with zero precautionary cash 
actually increased net equity issuance, and increasing precautionary cash led to decreasing net 
equity issuance during the crisis (column 4). For instance, a one-IQR increase in precautionary 
cash is associated with a quarterly decrease in net equity issuance of 0.49 percentage points. In 
contrast to net equity issuance, firms decreased their net debt issuance by 0.76 percentage points, 
regardless of pre-crisis precautionary cash (see column 5 and 6).  
The documented decrease in net debt issuance mainly occurred in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 
because of post-Lehman turbulence in credit markets (see Figure 7 and the discussion in 
Section  2). Hence, firms might have used precautionary cash to offset the decline in net debt 
issuance during these two quarters. If changes in policies, relative to before the crisis, are 
analyzed only for these two crisis quarters, the results are identical to the baseline results for all 
five crisis quarters.41 These sub-period results affirm that the use of precautionary cash is 
associated to the decline in equity funding but not debt funding. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that the use of precautionary cash is associated with 
a decline in equity funding but not debt funding during the financial crisis. This finding is 
consistent with the evidence presented by McLean (2011) of a dominant association between 
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 Precautionary cash tends to be even more important in explaining changes in cash savings and net equity issuance 
during these two quarters given that coefficient estimates for the interactions are -11.86 and -4.70, respectively. 
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cash savings and share issuance, which is significantly stronger for firms with high precautionary 
motives. 
To provide additional evidence on whether insufficient debt or equity financing caused 
firms to use precautionary cash, model (1) and (2) in Table 5 are estimated separately for firms 
with different degrees of ex ante debt and equity constraints. Table 6 presents cash saving 
regressions for terciles of firms with different degrees of debt and equity constraints at the onset 
of the crisis. Columns 1 to 6 show that firms with low debt and high equity constraints 
experienced the greatest decreases in cash savings. The differences in the point estimates between 
firms with low and high financial constraints are statistically significant in two-tailed tests.42 
When precautionary cash is added to the regression model, the term absorbs the previously 
documented differences in cash saving changes between the different constraint groups after the 
crisis (“after”) (see columns 7 to 12). Instead of the “after” coefficient, most other coefficients of 
the interaction terms become statistically significant. One notable exception is the interaction 
term in column 10, indicating that firms with low equity constraints did not make significant use 
of precautionary cash. In contrast, highly equity-constrained firms significantly relied on 
precautionary cash. To illustrate the magnitudes, the coefficient estimate in column 12 implies 
that a one-IQR increase in precautionary cash holdings relative to assets (14.6%) led to a 
decrease in quarterly (cumulative) cash savings of 1.54% (7.7% = 1.54%×5) relative to assets in 
firms with high equity constraints during the crisis. The coefficient estimates of the interaction 
terms are also significantly different between firms with low and high constraints. Similar results 
are obtained when cash levels (relative to assets) is used as the dependent variable instead of cash 
savings following the specification in Bliss et al. (2015). 
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 For this and further subsample tests, I compute the significance of the difference by interacting every independent 
variable with the constraint group variable in the full (pooled) regression sample. 
 117 
A possible explanation for the high use of precautionary cash in the low debt-constrained 
subsample is that approximately 90% of these firms have medium and high equity constraints. 
Accordingly, the highly significant results in the less debt-constrained sample may be driven by 
firms with medium and high equity constraints. The negative coefficient is lower in magnitude 
but remains significant if firms with medium and high equity constraints are excluded. Thus, 
firms with lower constraints to external capital also made use of precautionary cash during the 
financial crisis, which is somehow inconsistent with the notion of precautionary cash holding.43 
Whether they used it for investment purposes will be tested, among other things, in the 
subsequent section in which corporate investment is analyzed. 
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that insufficient equity financing but 
not insufficient debt financing caused firms to use precautionary cash. These findings are 
consistent with the discussion in Section 2 that a shock to the supply of equity but not debt most 
likely affected the corporate sector before the Lehman bankruptcy. Furthermore, these results are 
consistent with evidence from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Aebischer (2016), who find 
that firms stating concerns about possible underinvestment due to insufficient equity financing in 
the future hold more precautionary cash today. 
 
 Precautionary cash and crisis investment 5.3.
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that precautionary cash is primarily used to 
substitute for declines in net equity issuance during the crisis. In other words, when equity 
constraints became binding in the wake of financial market turbulence, cash was utilized as a 
substituting financing source. Thus far, I have not examined whether firms actually used 
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 It should be noted that this remaining firm group is rather small, with 49 firms and 477 quarterly observations. 
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precautionary cash to mitigate possible underinvestment due to insufficient equity financing 
during the crisis. The subsequent analysis addresses this issue. 
Other studies provide some evidence on this issue. Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) show 
that primarily equity-constrained firms were forced to curtail investment in capital expenditures 
and R&D during the crisis, and Duchin et al. (2010) demonstrate that (financially constrained) 
firms used their cash reserves to mitigate declines in investment. Extending these studies, I test 
whether precautionary cash is used to mitigate underinvestment by equity-constrained firms. 
Table 7 shows the results from investment regressions following Duchin et al. (2010). The 
regressions are estimated for the full sample and for subsamples of firms with varying degrees of 
ex ante debt and equity constraints. Columns 1 and 2 present the results based on the full sample. 
Quarterly investment by the average firm decreased by 0.112 percentage points during the crisis, 
a decrease of 4.3% relative to an unconditional pre-crisis mean of 2.589% as a share of assets 
(see column 1). The estimates in column 2 imply that firms with no precautionary cash were 
forced to reduce investment during the crisis and that precautionary cash was used to counteract 
the reduction in investment. In economic terms, investment declined by 0.237% of assets for a 
firm with zero precautionary cash, and 15.5% (0.237/1.531) precautionary cash (as a share of 
assets) is needed to eliminate this decline. 
In columns 3-8, the investment model is estimated separately for firms with different 
degrees of debt and equity constraints. The results show that the previously presented full sample 
results are driven by firms facing equity constraints. For instance, the “after” coefficient in 
column 8 indicates that firms with high equity constraints and zero precautionary cash 
experienced a decline in investment by 0.361 percentage points, a decrease of 9.2% relative to the 
high pre-crisis quarterly mean investment of 4.005% of that tercile. Additionally, the coefficient 
associated with the interaction term implies that a one-IQR increase in precautionary cash (21.9% 
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of assets) mitigates the investment decline by 0.525 percentage points, which corresponds to 
143% of the investment decline of a firm with no precautionary cash. 
The coefficient estimates for the “after” indicator and the interaction term differ 
significantly across firms with low and high equity constraints. The results indicate that firms 
facing high equity constraints had to undertake relatively greater cuts in investment during the 
crisis and that precautionary cash was relatively more important for mitigating these cuts.  
Finally, the results for the low debt constraint group are driven by firms with medium and 
high equity constraints. If these firms are excluded from the subsample, the coefficient estimates 
become insignificant. Together with the results presented in Table 6, this suggests that these low 
constrained firms systematically used precautionary cash during the crisis but for other purposes 
than investment. Further financial policies (e.g., dividends) should be investigated to shed light 
on this issue, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
Together with the financing results in Section 4.2, the results in Table 7 provide evidence 
that equity rationing during the crisis caused firms to underinvest and to use precautionary cash to 
mitigate underinvestment. 
 
 Robustness tests 5.4.
In this section, I perform two tests to ensure that the baseline results are not driven by 
confounding effects. Specifically, I seek to show that precautionary cash is not related to 
financial policies during placebo (non-existent) crises or during the dominant demand shocks of 
the later crisis in 2009 and 2010. 
First, tests during placebo crises are used to examine whether the financial policies of 
firms with different levels of precautionary cash followed different trends before the financial 
crisis. If policies followed different trends, this could be an indication that precautionary cash 
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was correlated with unobserved within-firm changes in investment or financing opportunities. I 
test for placebo crises starting on January 1 of 2005 and 2006 because these periods are unlikely 
to be influenced by other economic crises, periods of flight to quality or recuperation (e.g., 
rebound from the dot-com crisis). 
Table 8 presents the results of the placebo crises analysis. For both crises, no significant 
coefficients for the interaction term are observed. This confirms the insights from Figures 4-7 that 
the main outcome variables do not follow different trends before the onset of the financial crisis 
among firms with varying pre-crisis precautionary cash. Insignificant results are also found for 
net debt issuance during these nonexistent crises (not shown). These results confirm that the 
parallel trends assumption is satisfied in my setting. 
Second, analyzing the later crisis from 2009Q2 to 2010Q2 reveals further interesting 
insights on the use of precautionary cash holdings. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the uncertainty 
in the financial markets extended to the real economy, which led to decreasing consumer demand 
and caused firms to reconsider the values of their investment opportunities. This, in turn, led to a 
decrease in firms’ demand for external financing, and supply-side frictions became less binding. 
In such a state, firms are expected to use less (no) precautionary cash to mitigate declines in 
investment. 
Table 9 displays the results of the analysis of the later crisis period, which differ 
significantly from those of the crisis analysis. During the later crisis, quarterly net equity issuance 
and cash savings rebounded to levels that exceeded their pre-crisis levels (see columns 1 and 2).44 
The insignificant interaction terms in these two specifications indicate that firms with more 
precautionary cash did not experience different changes from before the crisis to the later crisis. 
Nevertheless, because these firms experienced significantly greater decreases in these policies 
                                                 
44
 Similar trends are also documented by Kahle and Stulz (2013). The simultaneous increase in net equity issuance 
and cash savings suggests that firms again start hoarding cash from equity proceeds. 
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during the crisis, their rebound after the crisis was consequently significantly larger (Figures 4 to 
6 also illustrate this idea). Firms experienced further declines in investment and net debt issuance, 
which were however the same for firms with different precautionary cash holdings (see columns 
3 and 4). This indicates that precautionary cash was used neither to substitute for declines in net 
debt issuance nor to sustain investment. These results are consistent with a dominant demand 
shock during which firms generally reduce their investment and demand for external capital. 
Overall, the results in Tables 8 and 9 show that in the absence of a capital supply shock 
(treatment), precautionary cash was not used. These results confirm the key identifying 
assumption behind my diff.-in-diff. strategy that, in the absence of treatment, the observed diff.-
in-diff. estimator is 0. 
 
 Non-precautionary cash and crisis financial policies 5.5.
All of the previous analyses used the precautionary component of cash based on the 
precaution index of Aebischer (2016) to explain differences in financial policy reactions to the 
financial crisis. In this section, I validate this instrument by testing whether the non-precautionary 
component of a firm’s cash reserves is able to explain the financial policy adoptions. In doing so, 
non-precautionary cash is defined as the difference between observed cash and precautionary 
cash, again measured six quarters before the onset of the financial crisis. As previously 
mentioned, this component of cash should be held for non-precautionary reasons, such as to 
support day-to-day operations, or held in excess of an optimal cash level. 
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 10. Non-precautionary cash has a 
significant effect on the crisis-induced reduction in cash savings (see column 1). However, the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction terms imply that changes in cash savings during the crisis 
are roughly four times more sensitive to precautionary cash than to non-precautionary cash. 
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Column 2 shows that only precautionary cash can explain significant changes in net equity 
issuance, which is consistent with the precautionary notion. In the investment regression, non-
precautionary cash is significant, and the coefficient estimate ascribes a similar role to this cash 
component in sustaining investment during the crisis as that ascribed to precautionary cash (see 
column 3). An important difference between the two components, however, emerges when 
investment regressions are estimated separately for firms with different degrees of equity 
constraints (see columns 4 to 6). While the importance of precautionary cash to sustain 
investment is significantly increasing in equity constraints, this is not the case for non-
precautionary cash. 
Overall, the results in Table 10 suggest that precautionary cash, as defined by Aebischer 
(2016), is a good instrument to explain firm cash savings, net equity issuance, and investment 
during the capital supply shock of the financial crisis. The residual, non-precautionary cash 
component also explains some, but generally less, variation in these policies. The results reveal 
that firms also used non-precautionary cash to fund some investment; however, this was observed 
mostly independent of financial constraints. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The present study uses the capital supply shock of the recent financial crisis to examine 
the use of precautionary cash holdings among U.S. industrial firms. If precautionary cash is really 
held to protect the firm and its investment against adverse economic changes, precautionary cash 
is expected to be used in reaction to the capital supply shock of the financial crisis. The 
specificity and exogenous nature of the crisis’ capital supply shock enables me to employ a 
difference-in-differences research design aimed at identifying whether insufficient debt or equity 
financing predominantly caused firms to use precautionary cash to mitigate underinvestment. 
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I utilize a novel instrument, precautionary cash defined as in Aebischer (2016), and find 
that firms with high precautionary cash at the onset of the crisis used more cash and experienced 
a greater decline in net equity issuance but no greater decline in net debt issuance during the 
crisis. Furthermore, I find that equity constraints rather than debt constraints caused firms to use 
precautionary cash. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that equity rationing was the 
predominant driver of firms’ use of precautionary cash during the financial crisis. In addition, in 
line with this hypothesis, I demonstrate that equity-constrained firms showed the greatest decline 
in investment and made relatively more use of precautionary cash to sustain investment. 
In a series of additional tests, concerns that the baseline results may be due to 
confounding effects are alleviated. Namely, the financial policies of firms with different 
precautionary cash holdings followed parallel trends during placebo (nonexistent) crises and 
during the later economy-wide crisis in 2009-2010 when capital demand effects were likely to 
dominate capital supply effects. I also demonstrate that the precautionary component of cash does 
a significantly better job at explaining changes in financing and investment policies during the 
financial crisis than the non-precautionary component of cash does. 
These findings raise several questions for future research. First, although the financial 
crisis is an event during which simultaneous credit and equity rationing were likely to be relevant 
for non-financial firms (especially from 2008Q4 to 2009Q1), evidence is found that only equity 
rationing caused U.S. industrial firms to use precautionary cash to mitigate underinvestment. This 
raises the question of whether credit rationing played an economically subordinate role among 
these corporate policies only during this specific event or whether this is true in general. Studying 
other capital supply shocks and flight-to-quality periods would shed light on this question. 
Second, the current results demonstrate that equity-constrained firms used precautionary cash as a 
tool to hedge the risk of an unexpected capital supply shock. It would be interesting to investigate 
 124 
whether firms use additional tools, such as credit lines or derivatives, to hedge such risk. The first 
evidence on this issue is provided by Lins et al. (2010) and Campello et al. (2011). Third, there is 
evidence that precautionary cash is an important funding source for investment in the presence of 
a capital supply shock. However, precautionary cash is not only held to sustain investment but 
also to protect the firm from default (Keynes (1936)). Thus, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether precautionary cash systematically helped firms survive the financial crisis. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition (Compustat item name) 
Panel A: Financial policy variables 
Cash savings (Cash and short-term investments (cheq) at t – cash and short-term investments 
(cheq) at t-1) / total assets (atq) at t-1. 
Net debt issuance (Long-term debt (dlttq) at t + short-term debt (dlcq) at t – long-term debt (dlttq) at t-
1 – short-term debt (dlcq) at t-1)/total assets (atq). 
Net equity issuance Sale of common and preferred stock (sstky)/total assets (atq). Because sale of 
common and preferred stock (sstky) is reported on a year-to-date basis in quarterly 
financial statements, we subtract the previous quarter’s sstky from the current 
quarter’s sstky for fiscal quarters 2, 3, and 4. 
Investment (CAPEX(capxy) + R&D(xrdq))/total assets (atq). Because CAPEX is reported on a 
year-to-date basis in quarterly financial statements, we subtract the previous 
quarter’s CAPEX from the current quarter’s CAPEX. 
  
Panel B: Precautionary and constraint variables 
Observed cash Cash and short-term investment (cheq)/total assets (atq). 
Precaution index First principal component from principal component analysis (PCA) of operating 
cash flow, industry sigma, R&D intensity, market-to-book ratio, net working capital 
(without cash), and product market fluidity (see Aebischer (2016) and Hoberg, 
Phillips and Prabhala (2014)). 
Precautionary cash Predicted cash values derived from the following cross-sectional regression from 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009): 
 Cashit = β0 + β1×Precaution indexit + ηt + εit, 
where Cashit denotes cash of firm i at quarter t, and ηt are quarter fixed effects. 
Debt constraint Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to debt 
financing constraints, following Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
Equity constraint Text-based constraint measure indicating potential underinvestment due to equity 
financing constraints, following Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
  
Panel C: Firm characteristics and crisis indicators 
Operating CF Operating income before depreciation (oibdq)/total assets (atq). 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets (total assets (atq) + market value of common equity 
(cshoq×prccq) – common equity (ceqq))/(0.9×book value of assets(atq) + 
0.1×market value of assets). The definition follows Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Book leverage (Short-term debt (dlcq) + long-term debt (dlttq))/total assets (atq). 
Assets Book value of total assets. 
After Indicator variable equals one if the observation’s calendar time is between January 
1, 2008 and March 31, 2009 and zero otherwise. 
Late after Indicator variable equals one if the observation’s calendar time is between July 1, 
2008 and June 30, 2009 and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1: US Treasury Yields and Baa Corporate Bond Yield Spreads 
 
Figure 2: US Treasury and Corporate Bond Yields (10 years) 
 
Figure 3: S&P 500 index and S&P volatility index 
Comments on Figures 1-3: The data series are based on monthly averages, and the period from January 2000 to December 2014 is 
covered. Treasuries and corporate bonds have a time to maturity of 10 years. The Baa bond spread is calculated as the yield of 
Moody's Baa bonds with respect to the 10-year Treasury rate. Gray areas depict flight-to-quality episodes consistent with Baele et 
al. (2013). The data are obtained from the Federal Reserve (https://research.stlouisfed.org/) and the Compustat/CRSP database. 
Equity 
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bottom 
Financial 
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Lehman 
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Figure 4: Quarterly cash saving for precaution subgroups 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative cash saving (five quarters) for precaution subgroups 
 
Figure 6: Quarterly issuance of equity for precaution subgroups 
 
Figure 7: Quarterly net debt issuance for precaution subgroups 
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Table 1: Timeline of the financial crisis: Shocks to financial and real markets 
This table outlines when shocks in the financial and real markets were most likely to affect the U.S. 
corporate sector during the financial crisis, following the discussion in Section 2. "Crisis I" and 
"Crisis II" refer to the crisis periods defined in this study; the distinction between these sub-periods is 
relevant for the investigation associated with financing policies in Table 5. 
Shock to corporate 
Before 
2006Q3-
2007Q3 
Crisis I 
2008Q1-
2008Q3 
Crisis II 
2008Q4-
2009Q1 
Later crisis 
2009Q2-
2010Q2 
equity market no likely likely no 
debt market no less likely likely likely 
product market (demand) no less likely less likely likely 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main sample of firm-quarter 
observations from July 1, 2006 to March 30, 2009. Precautionary cash holdings are 
predicted values from the following cross-sectional cash holding regression 
following Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009):  
Cashit = β0 + β1 × Precaution indexit + ηt + εit, 
where Cashit denotes the observed cash of firm i at quarter t, and ηt are quarter fixed 
effects. Cash is defined as cash and short-term investments as a percentage of assets. 
The precaution index is the first principal component of the following firm 
characteristics: operating CF, industry CF volatility, R&D intensity, market-to-book 
ratio, net working capital (without cash), and product market fluidity (see Aebischer 
(2016) for a more detailed description of the index construction). Precautionary and 
observed cash holdings are measured at the end of the latest fiscal quarter ending 
before July 1, 2006. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. "(%)" indicates 
that a variable is expressed as a percentage of assets. 
  
Mean  St. dev. Observations 
Cash savings (%) -0.052 5.946 22,284  
Net equity issuance (%) 0.635 3.506 20,335  
Net debt issuance (%) 0.528 4.788 21,443  
Investment (%) 2.598 2.703 22,292  
    
Precautionary cash 0.195 0.113 1,934  
Observed cash 0.195 0.214 2,322  
    
Operating CF (%) 2.705 4.272 22,292  
Tobin's Q 1.688 0.798 22,292  
Book leverage (%) 20.513 20.402 22,292  
Assets ($ millions) 3,889  9,249  22,292  
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Table 3: The precautionary cash-holding model over time 
The table presents the explanatory power of the precautionary 
cash-holding model over time. The precautionary cash-holding 
model, following Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), is estimated 
separately for the first quarter of each fiscal year and takes the 
following form: 
Cashi = β0 + β1 × Precaution indexi + εi. 
Cashi is defined as cash and short-term investments as a 
percentage of the assets of firm i. The precaution index is the 
first principal component of the following firm characteristics: 
operating CF, industry CF volatility, R&D intensity, market-to-
book ratio, net working capital (without cash), and product 
market fluidity (see Aebischer (2016) for a more detailed 
description of the index construction). 
Quarter Coeff. St. Error R2 
2004Q1 11.141*** (0.352) 0.405 
2005Q1 10.499*** (0.310) 0.375 
2006Q1 10.869*** (0.302) 0.410 
2007Q1 10.472*** (0.321) 0.365 
2008Q1 10.509*** (0.322) 0.360 
2009Q1 6.247*** (0.373) 0.229 
2010Q1 8.290*** (0.360) 0.266 
2011Q1 9.043*** (0.316) 0.343 
2012Q1 8.948*** (0.316) 0.350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132 
 
 
Table 4: Precautionary cash and financial policies during the financial crisis 
This table presents quarterly financial policies as a percentage of assets before and after the onset of the financial 
crisis for subgroups of firms based on their precautionary cash holdings at the latest fiscal quarter ending before 
July 1, 2006. Before covers fiscal quarters with an end date between July 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007 
(2006Q3-2007Q3). After covers fiscal quarters with an end date between January 1, 2008 and March 30, 2009 
(2008Q1-2009Q1). Change is the mean change of the financial variables from before to after the onset of the 
financial crisis. The financial policy variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance in two-sided difference-in-means tests with confidence levels of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. 
Precautionary cash group Before After Change (sign.) Change/Before 
Panel A: Cash savings         
Low 0.310 0.046 -0.264* -85.0% 
Medium 0.240 -0.179 -0.420*** -174.6% 
High 0.576 -1.149 -1.725*** -299.3% 
Panel B: Net equity issuance       
 
Low 0.398 0.122 -0.276*** -69.4% 
Medium 0.580 0.251 -0.329*** -56.7% 
High 1.620 0.721 -0.899*** -55.5% 
Panel C: Net debt issuance       
 
Low 0.626 0.183 -0.443*** -70.8% 
Medium 0.744 0.479 -0.265* -35.7% 
High 0.824 0.340 -0.483*** -58.7% 
Panel D: Operating CF       
 
Low 4.008 3.095 -0.913*** -22.8% 
Medium 4.076 3.351 -0.724*** -17.8% 
High 1.368 1.105 -0.263 -19.2% 
Panel E: Investment       
 
Low 1.960 1.842 -0.119* -6.1% 
Medium 2.352 2.140 -0.212*** -9.0% 
High 4.005 4.054 0.049 1.2% 
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Table 5: Precautionary cash and financing policies during the financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly financing policies for quarters with an end 
date between July 1, 2006 and March 30, 2009. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is quarterly cash savings as a 
percentage of assets. The dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is quarterly net equity issuance as a percentage of 
assets. The dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is quarterly net debt issuance as a percentage of assets. After is an 
indicator variable equal to one for fiscal quarters with an end date between January 1, 2008 and March 30, 2009 and zero for 
fiscal quarters with an end date between July 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007. Precautionary cash is measured at the end of 
the last fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006. All other variables are defined in previous tables and in the Appendix. All 
regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable Cash savings 
 
Net equity issuance 
 
Net debt issuance 
  
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
After -1.089*** 0.797*** 
 
-0.141** 0.627*** 
 
-0.875*** -0.700*** 
 
(0.118) (0.222) 
 
(0.061) (0.131) 
 
(0.095) (0.170) 
After × Precautionary cash 
 
-9.935*** 
 
 
-4.128*** 
 
 
-0.924 
  
(1.303) 
 
 
(0.805) 
 
 
(0.799) 
Operating CF 0.267*** 0.297*** 
 
-0.050*** -0.039** 
 
0.063*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Tobin's Q -0.796*** -1.009*** 
 
0.227** 0.139 
 
-0.056 -0.075 
 
(0.214) (0.210) 
 
(0.108) (0.109) 
 
(0.121) (0.123) 
Book leverage 0.022** 0.026*** 
 
-0.018*** -0.017*** 
 
0.198*** 0.198*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.638 0.879* 
 
-0.046 0.069 
 
-3.210*** -3.189*** 
 
(0.466) (0.453) 
 
(0.244) (0.244) 
 
(0.363) (0.366) 
Firm FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 20,992 20,992 
 
19,100 19,100 
 
20,403 20,403 
R2 0.118 0.126 
 
0.251 0.256 
 
0.179 0.179 
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Table 6: Financial constraints, precautionary cash, and cash savings around the financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly cash savings for quarters with an end date 
between July 1, 2006 and March 30, 2009. The regressions are estimated separately for subsamples of firms formed on the 
basis of their financial constraint status (according to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)) at the latest fiscal quarter ending 
before July 1, 2006. The dependent variable in all regressions is quarterly cash savings as a percentage of assets. All 
regressions include the same control variables as in Table 4 and firm fixed effects. All other variables are defined in previous 
tables and in the Appendix. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. p-values are 
reported at the bottom for the stated null hypotheses for the estimated coefficients A (After) and AxP (After x Precautionary 
cash) using subsamples of firms with low and high financial constraints. 
  Debt constraints   Equity constraints 
 
low medium high 
 
low medium high 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
After -1.861*** -0.842*** -0.367** -0.531*** -0.626*** -2.027*** 
  (0.307) (0.173) (0.164) 
  
(0.147) (0.188) (0.315) 
Observations 5,310 5,302 5,213 5,320 5,296 5,209 
R2 0.111 0.094 0.084 0.085 0.112 0.104 
After H0: low=high 0.000 0.000 
  
   
  
   
  (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
After 0.872 0.364 0.406 -0.129 1.024*** 0.437 
 
(0.551) (0.359) (0.272) (0.319) (0.370) (0.497) 
After × Precautionary cash -11.420*** -6.853*** -5.373*** -2.709 -9.169*** -10.572*** 
  
(2.571) (2.229) (1.740) 
  
(2.130) (2.351) (2.332) 
Observations 5,310 5,302 5,213 5,320 5,296 5,209 
R2 0.120 0.097 0.086 0.086 0.118 0.113 
After H0: low=high 0.424 
 
0.312 
After×Prec. H0: low=high 0.040   0.009 
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Table 7: Financial constraints, precautionary cash, and investment around the financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly investment activities for quarters with an end date between July 1, 
2006 and March 30, 2009. The regressions are estimated separately for subsamples of firms formed on the basis of their financial constraint status 
(following Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)) at the latest fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006. The dependent variable in all regressions is quarterly 
investment (CAPEX + R&D) as a percentage of assets. All other variables are defined in previous tables and in the Appendix. All regressions include 
firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, or * indicates that the 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported at the bottom for stated null hypotheses on the 
estimated coefficients A (After) and AxP (After x Precautionary cash) for subsamples of firms with low and high financial constraints. 
Full sample 
 
Debt constraints 
 
Equity constraints 
Subsamples 
    
 
Low Medium High 
 
Low Medium High 
  (1) (2) 
  
(3) (4) (5) 
  
(6) (7) (8) 
After -0.119* -0.237*** 
 
-0.431*** -0.009 -0.107 
 
-0.023 -0.255* -0.368*** 
 
(0.062) (0.077) 
 
(0.153) (0.137) (0.105) 
 
(0.086) (0.151) (0.118) 
After × Precautionary cash 
 
1.531*** 
 
2.712*** 0.318 0.273 
 
-0.024 1.559* 2.396*** 
 
 
(0.439) 
 
(0.556) (0.644) (0.725) 
 
(0.658) (0.895) (0.721) 
Operating CF 
 
-0.056** -0.074** -0.026*** -0.007 -0.021* -0.029* -0.056 
 
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.044) 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.477*** 
 
0.555*** 0.394*** 0.382*** 
 
0.330*** 0.359*** 0.610*** 
  
  
(0.134)   (0.186) (0.130) (0.092)   (0.106) (0.108) (0.209) 
Firm FE yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Observations 20,994 20,994 
 
5,310 5,302 5,215 
 
5,322 5,296 5,209 
R2 0.772 0.776 
 
0.786 0.720 0.718 
 
0.724 0.664 0.797 
A H0: low=high 
   
0.092 
 
0.021 
A×P H0: low=high       0.010   0.011 
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Table 8: Precautionary cash and financial policies during placebo crises 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly financial policies for two years 
around placebo crises. The placebo crises occur on January 1, 2005 and 2006. After is an indicator variable equal to 
one for fiscal quarters with an end date after the placebo crisis, and precautionary is measured at the end of the last 
fiscal quarter ending one year before the placebo crisis. All variables are defined in previous tables and in the 
Appendix. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity 
consistent and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable Cash savings 
 
Net equity issuance 
 
Investment 
Placebo crises  2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
After 0.178 -0.055 
 
-0.048 -0.221 
 
-0.040 0.004 
(0.407) (0.381) 
 
(0.234) (0.222) 
 
(0.090) (0.086) 
After × Precautionary cash -1.453 -0.982 
 
-1.123 -0.365 
 
0.520 0.497 
  (2.172) (2.088) 
 
(1.276) (1.239) 
 
(0.463) (0.473) 
Further controls yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 9,334 9,271 
 
8,202 8,253 
 
9,334 9,271 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.021 
 
0.189 0.200 
 
0.782 0.809 
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Table 9: Precautionary cash and financial policies during and after the financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly financial policies for quarters with 
an end date between July 1, 2006 and June 30, 2010. After is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal quarters with 
an end date between January 1, 2008 and March 30, 2009. Late after is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal 
quarters with an end date between April 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. All other variables are defined in previous tables. 
All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity consistent and 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
level, respectively. 
Dependent variable Cash savings   Net equity issuance   
Net debt 
issuance   Investment 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
After -0.948*** 
 
-0.108* 
 
-0.684*** 
 
-0.187** 
(0.116) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.082) 
After × Precautionary cash -9.519*** 
 
-3.983*** 
 
-0.604 
 
1.566*** 
 
(1.316) 
 
(0.616) 
 
(0.751) 
 
(0.468) 
Late after 0.275** 
 
0.504*** 
 
-1.230*** 
 
-0.375*** 
(0.110) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.087) 
Late after × Precautionary cash -0.263 
 
1.129 
 
-0.401 
 
0.049 
 
(1.358) 
 
(0.898) 
 
(0.977) 
 
(0.494) 
constant 0.384 
 
-0.397 
 
-2.293*** 
 
1.649*** 
  (0.413) 
  
(0.346) 
  
(0.350) 
  
(0.094) 
Further controls yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Firm FE yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Observations 28,070 
 
25,631 
 
27,183 
 
30,137 
Adjusted R2 0.027 
  
0.155 
  
0.055 
  
0.756 
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Table 10: Precautionary and non-precautionary cash and financial policies around the financial crisis 
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level quarterly financial policies with precautionary and non-
precautionary cash holdings for quarters with an end date between July 1, 2006 and March 30, 2009. Non-precautionary cash is the 
difference between observed cash and precautionary cash as a percentage of total assets, measured at the end of the last fiscal quarter 
ending before July 1, 2006. In columns 4 to 6, the regressions are estimated separately for subsamples of firms formed on the basis of their 
equity financial constraint status (following Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)) at the latest fiscal quarter ending before July 1, 2006. All 
other variables are defined in previous tables and in the Appendix. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
  
Cash 
savings   
Net equity 
issuance   Investment 
 
Full sample 
 
Full sample 
 
Full sample 
 
Low Medium High 
  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
After 0.697*** 
 
0.644*** 
 
-0.182** 
 
-0.023 -0.207* -0.348** 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.106) (0.118) (0.171) 
After × Precautionary cash -9.297*** 
 
-4.165*** 
 
1.343*** 
 
0.195 1.395** 2.099*** 
 
(1.345) 
 
(0.841) 
 
(0.467) 
 
(0.754) (0.652) (0.788) 
After × Non-precautionary cash -2.612*** 
 
-0.360 
 
1.123*** 
 
0.777* 1.163*** 1.355*** 
 
(0.609) 
 
(0.350) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.426) (0.353) (0.369) 
Firm FE yes   yes   yes   yes yes yes 
Observations 18,945 
 
17,265 
 
20,994 
 
5,322 5,296 5,209 
Adjusted R 0.107   0.244   0.803   0.753 0.700 0.820 
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